Latest 12 Cases This Week: Williams v. Mari Properties, LLC (Ala.), Capra v. Capra (Cal. Ct. App.), Trenk v. Soheili (Cal. Ct. App.)

The Twenty-Sixth Amendment and the Real Rigging of Georgia’s Election

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar explains why Georgia’s law allowing persons 75 years and older to get absentee ballots for all elections in an election cycle with a single request, while requiring younger voters to request absentee ballots separately for each election, is a clear violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Dean Amar acknowledges that timing may prevent this age discrimination from being redressed in 2020, but he calls upon legislatures and courts to understand the meaning of this amendment and prevent such invidious disparate treatment of voters in future years.

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COVID Comes to Federal Death Row—It Is Time to Stop the Madness

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—explains the enhanced risk of COVID-19 infection in the federal death row in Terre Haute, not only among inmates but among those necessary to carry out executions. Professor Sarat calls upon the Trump administration and other officials to focus on saving, rather than taking, lives inside and outside prison.

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Williams v. Mari Properties, LLC

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: 1190555

Opinion Date: December 18, 2020

Judge: Stewart

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Trusts & Estates

Eleanor Williams appealed a probate court order denying her request for redemption of certain real property. In 2003, the State purchased property located in Birmingham ("the property") at a tax sale after the then owners, Benjamin and Marzella Rosser, failed to pay ad valorem taxes. The State sold the property in 2016 for $1,000 to Waynew Global Holdings, LLC ("WGH"). In February 2017, WGH sold the property to Mari Properties, LLC ("Mari"), for $5,000, and Mari recorded the deed to the property. Williams claimed that she inherited the property from the Rossers in or around March 2003. In September 2017, Williams petitioned for redemption of the property under section 40-10-120, Ala. Code 1975, with which she tendered $1,100. The probate court granted Williams petition, thereby ordering Mari to compute and submit the amount of those items and stated that, upon receipt of those figures, the probate court would enter an amendment to the order and direct payment by Williams. The probate court did not vest title of the property in Williams. Mari, however, moved to vacate the probate's order, arguing the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the redemption petition because, it argued, Williams was required under 40-10-120 to redeem the property through statutory redemption within three years of the May 13, 2003, tax sale. Mari contended in the motion that the only redemption process available to Williams was judicial redemption under section 40-10-83, Ala. Code 1975, and that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over that process. Despite Mari's filing of the notice of appeal to the circuit court, the parties continued filing documents in the probate court. By March 6, 2020, the probate court reversed course, vacating its earlier judgment in favor of Williams for redemption under 40-10-120, and holding that Williams should have filed her redemption petition with the circuit court. The Alabama Supreme Court determined that once Mari appealed to the circuit court, the probate court's jurisdiction was divested, making all orders filed after Mari's circuit court suit void.

Capra v. Capra

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C084032(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 22, 2020

Judge: Harry E. Hull, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law

Heirs contested rights to a family cabin and a federal use permit authorizing the cabin on federal land. Plaintiffs alleged the defendant was wrongfully claiming sole ownership of the cabin and permit, and was threatening to sell the property. Three actions taken by the trial court were the subject of this appeal: (1) the court sustained defendant’s demurrer without prejudice and dismissed the action solely based on lack of jurisdiction; (2) it denied plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify defendant’s attorney; and (3) it denied plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief filed while this appeal was pending. Plaintiffs contended the trial court erred in each instance. In his cross-appeal, defendant contended the trial court erred by not dismissing the action with prejudice. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held: (1) the trial court had jurisdiction to try this matter; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify counsel; and (3) plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief pending this appeal was now moot. An application for injunctive relief and defendant’s arguments for dismissing with prejudice could be considered by the trial court on remand.

Trenk v. Soheili

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B295434(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 21, 2020

Judge: Elwood G.H. Lui

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Trusts & Estates

Maryam Soheili and Morteza Sohyly (appellants) appeal from a judgment quieting title to a house owned by respondents Joseph and Dinah Trenk. After Sohyly filed suit against Joseph Trenk for malpractice, the parties settled and Joseph agreed to pay $100,000 and executed a promissory note and a trust deed on the property to secure the obligation. Sohyly’s sister, Maryam Soheili, was designated as the beneficiary of the trust deed. After Joseph stopped regular payments on the note after 2003, Sohyly began nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings in 2018. The Trenks then filed this action to clear title to their house, alleging that the trust deed was no longer enforceable. The trial court quieted title in the property in favor of the Trenks, ruling that both the statute of limitations and the Marketable Record Title Act barred enforcement of the trust deed. The Court of Appeal held that a power of sale in a trust deed is enforceable even if the statute of limitations has run on the underlying obligation. In this case, because the trust deed did not state the last date for payment under the promissory note, under Civil Code section 882.020, subdivision (a)(2), appellants would have 60 years to exercise the power of sale in the trust deed. However, the court held that the power of sale is not enforceable for another reason. The court explained that the property presumptively is community property, appellants did not rebut that presumption at trial, and because Dinah did not execute the trust deed, she has the power to void it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Ching v. Dung

Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii

Docket: SCWC-16-0000845

Opinion Date: December 21, 2020

Judge: Michael D. Wilson

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) in this appeal, holding that the ICA erred when it vacated the jury's civil conspiracy verdict, when it vacated an order of the circuit court on judicial admissions and judicial estoppel, and when it vacated the jury's verdict on Plaintiff's nuisance, invasion of privacy, and malicious prosecution claims. In this dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants over an easement located on Defendants' property that escalated into numerous incidents of alleged wrongful conduct by both parties, both parties appealed a $616,000 jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The ICA vacated the circuit court's judgment, vacated the entire jury award, and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the circuit court made numerous errors. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury's award, holding (1) the ICA erred in vacating the circuit court's determination that Defendants judicially admitted to the existence of the easement and that its scope included vehicular ingress and egress; and (2) the ICA erred in several other respects.

Harts v. County of Knox

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 308 Neb. 1

Opinion Date: December 18, 2020

Judge: Michael G. Heavican

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court reversing and vacating the decision of the County of Knox board of supervisors approving a conditional use permit for an expansion of H&H Cattle's feedlot to 20,000 head of cattle, holding that there was no merit to Defendants' appeal. In 2003, H&H Cattle, the predecessor in interest of Epic Land and Cattle, LLC, obtained an impact easement from the mother of Plaintiffs. Thereafter, the County's board of supervisors approved a conditional use permit for an expansion of H&H Cattle's feedlot to 7,500 head of cattle. Fourteen years later, H&H Cattle again sought expansion of its feedlot. Relying in part on the 2003 impact easement, the board of supervisors granted the conditional use permit. The district court reversed and vacated the decision approving the permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in finding Plaintiff was unable to execute an easement that bound the shares of her children; (2) Defendants' arguments regarding estoppel by deed and ratification were without merit; and (3) any reliance on the easement was not reasonable.

Town of Irondequoit v. County of Monroe

Court: New York Court of Appeals

Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 07689

Opinion Date: December 22, 2020

Judge: DiFiore

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Court of Appeals concluded that the Town of Irondequoit and the Town of Brighton were entitled to relief on their claims challenging the determination of Monroe County that it would not credit unpaid property maintenance and demolition charges, holding that the County was required to credit the maintenance and demolition charges. The Towns adopted local town code provisions authorizing the imposition of property maintenance and demolition requirements on real property owners providing for reimbursement of any maintenance and demolition costs incurred by the towns. The County later issued a memorandum stating that it would no longer guarantee the maintenance and demolition charges. The Towns then initiated this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking to annul the County's determination. Supreme Court granted relief to the towns, concluding that the charges were unpaid taxes that the County was required to credit. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division and, as so modified, affirmed, holding that the charges at issue must be credited pursuant N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law 936.

Ashe County v. Ashe County Planning Board

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Docket: 249PA19

Opinion Date: December 18, 2020

Judge: Ervin

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

In this dispute between petitioner Ashe County Board of Commissioners and respondents Ashe County Planning Board and Appalachian Materials, LLC arising from Appalachian Materials' application for a permit pursuant to the County's Polluting Industries Development Ordinance authorizing Appalachian Materials to operate a portable asphalt production facility on property located in Ashe County, the Supreme Court held that the case should be remanded due to errors by the court of appeals. After the Planning Board ordered that a permit be issued to Appalachian Materials Ashe County sought judicial review. The trial court ordered the County to issue the requested permit within ten business days. The court of appeals affirmed the challenged trial court order. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the County's failure to appeal a letter written by the Planning Director gave that letter partially binding effect. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding that the court of appeals erred by holding that Ashe County lost its right to challenge the issuance of the contested permit because it failed to seek review of opinions that the Planning Director expressed in the letter.

Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Ohio Valley Coal Co.

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6787

Opinion Date: December 22, 2020

Judge: DeWine

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this dispute between a coal mining company and the owner of a natural gas pipeline over whether the pipeline owner may recover for damage caused to the pipeline as a result of mining the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court in favor of the mining company, holding that surface damage liability waivers in the relevant property deeds were valid and enforceable. The mining company held its interest in the coal underneath the lands through property deeds that severed the surface estate from the mineral interest. The deeds included provisions waiving liability for damage to the land's surface caused by mining activities. The trial court entered judgment for the mining company. On appeal, the pipeline owner asserted that the surface damage liability waivers were rendered invalid by an administrative agency's regulation requiring mining operators to pay for damage to surface structures from mining activities. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the administrative agency lacked authority to enact a regulation requiring mining operators to pay damages irrespective of common law property rights to the extent those rights have not been limited by federal law; and (2) the surface damage liability waivers at issue remained valid and enforceable.

Gerrity v. Chervenak

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6705

Opinion Date: December 17, 2020

Judge: Judith L. French

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's decision granting summary judgment for John Chervenak, trustee of the Chervenak Family Trust, and declaring the trust the owner of the disputed mineral rights in this case, holding that the Chervenaks satisfied the notice requirements of the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act. Timothy Gerrity filed this action to quiet title and for a declaratory judgment, claiming that he was the rightful owner of severed mineral rights under the Chervenak property. At issue was whether the Chervenaks satisfied the notice requirements that the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act, Ohio Rev. Code 5301.56(E)(1), imposes as prerequisites to deeming a severed mineral interest abandoned and vested in the owner of the land subject to the mineral interest. The lower courts rendered judgment for Chervenak. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) application of the Dormant Mineral Act is not limited to circumstances in which every holder of a severed mineral interest has been identified; and (2) a surface owner must use reasonable diligence to identify and locate holders of a severed mineral interest, but what constitutes reasonable diligence will vary based on the facts of each case.

Endeavor Energy Resources, LP v. Energen Resources Corp.

Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Docket: 18-1187

Opinion Date: December 18, 2020

Judge: Blacklock

Areas of Law: Contracts, Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this dispute over the meaning of an oil and gas lease covering an 11,300-acre tract in Howard County, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Energen Resources Corp. and John Quinn, holding that the contested provision of the lease in this case was ambiguous. The lease at issue allowed Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. to retain its leasehold interest in the parcel only by drilling a new well every 150 days, with the exception that Endeavor could "accumulate unused days in any 150-day term...in order to extend the next allowed 150-day term between the completion of one well and the drilling of a subsequent well." At issue on appeal was how to calculate the number of "unused days." Energen and Quinn argued that the contested provision unambiguously allowed unused days earned in any term to be carried forward only once to the next 150-day term. The trial court agreed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the disputed provision was ambiguous.

Palmyra Associates, LLC v. Commissioner of Highways

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 191680

Opinion Date: December 17, 2020

Judge: McCullough

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this appeal brought by the landowner in a condemnation proceeding the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in all respects, holding that the circuit court did not err. After a trial, the circuit court entered a final order confirming the award entered by the Commissioner of Highways of $107,131 for the take and setting aside the award for damages to the residue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit ten-year-old site plans into evidence; and (2) did not err in deciding to strike the testimony of the owner of the property concerning damage to the residue of the property. As to Appellant's remaining assignment of error, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of invited error foreclosed relief on the claim that the trial court "put the parties on terms."

Fuger v. Wagoner

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 WY 154

Opinion Date: December 18, 2020

Judge: Kate M. Fox

Areas of Law: Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law

In this property dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding largely in favor of Larry Wagoner, holding that the oral contract between the parties in this case was void. Donald Fuger and Wagoner entered into an oral agreement to construct two buildings on a portion of the Fugers' property. When the buildings were completed Wagoner occupied one and rented the other for several years. Fuger and wife later sued Wagoner and his wife seeking to evict them from the property. Wagoner, in turn, sued the Fugers, alleging contract and equitable theories for ownership of one building and the underlying property. The district court held that an enforceable oral contract existed between Fuger and Wagoner and awarded Wagoner $302,234 plus post-judgment interest. The court did not reach Wagoner's equitable claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding that a valid oral contract between Wagoner and Fuger existed. The Court remanded for consideration of Wagoner's equitable claims.