| Andrus v. Texas |
| Court: US Supreme Court Docket: 18-9674 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Andrus was six years old, his mother sold drugs out of their apartment. She turned to prostitution and regularly left her five children to binge on drugs. She often was high and had drug-addicted, sometimes violent, boyfriends. When Andrus was 16, he served as a lookout while others committed a robbery. During 18 months in juvenile detention, he was exposed to gangs, drugs, and extended solitary confinement, resulting in suicidal urges. In 2008, Andrus, then 20, attempted a carjacking while under the influence of PCP-laced marijuana. Andrus fired multiple shots, killing two people. At his capital murder trial, Andrus’ defense counsel declined to present an opening statement or evidence. In his closing argument, counsel conceded Andrus’ guilt. The jury found Andrus guilty of capital murder. During the punishment phase, the prosecution presented evidence of Andrus' aggressive behavior in juvenile detention; that Andrus had gang tattoos; that Andrus had hit, kicked, and thrown excrement at prison officials while awaiting trial; and that Andrus was involved in an aggravated robbery. Counsel raised no material objections. In mitigation, counsel focused on Andrus’ basic biographical information, without revealing the circumstances of Andrus’ childhood; the only expert witness focused on the general effects of drug use on adolescent brains. A prison counselor testified that Andrus “started having remorse.” Andrus testified about his childhood. The jury sentenced Andrus to death. In Andrus’ state habeas proceeding, Andrus’ life history came to light. Andrus’ counsel offered no reason for failing to investigate Andrus’ history. The trial court recommended a new sentencing proceeding. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated. Andrus demonstrated counsel’s deficient performance under Strickland, but the Court of Criminal Appeals may have failed properly to engage with the question of whether Andrus established that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him. |
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| United States v. Almonte-Nunez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 15-2070 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Dyk Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence for robbing an individual of a United States passport, brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error. Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's request for substitution of counsel; (2) Defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 2112 for robbery properly served as the predicate "crime of violence" for Defendant's sentence for brandishing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A); and (3) under a plain error standard, Defendant did not establish a prima facie nonfrivolous double jeopardy claim. |
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| United States v. Ilarraza |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1395 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Selya Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence for conspiring to deal in firearms without a license and dealing in firearms without a license on a theory of aiding and abetting, holding that Defendant's challenges to his sentence were unavailing. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court committed several errors that inflated the calculation of his guideline sentencing range. The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) the district court did not err in finding that Defendant was a "prohibited person" at the time of the offense; (2) the district court did not clearly err in finding that the offenses of conviction involved at least eight firearms; (3) the district court did not err in applying the exportation enhancement, the enhancement for engaging in firearms trafficking, and the role-in-the-offense enhancement; and (4) Defendant waived his claim that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history score. |
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| United States v. Lewis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1916 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence of 108 months' imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute cocaine after the district court applied a career-offender enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, holding that the district court properly applied the career-offender enhancement. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the career-offender enhancement applies where a defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of a "controlled substance offense." See U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a). The commentary to section 4B1.2 provides that such offenses include conspiracies and other inchoate crimes. The district court overruled Defendant's objection to the career-offender designation, concluding that Defendant's age, conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and predicate offenses of two prior state drug-trafficking offenses triggered the career-offender enhancement. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because this Court has previously held the commentary to section 4B1.2 authoritative in defining a "controlled substance offense," there was no clear or obvious error in Defendant's sentence. |
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| United States v. Moore-Bush |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Dockets: 19-1582, 19-1626, 19-1625, 19-1583 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants' motions to suppress all evidence obtained directly by a pole camera, holding that the doctrine of stare decisis controlled this case and required reversal of the district court. At issue was whether the Supreme Court's opinion in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), a cell phone location automatic tracking technology case, provided a basis for departing from otherwise binding First Circuit precedent in United States v. Bucci, 582 F.3d 108 (1st Cir. 2009) and Supreme Court precedent on which Bucci was based. The First Circuit held that, by departing from that precedent in granting Defendants' motions to suppress, the district court violated the vertical rule of stare decisis. The Court thus remanded with instruction to deny the motions to suppress. |
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| McCray v. Lee |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-1144 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Amalya Lyle Kearse Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Plaintiff pro se, a New York State prisoner, appealed the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against correctional facility officials for failure to clear snow and ice from outdoor exercise yards for an entire winter, thereby allegedly violating plaintiff's rights under the Eighth Amendment by denying him physical exercise for four months, and causing him to be injured in a slip-and-fall accident. The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the Eighth Amendment claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because the complaint states cognizable Eighth Amendment claims for damages with regard to the denial of physical exercise. The court noted that the district court properly dismissed as moot plaintiff's requests for injunctive or declaratory relief against officials at Green Haven. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims. The court upheld the district court's dismissal of the slip and fall claims where the complaint did not make any claims of exceptional circumstances that would elevate the Green Haven yard conditions beyond the typical level of danger presented by a slippery sidewalk or a wet floor. Finally, the contention that defendants failed to comply with a consent decree is not pleaded in the complaint and was not raised in the district court. Therefore, the court declined to address this argument. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. |
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| United States v. Bellille |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-3544 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Thomas L. Ambro Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics |
| Golubitsky, as a Virgin Islands Criminal Justice Act (CJA) panelist, was appointed counsel for Bellille, an indigent defendant in a multi-defendant RICO prosecution. Golubitsky unsuccessfully moved to withdraw, arguing that he was no longer a CJA panelist, having moved to an in-house counsel role, and was contractually barred from the representation. Weeks later, Golubitsky purportedly started an of-counsel relationship at the DiRuzzo law firm and filed an emergency motion to withdraw as Bellille’s counsel, arguing that DiRuzzo represented Ayala, who was likely to testify against Bellille, which created a conflict of interest. Golubitsky and DiRuzzo explained that Golubitsky was “on [the firm’s] system,” could bill using the firm’s software, and was added to DiRuzzo’s malpractice insurance. Golubitsky worked full-time as in-house counsel while working part-time for DiRuzzo’s Florida firm, litigating four matters together. They had no involvement in the other’s work related to Bellille’s case nor had they shared any information about the case. The court denied Golubitsky’s motion and ordered DiRuzzo and Golubitsky to wall off the latter’s representation of Bellille from DiRuzzo’s representation of Ayala. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, noting many “factual gaps,” surrounding the relationship between DiRuzzo and Golubitsky and why the relationship was established. The situation cannot be both ways. Either the of-counsel relationship was not genuine and there was no basis for imposing a screen or there was a true of-counsel relationship and a screen alone could not cure the conflict. |
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| United States v. Doe |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-6152 Opinion Date: June 17, 2020 Judge: James Andrew Wynn, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In explaining defendant's original sentence, the district court's order denying defendant's 18 U.S.C. 3582 motion referred to the government's motion under USSG 5K1.1 based on defendant's substantial assistance. The Fourth Circuit circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to seal the order referring to defendant's assistance, because it was necessary to protect defendant from harm. In this case, defendant's request implicates the public's interest in accessing judicial records, the government's interest in protecting cooperating defendants in federal custody, and defendant's interest in his own safety. Furthermore, the district court ignored facts showing that defendant faces a heightened risk of harm in prison and failed to consider the increased risks that all government cooperators now face due to the advent of electronic filing and the use of the internet to identify cooperators. |
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| United States v. Macias Lozano |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4082 Opinion Date: June 17, 2020 Judge: Albert Diaz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| On appeal, defendant contends that the delay of over six years between the date of his federal charge and the date of his guilty plea violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Defendant also contends that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit held that defendant's speedy trial argument is foreclosed by his guilty plea and, in any event, failed on the merits. In this case, defendant did not know of the pending federal charge until he was arrested and thus he did not experience oppressive pretrial incarceration or anxiety during the delay. Nor does defendant assert that the delay impaired his ability to prepare a defense. Furthermore, defendant failed to show prejudice. The court also held that defendant's sentence is procedurally reasonable where the district court acted within its discretion when it heard defendant's arguments and varied downward, albeit not as far as defendant would have liked. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. |
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| United States v. Smith |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4321 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: James Harvie Wilkinson, III Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, along with simple possession of a smaller quantity. The court agreed with defendant that the district court erred in permitting the government to deviate from the order of closing arguments prescribed in Rule 29.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court explained that the district court's decision to allow the government to waive its initial closing argument—yet retain the opportunity to rebut defendant's—violates the letter and spirit of that rule, inasmuch as it impairs a defendant's ability to rebut the government's arguments in the prescribed manner. However, the court held that this error did not prejudice defendant in light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the verdict. Furthermore, the court found no error with respect to defendant's remaining claims. |
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| Smith v. Nagy |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-1751 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: R[ansey] Guy Cole, Jr. Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Detroit police discovered Ralston dead in her home, with multiple stab wounds, plus “defensive-type” cuts and bruises. Ralston was clutching long brown hair, which was never matched to any person. Blood was found throughout Ralston’s house. Days later, police arrested Smith. There was no physical evidence linking Smith to Ralston’s death. Smith’s acquaintances (Dennis and Evans) testified that Smith had confessed to killing a woman “at a safe house” that he had intended to rob. Ralston’s son confirmed that Smith was at the house the night before Ralston's death. Smith was convicted of first-degree felony murder and assault with intent to commit armed robbery. A juror reported that he and others had changed their votes based on a belief that Smith would receive a relatively light sentence for felony murder. The court declined to grant an evidentiary hearing and imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Michigan courts upheld the convictions. Smith returned to state court to (unsuccessfully) seek relief from judgment with an affidavit from Evans’s brother, attesting that he spoke with Evans and Dennis on the day that Smith allegedly confessed, that they said Smith had only said that the police wanted to speak with him, and they thought that they might receive a reward for providing information. The federal district court construed Smith’s habeas claim to be an actual innocence claim and denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the state court should have granted a post-trial evidentiary hearing to determine whether the jury improperly relied on prejudicial information; there was insufficient evidence for conviction; and the courts erred in refusing to consider new evidence of Smith’s innocence. |
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| United States v. West |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-6106 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Ronald Lee Gilman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In February 2018, a confidential informant purchased 14.18 grams of methamphetamine from West for $300 in a Walmart restroom. Two months later, the same confidential informant met West inside a Meijer restroom and paid West $900 for 116.112 grams of simulated methamphetamine. Leaving Meijer, West entered the rear passenger side of a vehicle in which the driver’s seat was occupied by Johnson. Johnson’s girlfriend sat in the front passenger seat. Officers stopped and searched the vehicle, discovering a semi-automatic pistol under the front passenger seat. West was charged with knowingly and intentionally distributing methamphetamine in February 2018, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and for being a felon in possession of a firearm in April 2018, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). West pleaded guilty to the drug charge; the government dismissed the felon-in-possession charge. The district court determined that West’s base offense level should be increased by two levels under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1) because a firearm was possessed in relation to West’s drug-related offense, resulting in a Guidelines range of 37-46 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed West’s 40-month sentence. The court rejected arguments that the district court abused its discretion in determining that he possessed the gun found in the vehicle and that the transaction was not “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(2). The district court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. |
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| Wright v. City of Euclid |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3452 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Bush Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Plain-clothes Euclid officers approached Wright’s parked SUV with weapons drawn. Thinking he was being robbed, Wright, an African-American, tried to back up. Officers flashed their badges. Wright stopped the SUV. Officers opened the driver’s door. Wright had no weapon. The officers simultaneously deployed a taser and pepper-sprayed him at point-blank range, while Wright remained seated. Wright had trouble getting out because of a colostomy bag stapled to his abdomen. He was recovering from an operation. The encounter caused bleeding. The officers arrested Wright “arising from a drug investigation,” although they found no drugs on him. Wright was detained for more than nine hours and subjected to an intrusive body scan after the officers knew of Wright’s medical condition. No drug-related charges were ever brought against him. The Sixth Circuit reinstated Wright's civil rights case. Even if the officers had no knowledge of Wright’s medical condition, other facts, construed in Wright’s favor, could support a reasonable juror’s finding that Wright did not actively resist. An officer may not tase a citizen not under arrest merely for failure to follow orders when the officer has no reasonable fear for his safety. With respect to the Monell claim, the evidence includes the Chris Rock video, played during the city's use-of-force training, in which the comedian talks about police misconduct. There was an offensive cartoon in Euclid’s police-training manual, showing an officer in riot gear beating a prone, unarmed civilian with a club, with the caption “protecting and serving the poop out of you.” Wright has sufficient evidence of municipal policy. |
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| Reid v. Balota |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1396 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Illinois inmate Reid sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a corrections officer used excessive force against him. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that Reid had not exhausted administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated. The prison’s communications were so obscure that they made further steps of its administrative process unknowable and, thus, unavailable to Reid. Reid had filed both a “standard grievance” and an emergency grievance, followed by an appeal to the Review Board, which was returned to him. Reid filed a second emergency grievance, which was again denied; the Board returned Reid’s subsequent appeal. The prison’s responses indicated that there was no conceivable next step for Reid. The grievance officer’s memorandum gave him conflicting messages. The Board told him that his appeal was missing specific documents but did not check the box specifying that those documents needed to be provided or that some explanation needed to be given for their absence. When the warden and the Board rejected the second grievance, neither mentioned a pending standard grievance or an ongoing Internal Affairs investigation. As far as Reid could tell, his standard grievance had been either lost in the shuffle or resolved against him. |
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| Shaffer v. Lashbrook |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1372 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: KANNE Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Shaffer sued corrections officials, alleging that an officer attacked him and that others refused to treat his injuries. The court directed Shaffer to notify the court and the defendants if he were released, stating that it would not independently investigate his whereabouts and that failure to notify the court of any address changes could result in a dismissal. Shaffer conducted discovery and flooded the court with filings until he was released on parole 13 months later. The defendants, having had mail returned as undeliverable, moved for an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. The case languished for five months. On the deadline for the close of discovery, a defendant filed another motion. A month passed without any response, so the court dismissed Shaffer's case under FRCP 41(b) for failure to prosecute. Shaffer’s parole was revoked. Shaffer filed a notice of his new address, with requests for appointment of counsel and a status hearing 47 days after the entry of judgment. Shaffer asserted that his notices to opposing counsel and the court about his release must have gotten lost in the mail and that prison officials had not forwarded his mail. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Shaffer’s motion. Shaffer’s allegation that he tried to notify the court was self-serving and not credible; it was not plausible that the postal service lost multiple, separate mailings. Shaffer had not established that his failure to update the parties stemmed from mistake or excusable neglect. |
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| United States v. Freeman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 19-3153, 19-2928 Opinion Date: June 17, 2020 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jackson was driving with Freeman as a passenger, Chicago Police Officer Petrus, on patrol with other officers, observed an object hanging from Jackson’s rearview mirror that appeared to be an air freshener. Petrus ran Jackson's license plate through a database, then pulled Jackson over for violating a city ordinance regarding the obstruction of the driver’s clear view. During the traffic stop, the officers discovered a loaded rifle beside the front passenger’s seat and two loaded handguns underneath the driver’s seat. The men were charged as felons in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At a suppression hearing, Petrus testified that she believed the law to be that a driver “cannot have anything obstructing the driver’s view” and that the air freshener obstructed the driver’s view. She explained that her “verbiage was off” when she first spoke to Jackson and said that “can’t have anything hanging from there [the rearview mirror]” and that she was “trying to gain control of the situation.” The court concluded that “this type of air freshener is enough justification to pull the car over,” finding Petrus “very credible.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. All that is required for a traffic stop is reasonable suspicion; the officer had an articulable and objective basis for suspecting that the air freshener obstructed Jackson’s clear view in violation of the city municipal code, so the stop was lawful. |
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| United States v. Lyons |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 19-2101, 19‐2090 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| DHS’s Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) notified Agent Harrington about an airplane that would be landing at the Litchfield Municipal Airport. Harrington concluded that the plane might be smuggling drugs, and called Lieutenant Jarman for a drug‐detection dog. Lyons landed the Cessna at around 12:05 a.m. Eymann and Lyons loaded its cargo into the airport’s courtesy car and left the airport. Officers followed that car and blocked it in. Eymann admitted that he had a small amount of marijuana in the car. The drug‐dog (Arie) arrived and alerted on luggage, which the officers searched, finding a small amount of marijuana. Harrington frisked Lyons, who had $2,600 in his pocket. Officers arrested the men and returned to the airport. Arie alerted at the Cessna and on bags from inside the plane. Officers found 65 pounds of marijuana and a firearm. The court suppressed the evidence because, although Arie had completed the necessary training, his certification had lapsed weeks earlier. The state dismissed the charges. The two were then charged with federal conspiracy to distribute marijuana and aiding and abetting the possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute,. Lyons was also charged with carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress. The AMOC information established reasonable suspicion. Because the officers used little show‐of‐force, kept their questioning reasonable, and acted consistently with investigatory detention, a reasonable person would not have understood that his freedom was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest before the handcuffing. Eymann's admission gave the officers probable cause to search the car. Once the marijuana was found, there was probable cause to arrest Eymann. The inevitable‐discovery doctrine then applied. |
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| United States v. Schaul |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1632 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Schaul's business, ChildRite, provided incontinence supplies for special-needs individuals. In 2009-2013, Schaul submitted claims for Medicaid reimbursement for four million units; approximately one million of those units did not exist. He obtained $582,844.10 from Medicaid for those nonexistent items. Charged with health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, Schaul entered into a plea agreement that described a scheme to defraud Medicaid, substantially identical to that described in the indictment. It stated that Schaul’s counsel had “fully explained” the indictment and the charges and that Schaul fully understood the nature and elements of the crimes. The agreement erroneously stated that the government needed to prove that the defendant “knowingly or willfully" executed the scheme.” The statute requires proof that the defendant acted “knowingly and willfully.” At his hearing, Schaul agreed with the government’s factual allegations and stated that he had discussed the charges with counsel; that he understood the charge; that he had no questions; and that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation. When the prosecutor explained the elements of the offense, he read from the plea agreement, which incorrectly stated the mens rea element. The court imposed a 24-month sentence plus $582,844.10 in restitution. After his attorney moved to withdraw, Schaul filed an unsuccessful motion to delay the date of his reporting to the Bureau of Prisons. Schaul filed a motion to reconsider, stating, for the first time, that he could “prove … there was no intent to commit fraud.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The misrepresentation of the elements of the offense constituted plain error but did not affect Schaul’s substantial rights. The record affirmatively demonstrates that he knowingly and willfully violated the law. |
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| United States v. Shanks |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3628 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| While on supervised release for a drug crime, Shanks was charged in a drug-distribution conspiracy that led to overdoses that resulted in a death and serious bodily injury. At an arraignment, defense counsel reported that Shanks pled not guilty and understood the charges. When the government filed a superseding indictment, Shanks refused to enter a plea; challenged the court’s jurisdiction, denied understanding the charges, and refused to talk with counsel. Shanks did not appear in court again. The judge issued an order for Shanks to appear at trial. Shanks refused to accept service. The judge, counsel, and a court reporter began the trial outside Shanks’s jail cell. Shanks denied understanding whatever was said or refused to answer, despite repeated explanations. The judge found that by “disruptive conduct” Shanks had waived his right to attend. To avoid harm to Shanks or others, the judge did not use force but told Shanks that, if he changed his mind, the marshals would transport him. Outside of the jury’s presence, the judge regularly asked whether Shanks had changed his mind. The judge instructed the jury not to draw any inference from Shanks’s absence. Shanks was sentenced to multiple life terms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court did not comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43, which (he claimed) requires a defendant’s presence in a courtroom at the start of the trial and that the court clearly erred in finding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to attend. |
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| United States v. Washington |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1331 Opinion Date: June 17, 2020 Judge: Diane S. Sykes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Chicago Police Officers testified that Washington, standing with his back to them, turned his head as their unmarked squad approached and walked away. He removed a shiny, polished chrome handgun from his waistband and tossed it over a fence into a yard. The officers questioned Washington and recovered the handgun. Washington was charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The government moved to introduce a YouTube video posted three months before the arrest, depicting Washington and another displaying a chrome handgun, arguing that the gun in the video was the same gun that was recovered from the yard. The court rejected a Rule 404(b) objection and permitted the government to introduce still photos from the video. At trial, an ATF Agent, who examined the gun recovered from the yard, described its features and told the jury that the gun recovered by police and the pistol in the still photos from the video had many similarities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Washington's conviction. Evidence of recent past possession of the same gun is admissible for a non-propensity purpose—to show the defendant’s ownership and control of the charged firearm—although evidence of past possession of a different gun would raise Rule 404(b) concerns. The judge minimized its potential for unfair prejudice by limiting the government to still photos. |
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| Haney v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3582 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of movant's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 based on the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Movant was sentenced after he pleaded guilty to receipt and distribution of a visual depiction involving the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. The court held that movant's sentencing argument under USSG 2G2.2(b)(1) had no merit, and counsel was not ineffective in declining to advance it. The court held that, in view of the risks involved in pursuing the alternative course, and the limited potential reward, there is ample reason to conclude that counsel's decision to withdraw the objection to the two-level distribution enhancement pursuant to 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) was objectively reasonable. Finally, because the reasonableness of counsel's performance is an objective question, it was permissible for the district court to resolve the motion without testimony from counsel about his subjective reasoning on this point. |
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| United States v. Cramer |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1465 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: James B. Loken Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography. The court held that ample evidence showed that defendant knowingly distributed child pornography and the distribution enhancement was properly applied; defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court did not err in weighing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors; and the six special conditions of supervised release were reasonably related to defendant's offense, history, characteristics, and were needed to protect the public from a dangerous child sexual predator. |
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| United States v. Howard |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2498 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Beam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a sentencing reduction to defendant under the First Step Act. Unlike the factual scenario in U.S. v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769, 771 (8th Cir. 2019), the district court here addressed its discretion under the Act particularly, conducting the appropriate second step contemplated by the Act. Therefore, the court found that although the district court erred regarding defendant's eligibility under step one, remanding on the basis of that error would be an exercise in futility. In this case, the district court was the original sentencing court and thus was uniquely positioned to consider the many factors necessary in exercising its ultimate discretion. Furthermore, the court explained that the district court's plain statement regarding its decision not to exercise its discretion under the Act closes the matter. |
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| United States v. Myles |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1619 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for making a false material declaration before a jury. The court held that the district court properly excluded evidence of defendant's duress defense where she failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that she faced a present, imminent, and impending threat. She also failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that she had no reasonable, legal alternative to giving false testimony. The court also held that the district court did not err in applying a cross-reference under USSG 2X3.1, which resulted in a 20 base level offense for the underlying offense. Furthermore, the district court did not err by applying the four-level specific offense characteristic for the criminal offender's possessing the gun in connection with another felony offense. |
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| Rose v. Guyer |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-35630 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: N. R. Smith Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| An order denying a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70(a) motion to enforce a conditional writ of habeas corpus pertains to the district court's adjudication of the habeas petition, and 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(A) therefore requires a habeas petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) in order to appeal the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit denied petitioner a COA and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his appeal from the district court's order denying his motion under Rule 70(a) to enforce the district court's conditional writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner was convicted, after a jury trial, of aggravated kidnapping, assault with a weapon, and assault on a peace officer, and sentenced to 100 years in prison with 20 years suspended. In this case, petitioner failed to make the requisite showing that reasonable jurists would debate whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that the State complied with the conditional writ and thus in denying petitioner's Rule 70(a) motion. Consequently, petitioner failed to make a substantial showing under section 2253(c)(2) to permit the issuance of a COA. |
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| Staten v. Davis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 17-99008 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Susan Graber Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's conviction and capital sentence for murdering his parents. Petitioner alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his lawyer failed to present additional evidence of third-party culpability. Petitioner also alleged that a contract for indigent defense services between Los Angeles County and the Pomona Contract Lawyers Association (PCLA) violated his constitutional rights because it interfered with his ability to obtain second trial counsel. The panel held that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to present testimony that gang members appeared to claim credit for the murders, but that counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to find and call a gang expert to counter the testimony of the prosecution's gang expert. In this case, fairminded jurists could disagree as to whether the testimony of five witnesses regarding the gang members' boasting was reasonably likely to have changed the outcome of petitioner's trial. Therefore, there were reasonable grounds for the California Supreme Court to conclude that the omitted testimony would not have altered the outcome. The panel also held that the California Supreme Court's summary denial on the merits of the PCLA contract claims (claims 1, 2, 3, and 11) was not unreasonable, because there is no evidence in the record that trial counsel was appointed to represent petitioner under the contract, was a member of the PCLA at the time the initial contract was signed, or was a signatory to the original contract. |
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| United States v. Jaycox |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-10077 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Restani Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). The panel held that defendant's prior conviction under California Penal Code section 261.5(c) is not a categorical match to the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor. The panel explained that because the minimum conduct required for a conviction includes consensual sexual intercourse between an individual a day shy of eighteen and an individual who is 21 years of age, section 261.5(c) is not a categorical match to the general federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor. Although the "relating to" language in section 2252(b)(1) has a broadening effect and will allow certain flexibility at the margins, the panel cannot say that the minimum conduct criminalized under section 261.5(c) relates to abusive sexual conduct involving a minor. Finally, because the district court determined defendant's sentence in view of the incorrect statutory and Guidelines ranges, the district court's weighing of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors was potentially affected and must be redone. Accordingly, the panel remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Kelley |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-30066 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Sandra S. Ikuta Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Step Act of 2018 does not permit a plenary resentencing proceeding in which a defendant's career offender status can be reconsidered. The Act permits the court to sentence "as if" parts of the Act had been in place at the time the offense occurred, not "as if" every subsequent judicial opinion had been rendered or every subsequent statute had been enacted. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly exercised its discretion when it acknowledged that the Act did not authorize it to conduct a plenary resentencing and instead recalculated defendant's Guidelines range to be 188-235. The panel held that the district court correctly applied the applicable laws existing when defendant's covered offense was committed, "as if" the Act was also in existence. The district court then proceeded to the second step of the resentencing and exercised its discretion to impose a reduced term of imprisonment of 180 months. The panel found no error in the district court's approach. |
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| United States v. Shehadeh |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-10399 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Ryan D. Nelson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea filed after he was sentenced to a mandatory 30 year prison term and before the district court entered an amended judgment ordering restitution. Defendant filed his notice of appeal the day after the district court entered the amended judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that defendant's appeal was timely because it was filed within fourteen days of entry of the amended judgment. The panel explained that, because the district court had delayed a final sentence by deferring restitution, it had jurisdiction to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea until the final restitution order if he presented a "fair and just reason" to do so. The panel affirmed the district court's refusal to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea because it was knowing and voluntary. Finally, the panel held that defendant's remaining claims are waived and did not consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim for the first time on appeal. |
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| United States v. Hamett |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-5054 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Mary Beck Briscoe Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-appellant Randy Hamett was convicted of kidnapping, possession of a stolen firearm, and possession of firearms while subject to a domestic violence protective order. Hamett was represented by counsel throughout much of his jury trial. Near the end of the government’s case-in-chief, however, Hamett requested a sealed ex parte hearing, where he discussed with the court, with his counsel present, the possibility of representing himself. At this hearing, despite stating that he “ha[d] two great attorneys,” but Hamett asked the district court if he could “talk to another attorney . . . that might be able to answer just some legal questions.” The court declined this request, giving Hammett two options: to continue with his appointed counsel, or to proceed pro se. Hamett stated that he did not want to represent himself, and the trial resumed. At the conclusion of the government’s case-in-chief, Hamett requested another sealed ex parte hearing with his attorneys and the court. At this hearing, Hamett asked the court various questions regarding post-conviction relief and his right to appeal. He then told the court that he would like to take over his own representation in order to recall various witnesses to demonstrate “untruths.” Hamett acknowledged he did not know the elements of the crimes of which he was charged, nor had he read the jury instructions. At the conclusion of its colloquy, the district court allowed Hamett to proceed pro se, “based upon [Hamett's] knowledge of the facts in wanting to ask questions that counsel have not asked for their own strategic reasons.” Trial resumed with the assistance of standby counsel. Hamett recalled various witnesses and made his own closing argument. The jury convicted Hamett on all three counts. Hamett was appointed new counsel to represent him at sentencing. The Tenth Circuit reversed conviction, "considering the rigorous restrictions on the information that must be conveyed to a defendant before permitting him to waive counsel at trial," the Court found the district court’s warnings did not adequately ensure Hamett was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Furthermore, the Court held there were no case-specific factors permitting it to conclude that, despite the inadequate warnings, the district court nevertheless correctly determined that Hamett’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and intelligent when it was made. Accordingly, the Court concluded the district court erred in finding Hamett knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. |
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| United States v. Young |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 18-6221 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Carlos F. Lucero Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Shane Young appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress a confession. A sheriff's deputy witnessed Young's vehicle swerving on the roadway, and signaled for Young to stop his car. Young continued to drive, ultimately pulling into a nearby residential property, stopping his car, and fleeing on foot. The deputy pursued, tasing and arresting Young. After the arrest, the deputy retraced Young’s path and found a small case containing about four grams of a substance containing methamphetamine. Officers later found a black bag containing about 93 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine near where Young previously stopped his car. The deputy arrested and interviewed Young; Young admitted to possessing the smaller quantity of methamphetamine but denied that the larger quantity was his. Days later, while still held in the county jail, Young was interrogated by a Federal Bureau of Investigations Special Agent. The agent told Young he tried to help people in trouble, and would do his best to try and help. The agent then told Young he had met with the prosecutor about Young’s arrest. He said the prosecutor had met with the judge. The agent reiterated that Young needed to trust him, and he asked Young about the bag with the larger quantity of drugs in it, suggesting that Young could explain that he threw the bags in different directions as he ran from the car. In response, Young wondered aloud whether he should have a lawyer present. Following the agent's earlier suggestion, Young admitted that after he exited his vehicle, he lost his grip on the containers of methamphetamine, and they flew in different directions as he was running away. He also provided information about the source of the methamphetamine and about his drug-dealing activities. After his confession, Young was charged with possession with intent to distribute approximately 97 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. Although the court found the agent made false representations and improper promises of leniency that were “coercive in nature under the circumstances,” it ultimately concluded Young’s confession was not involuntary and denied his motion to suppress. Young pled guilty and was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Tenth Circuit concluded Young’s capacity for self-determination was critically impaired, rendering his confession involuntary. Judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Swain v. Junior |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 20-11622 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Newsom Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in issuing an injunction against the County and the Director of the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitations Department (MDCR), requiring defendants to employ numerous safety measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and imposing extensive reporting requirements. Metro West inmates had filed a class action challenging the conditions of their confinement under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 for the named plaintiffs with a "medically vulnerable" subclass of inmates. The court held that plaintiffs failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claim for deliberate indifference. The court explained that the district court erred in relying on the increased rate of infection, and in concluding that defendants' inability to ensure adequate social distancing constituted deliberate indifference. In this case, the court simply could not conclude that, when faced with a perfect storm of a contagious virus and the space constraints inherent in a correctional facility, defendants acted unreasonably by "doing their best." The court also agreed with defendants that the district court erred in its likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits analysis because it failed to consider "two threshold issues": (1) the heightened standard for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and (2) exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Finally, the court held that the district court erred in holding, without any meaningful analysis, that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction. Furthermore, the district court erred in its determination of the balance-of-the-harms and public-interest factors. |
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| United States v. Oliver |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-15565 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Charles R. Wilson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for panel rehearing of this court's opinion reversing defendant's sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The court vacated its previous opinion and substituted the following opinion. Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and 924(a)(2). Based, in part, on his prior Georgia conviction for making terroristic threats under O.C.G.A. 16-11-37(a) (2010), defendant was sentenced under the ACCA to 180 months in prison. The court held that O.C.G.A. 16-11-37(a) is divisible under Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016), and that a threat to commit "any crime of violence" under Georgia law always includes an element requiring threatened violent force against another. Therefore, the court held that defendant's terroristic-threats conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. |
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| United States v. Steven Jones |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Dockets: 19-11505, 19-10758, 19-11955, 19-12847 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief under the First Step Act of 2018 to Defendants Jones and Jackson, holding that the district court did not err in refusing to allow Jones to relitigate his drug-quantity finding and that the district court correctly concluded that it could not reduce Jackson's sentence because his drug-quantity finding meant that he would face the same statutory penalty of life imprisonment under the Fair Sentencing Act. The court vacated the denials of relief to Defendants Allen and Johnson, holding that their orders do not make clear that the district court understood that it could reduce the sentences. Therefore, the court vacated the orders denying Allen and Johnson's motions and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Ex parte James Antuam Blackman. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Alabama Docket: 1190105 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| James Blackman petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge James Patterson of the Mobile Circuit Court ("the trial court") to set aside an order setting Blackman's case for trial, to reinstate Blackman's guilty plea that the trial court withdrew sua sponte, and to proceed to sentencing Blackman on his guilty-plea convictions. Because the trial court's sua sponte withdrawal of Blackman's guilty plea subjected Blackman to double jeopardy and thus divested the trial court of jurisdiction to conduct a trial, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ. |
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| Jackson v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 251 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Kemp Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not err when it dismissed the petition without holding a hearing. In 2003, Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to eighty years' imprisonment. In 2019, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to convict him of second-degree murder when he was charged with first-degree murder and that there was no rational basis to support a conviction for the lesser-included offense. The circuit court denied and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly dismissed the petition on the basis that Appellant had repeated claims that were unsuccessfully presented in previous habeas petitions; (2) the repetition of Appellant's previous claims represented an abuse of the writ; and (3) the circuit court was not required to hold a hearing on the petition. |
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| Jackson v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 255 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus and denied the motions subsequently filed by Appellant to amend his reply brief, holding that the circuit court did not err. In his petition, Appellant alleged (1) the judgment and commitment order was illegal on its face because it was signed by a judge that did not preside at his trial and lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, (2) the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it admitted certain evidence, and (3) the judge lacked jurisdiction because he failed to recuse himself. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's claims were either without merit or were not cognizable in a habeas proceeding; and (2) the circuit court was not required to appoint counsel and hold a hearing on the petition. |
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| Linell v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 253 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Rhonda K. Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition seeking permission to file a writ of error coram nobis in the trial court, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to coram nobis relief. Petitioner was convicted of two counts of felony murder and sentenced to life without parole. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. In his coram nobis petition, Petitioner raised four claims that were not cognizable in a proceeding for writ of error coram nobis. Petitioner also asserted a Brady violation, but the Court held that the Brady allegation alone was not a sufficient basis for error coram nobis relief. Petitioner also requested an attorney. The Supreme Court held that because Petitioner did not make a meritorious claim, he was not entitled to appointment of counsel. |
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| People v. Frahs |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S252220 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Tani Cantil-Sakauye Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal conditionally reversing Defendant's convictions and sentence with instructions for the trial court to consider Defendant's eligibility for diversion under Cal. Penal Code 1001.36, holding that the court of appeal did not err when it remanded this case for a diversion eligibility hearing. Defendant was found guilty of two counts of second degree robbery and of throwing a substance at a motor vehicle without intent to cause injury. While Defendant's appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 100.36, which created a pretrial diversion program for certain defendants with mental health disorders. The court of appeal conditionally reversed Defendant's conviction and sentence, concluding that section 1001.36 applies retroactively to all nonfinal judgments and that Defendant was entitled to a limited remand because he appeared to satisfy at least one of the statute's threshold eligibility requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 1001.36 applies retroactively; and (2) a conditional limited remand was appropriate in this case. |
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| California v. Aguilera |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D075381(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 17, 2020 Judge: Guerrero Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The State of California, represented by the San Diego County District Attorney, appealed the dismissal of all criminal charges against defendants Mario Aguilera, Jesus Castaneda, Ricardo Eaton, Daniel Gracia, William Sherman, and Jose Villanueva. Defendants were charged with multiple felonies, including robbery and carjacking arising from an aborted illegal drug transaction. The trial court found that defendants' constitutional right to due process was violated because the federal government refused defendants' requests to produce potentially exculpatory evidence in the possession of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that neither due process nor any other constitutional provision required dismissal of the charges against defendants under the circumstances here. The dismissal order was therefore reversed. |
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| California v. Albert |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E071365(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Raphael Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After the verdict in this case, a juror asserted that during the trial he had been visited at home by a man who purported to be the brother of one of the defendants, causing the juror to be scared. The trial court denied a new trial motion brought by defendants-appellants Anthony Albert and Noah Roosevelt Davis due to that incident, leaving in place their convictions of first degree murder and gang participation. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected defendants’ claim that the Court should have presumed the juror had a bias that violated the defendants’ constitutional rights, thus affirming the convictions. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court modified the judgment to correct certain sentencing errors, ordered the correction of clerical error in defendants’ abstract of judgment, reversed the orders imposing a $10,000 criminal restitution fine on each defendant, and remanded for a hearing on defendants’ ability to pay the fines. |
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| California v. Chen |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E071585(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Raphael Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The attempted replacement of a fence led defendant Yi Chih Chen to threaten his neighbors with a shotgun. Following a jury trial, defendant was acquitted on felony charges but convicted on a misdemeanor brandishing charge and sentenced to 36 months of summary probation. At trial, his position was that he acted in defense of property. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that displays of deadly force were an unreasonable means of defending property where there is no home invasion or threat of death or serious bodily harm. |
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| California v. Johnson |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C089373(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Ronald B. Robie Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| On appeal, Defendant Dammar Johnson challenged the trial court’s denial of his renewed motion to suppress. He was parked on the side of a road when two police officers approached to investigate his car’s missing registration tag. Defendant ended up handcuffed in the patrol car for resisting an officer. After defendant was detained, one of the officers performed what was described as a tow inventory search. The officer smelled marijuana emanating from the car and found “[p]ossibly a couple grams” of marijuana in the center console; the search then purportedly transitioned from an inventory search into a probable cause search, which revealed a loaded handgun in the rear cargo area of the car. Defendant sought to suppress the evidence from the search, but the motion and his renewed motion were denied. The magistrate and trial judge found the search was not an inventory search, but upheld it based on probable cause. Defendant pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the odor of marijuana and visual observation of approximately two grams of marijuana in a plastic baggie knotted at the top in defendant’s parked car provided probable cause to justify the search conducted by the officers. The Court concluded the officers did not have probable cause, and therefore reversed. |
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| California v. Reneaux |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C082186(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 17, 2020 Judge: Harry E. Hull, Jr. Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Jessie Reneaux was convicted by jury of inflicting corporal injury on his girlfriend, L.E., with whom he was cohabiting, guilty of false imprisonment of his girlfriend, and guilty of dissuading his girlfriend from testifying against him. He appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses against him by allowing the girlfriend’s out of court testimonial statements to be admitted into evidence; and, (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed consecutive rather than concurrent terms. In supplemental briefing, defendant contended that in light of the recent passage of Senate Bill No. 1393 (SB 1393), this matter should have been remanded to permit the trial court to consider whether it should exercise its newly-legislated discretion to strike or dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancements imposed under Penal Code section 667(a). To this, the State agreed. The Court of Appeal concluded defendant forfeited, by his own wrongdoing, his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine L.E., and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive prison terms. The Court therefore affirmed judgment of conviction, but remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion under Penal Code sections 1385 and 667(a) to strike or dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancements. |
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| In re Brownlee |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F077663(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Snauffer Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Terrence Brownlee was 19 years old when he was sentenced to 17 years to life in state prison for second degree murder committed with a firearm. The Court of Appeal held that Brownlee was not entitled to a youth offender parole hearing, because the statutory framework's plain language, Penal Code sections 3051, 3051.1, and 4801, does not afford him one. The court explained that, within this statutory framework, if a prisoner's first parole hearing is not a youth offender parole hearing, then the prisoner does not receive a youth offender parole hearing. Such prisoners are still entitled to have the board consider the diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and maturity. |
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| In re Rayford |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Dockets: B264402(Second Appellate District) , B303007(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Feuer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendants Rayford and Glass were convicted of 11 counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling based on their participation in a 2004 shooting. The Court of Appeal granted the petitions for habeas relief and held that People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 597, applies retroactively to defendants' convictions. The Supreme Court held in Canizales that a jury may convict a defendant under the kill zone theory only when the jury has made two findings. Under Canizales, the court held that the evidence at trial was not sufficient to instruct the jury on the kill zone theory, and it was prejudicial error to instruct the jury on the kill zone theory. |
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| In re S.J. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A157266(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 17, 2020 Judge: Mark B. Simons Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| In October 2018, S.J. (born September 2001) consumed alcohol and drove. He veered off the road and hit a parked car and a fence. Responding officers observed signs of intoxication. A breath test showed S.J.’s blood-alcohol level was 0.12%. A petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a) alleged: misdemeanor driving under the influence; misdemeanor driving while having a blood-alcohol level of 0.08% or more; and misdemeanor driving without a license. In February 2019, the juvenile court found S.J. not suitable for informal supervision, commenting “a standard term in adult-land for a DUI is search and seizure for alcohol. … it’s particularly important when we have a minor . . . whose … mother has allowed ... the minor to consume alcohol. … I just don’t see how, in a DUI with a .12 and a minor who also smokes marijuana, we can effectively supervise and ensure rehabilitation without a search and seizure clause, which is foreclosed in an informal probation setting.” The court sustained two allegations, dismissing the driving without a license allegation, declared S.J. a ward of the court, and directed the Probation Department to supervise him at home. The court imposed a $75 restitution fine, a $390 fine for violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, and $1,355 in penalties. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of informal supervision but remanded for recalculation of the penalties, most of which were inapplicable in this noncriminal proceeding. |
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| People v. Cole |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A156662(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Peter J. Siggins Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Ricardo and Cole were arguing about their relationship. Ricardo demanded to see Cole's phone. Standing in an alley, they exchanged cell phones. Ricardo saw a text message indicating that Cole did not intend to repay certain expenses Ricardo had paid. Ricardo threw Cole’s phone on the ground. Cole repeatedly punched Ricardo in the face. While Ricardo was on the ground, Cole reached into his pockets and took his work and personal cell phones. Cole left Ricardo lying in the alley, threatening: If you call the cops I will send my brother to kill you. Police quickly apprehended Cole, who was uninjured with blood on his face and hand. Ricardo’s cell phones were in his pocket. Cole testified that he had acted in self-defense during a mutual fight started by Ricardo. Cole admitted he was a “con artist” who pretended to be Ricardo’s boyfriend and led him on for a year to think they would eventually have sex. Cole was convicted of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, battery with serious bodily injury, and second-degree robbery. The trial court placed Cole on three years’ probation. The court of appeal affirmed, modifying the sentence. Cole is subject to only one probationary term. The court was not required to instruct the jurors that they must agree on the specific acts that constituted the force or fear element of robbery. |
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| People v. Howard |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A157285(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Barbara J.R. Jones Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2010, an 80-year-old woman was shot and killed during a burglary of her home. Three defendants, including Howard, were charged. Howard was convicted of first-degree murder with a felony-murder special circumstance and a finding that he had been armed in the commission of the offense. The court sentenced Howard to life without the possibility of parole. In 2018, the court of appeal reversed the felony-murder special circumstance, concluding the evidence was insufficient to show Howard—who was not the actual killer—acted with reckless indifference to human life. On remand, Howard moved to vacate his murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95, effective 2019. The statute provides that where a murder conviction was charged generically and the underlying felony was not charged, the trial court redesignates the “underlying felony for resentencing purposes.” The parties agreed and the court vacated Howard's murder conviction. The court redesignated Howard’s conviction as first-degree burglary, sentenced Howard to the aggravated six-year prison term for the burglary, designated the offense a violent felony, and imposed a one-year arming enhancement. The court of appeal affirmed. The evidence at trial established that the defendants burglarized a residence. Redesignating the conviction as first-degree burglary did not violate Howard’s constitutional rights. The court properly designated the offense a violent felony and imposed an arming enhancement. |
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| People v. Jones |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A155720(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Burns Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Following a fatal alcohol-related car crash, a jury convicted Jones of two counts of second-degree murder. Jones claims that the court erred in discharging Juror 10 who felt coerced or bullied by Juror 9, who had disclosed Jones’s criminal history, which was not part of the record at trial. Juror 9 was also discharged. The court of appeal reversed. The record does not support discharging Juror 10, who told the court she was “extremely upset” by the disclosure of the prior arrest and “felt somewhat coerced” because Juror 9 said it after Juror 10 expressed reservations about one of the murder charges. The court asked Juror 10 if it was “fair” to say that “it would be very difficult for you to continue in your deliberations” because of those actions and “the impression that you had as to why it was being brought up.” Juror 10 replied, “Yes,” and added that disclosure was stated “with attitude.” This does not meet the heightened standard. Juror 10 never requested to be discharged, nor did she ever say she was unwilling or unable to continue deliberating. The removal of Juror 10—a potential holdout juror in a murder case—illustrates the need for a record that manifestly supports the court’s reasoning. |
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| Colorado v. Harrison |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 57 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Samour Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Brittany Harrison was charged with possession of two controlled substances and drug paraphernalia. Before trial, she filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that she was entitled to immunity pursuant to section 18-1-711, C.R.S. (2019) because she had suffered an emergency drug overdose event that was reported by another person to the 911 system. Though the district court denied her motion, it allowed her to rely on that statute to raise an affirmative defense at trial. The jury found Harrison guilty as charged, but a division of the court of appeals vacated her judgment of conviction. In a matter of first impression for the Colorado Supreme Court, the Court reduced the issues presented on appeal as: (1) did the division correctly construe the requirement in section 18-1-711(1)(a) that a person must “report in good faith an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event;” and (2) did the division correctly conclude that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to disprove Harrison’s affirmative defense and, consequently, to support her convictions? Because the Court answered both questions in the negative, it reversed the division’s judgment. |
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| Colorado v. Meagher |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 56 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Gabriel Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use |
| The Colorado State Engineer, and the Division Engineer for Water Division 3 (the “Engineers”), brought claims against Nick Meagher for injunctive relief, civil penalties, and costs, arising from Meagher’s failure to submit Form 6.1, "Water Use Data Submittal Form," as required by Rule 6.1 of the Rules Governing the Measurement of Ground Water Diversions Located in Water Division No. 3, The Rio Grande Basin (the “Measurement Rules”). Meagher appealed the water court’s orders denying his motion to dismiss the Engineers’ claims and granting the Engineers summary judgment on those claims, contending the court erred by: (1) denying his motion to dismiss because the Engineers’ claims were mooted by his ultimate submission of Form 6.1; (2) granting summary judgment for the Engineers based on an erroneous interpretation of Rule 6.1 and section 37-92-503, C.R.S. (2019), and notwithstanding the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to his culpable mental state and the amount of the civil penalties to be imposed; (3) enjoining future violations of Rule 6.1; and (4) awarding costs and fees to the Engineers. Finding no reversible error, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the water court's judgment. |
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| Hoggard v. Colorado |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 54 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Brian D. Boatright Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner Shawna Hoggard and her ex-husband Javier were in the midst of a child-custody dispute when she forwarded an email she received from Javier to their court-appointed child and family investigator containing "concerning comments and an apparent threat." Javier claimed that while he had written parts of the email, he had not written the "concerning" portions. He then contacted law enforcement to report that Hoggard had falsified the email. The State charged Hoggard with attempt to influence a public servant and second-degree forgery. At trial, when the court instructed the jury on the charge of attempt to influence a public servant, it did not inform the jury that the mens rea of “with the intent” applied to all elements of the crime and not just a single element. Additionally, when the court instructed the jury on the charge of second-degree forgery, a class 1 misdemeanor, it included language in one element from the offense of felony forgery, a class 5 felony. Hoggard did not object to either instruction. The jury found her guilty of both original charges. Hoggard appealed, and the court of appeals upheld her convictions. Hoggard argued to the Colorado Supreme Court that the trial court’s instructions constituted reversible error. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that even if the instruction on attempt to influence a public servant was erroneous, any error was not plain. Furthermore, although the trial court erred in including language from the felony forgery statute when it instructed the jury, the instruction did not amount to a constructive amendment, and the error was not plain. Hence the Court affirmed the appellate court, but on different grounds. |
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| Manjarrez v. Colorado |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 53 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Monica M. Márquez Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Forty-five-year-old Richard Manjarrez hired his friends’ teenage daughter to clean his house. The girl’s parents had consented to the housecleaning arrangement because they considered Manjarrez a family friend and trusted him. On the girl’s third cleaning visit, however, Manjarrez kissed her, touched her breast, and digitally penetrated her. He then drove her home. A jury convicted Manjarrez of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust in violation of section 18-3-405.3(1), C.R.S. (2019), and the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Manjarrez acknowledged that the sexual contact took place but argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to show that he occupied a position of trust with respect to the victim because there was no evidence that he had any express duty of supervision over her. Finding he was implicitly responsible for her welfare and supervision while she was at his home to clean, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed Manjarrez's conviction. |
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| Sullivan v. Colorado |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 58 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Samour Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Colorado Court of Appeals dismissed Christopher Sullivan's appeal, finding that it was barred by the plea proviso, rejecting Sullivan's claim the plea proviso did not apply because his appeal involved the manner in which the sentence was imposed, not "the propriety of the sentence." The appellate court surmised an appeal related to the manner in which the sentence was imposed was an appeal regarding the propriety of the sentence. The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether "propriety of the sentence" as that phrase was used in C.R.S. 18-1-409(1), encompassed the manner in which the sentence was imposed. The Supreme Court held that “the propriety of the sentence,” as that phrase was used in the plea proviso, did not comprehend the manner in which the sentence was imposed (i.e., the propriety of the sentencing proceeding). Because Sullivan’s appeal concerned the manner in which his sentence was imposed, it was not barred by the plea proviso. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment. |
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| Dobbins v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0402 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Sarah H. Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Michael Dobbins was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Hollis Boddie. On appeal, Dobbins contended: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to grant Dobbins’s motion for mistrial, to rebuke the prosecutor, or to give a curative instruction when the prosecutor referenced Dobbins’s “previous trial” before the jury; and (3) that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to provide written notice of her intent to use a prior conviction of one of the State’s witnesses for impeachment purposes. Seeing no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Gardhigh v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Dockets: S20A0227, S20X0228 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Appellant Corey Gardhigh was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, felony murder, and other crimes in connection with the beating death of Paul Grady. In his appeal, Case No. S20A0227, Gardhigh contended the trial court erred: (1) by denying his pretrial motion for immunity; (2) that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial on the general grounds. In Case No. S20X0228, the State cross-appealed, contending that the trial court erred by sentencing Gardhigh for voluntary manslaughter and vacating his sentence for felony murder under the modified merger rule adopted in Edge v. Georgia, 414 SE2d 463 (1992); and (4) by giving the jury an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Georgia v. Pauldo |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0191 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Raekwon Pauldo was convicted by jury on one count of malice murder, one count of felony murder, and three counts of aggravated assault in connection with the death of Jaquel Smith. The trial court granted Pauldo’s motion in limine to exclude the portions of his custodial interview with police after he invoked his rights to remain silent and to counsel on the ground that police failed to honor Pauldo’s invocation of those rights by continuing to interrogate him. The State appealed that ruling. After its review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded police did not continue the interrogation, that Pauldo reinitiated a conversation with police about the case, and that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights before further interrogation began. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order. |
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| Glover v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0133 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: McMillan Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant DeAndre Glover was convicted of malice murder and making a false statement in connection with the 2015 shooting death of Mario Williams. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial and Glover appealed, arguing he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the admission of hearsay testimony. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Heard v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0064 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Damien Heard was convicted as a party to malice murder and other crimes in connection with the fatal shooting of James Daniel Evers, the armed robbery of Donald Evers, and the aggravated assaults of Charles Emmons and John Elledge, Jr. On appeal, Heard argued that, among other things, the trial court erred by admitting under OCGA 24-4- 404 (b) evidence of subsequent crimes committed by Appellant. The Georgia Supreme Court determined that because the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence of Appellant’s later crimes and the error was not harmless, Appellant’s convictions were reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Mathis v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0134 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Nathaniel Mathis was found guilty of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2016 shooting death of Rodney Benton. Mathis appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to each offense of which he was convicted, and contending that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel: (1) did not file a pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA 16-3-24.2; and (2) did not call Mathis’ nephew and mother as witnesses at an immunity motion hearing and at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Medina v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0505 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Terrance Medina was indicted for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4) in connection with the July 20, 2015, shooting death of James Thornton. The jury reached a verdict as to malice murder but was deadlocked on the remaining counts. The parties and the trial court agreed to a mistrial on all counts. Before the trial court actually declared the mistrial, however, it instructed the jury to disclose its verdict. When the jury reported its not guilty verdict on the malice murder count and the judge read it in open court, all of the requirements for formally returning a verdict on that count were fulfilled and the verdict became effective. The trial court then purported to declare a mistrial on all counts, including malice murder. But the mistrial was not effective as to the malice murder count. Double jeopardy thus precluded retrial on that count, although retrial was permissible on the felony murder, aggravated assault, and firearm possession counts. The Georgia Supreme Court found: (1) the record did not show the jury's verdict on Count 1 must have been based on a finding that Medina acted in self-defense; (2) the jury also could rationally have found Medina not guilty of malice murder based on a conclusion that the evidence did not prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt, while being undecided on the different issue of whether the evidence proved the general intent to inflict injury needed for aggravated assault (Count 2), which was the predicate for the felony murder count (Count 3) and one of the predicates for the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). The Court concluded Medina failed to carry his burden of establishing that the jury necessarily determined that he acted in self-defense. Consequently, he could be retried on Counts 2, 3, and 4. |
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| Newman v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0409 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In this case's first appearance, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of David Newman's motion for a new trial. In doing so, the Court found the trial court erred in concluding that harmful error occurred at Newman’s trial based on the court’s failure to give a sua sponte jury charge on the use of force in defense of habitation under OCGA 16-3-23. However, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of the remaining claims raised in Newman’s motion for new trial that had not been ruled upon in the trial court’s original order on the motion. This appeal stemmed from the trial court’s denial of Newman’s numerous remaining claims relating to the alleged ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Finding that Newman failed to show his trial counsel performed deficiently, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court with respect to those claims. |
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| Redding v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0177 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Merrick Redding was tried by jury and convicted of murder and aggravated assault in connection with the death of Joseph Davis. Redding appealed arguing: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial; and (3) that certain evidence was admitted erroneously at trial. Although the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions, the trial court failed to apply the proper standard to the claim that Redding was denied his right to a speedy trial. For that reason, the Court vacated the judgment below and remanded for the trial court to resolve that claim under the proper standard. The Court declined at this point to address the remaining claims of error. |
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| Scott v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0125 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Torrey Sicarr Nigel Scott was tried by jury and convicted of murder, four rapes, and various other offenses in connection with a violent crime spree in the Savannah area in late 2013 and early 2014. Scott appealed, claiming: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain several of his convictions; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay evidence; and (3) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain one of his rape convictions, and reversed that conviction. The Court affirmed in all other respects. |
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| Tumlinson v. Dix |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1277 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In a discretionary appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court considered whether the superior court erred in dismissing Marcus Tumlinson's petition for pre-trial habeas relief without considering the merits of his claims or holding a hearing. Because the record showed Tumlinson exhausted his efforts to seek an interlocutory review of the trial court’s order denying him bond in this case, and because he had no other adequate remedy for meaningful review of the lawfulness of his continued detention, the habeas court erred in concluding that it lacked the authority to consider the merits of Tumlinson’s petition for pre-trial habeas relief on this basis. The Supreme Court therefore remanded this case and directed the habeas court to consider Tumlinson’s petition and any exhibits, and if necessary, to conduct a hearing. |
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| State v. Engelby |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-15-0000724 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Mark E. Recktenwald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming Defendant's conviction for two counts of sexual assault in the first degree for molesting a minor child, holding that the testimony of Dr. Alexander Bivens, the State's expert witness in child sexual assault dynamics, did not improperly profile Defendant as a child molester. The challenged testimony was not introduced during the State's case-in-chief but, rather, was elicited by the defense during cross-examination. The State further developed that testimony on redirect examination without any objection by the defense. On appeal, Defendant argued that the testimony impermissibly bolstered the child's credibility and improperly profiled him as a molester. The ICA affirmed, concluding that the testimony neither impermissibly profiled nor unduly prejudiced Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not properly preserve his claim about bolstering and waived his ability to challenge the statements under Haw. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); (2) under plain error review, Defendant's substantial rights were not affected; and (3) the testimony did not improperly profile Defendant as a child molester. |
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| State v. Ernes |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-17-0000507 Opinion Date: June 17, 2020 Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of assault against a law enforcement officer in the second degree, holding that the record did not reflect an on-the-record exchange sufficient to constitute the true colloquy required to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of Defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial. Defendant was convicted after a bench trial. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court reversibly erred in failing to obtain a valid on-the-record waiver of his constitutional right to a jury trial. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the ICA and the district court, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the record did not reflect an on-the-record exchange sufficient to constitute the true colloquy required to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of Defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial. |
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| State v. Lora |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-18-0000548 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Richard W. Pollack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the intermediate court of appeals' (ICA) judgment on appeal and the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that the circuit court erred in admitting a portion of the complaining witness's testimony and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was indicted for one count of sexual assault in the first degree and one count of sexual assault in the third degree. The jury found Defendant guilty on both counts. The ICA affirmed. On appeal, Defendant argued that a portion of the complaining witness's (CW) testimony was not properly admitted for the purpose of bolstering the credibility of the CW's account of the incident. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the cited testimony was not relevant to the witness's credibility, and the erroneous admission of the testimony was highly prejudicial to the defense. |
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| State v. Stone |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-17-0000078 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree, holding that Defendant's due process right to a fair trial was implicated by the lack of a correction of a police officer's false testimony before conclusion of trial, and the error was not harmless. Defendant appealed the circuit court's denial of his motion for a new trial, asserting that he met the intermediate court of appeals' (ICA) four-part test for a new trial based on false testimony from a material prosecution witness and that his right to a fair trial was violated because Officer Douglas Korenic testified falsely during trial. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant satisfied the ICA's four-part test for a new trial based on false testimony from a material prosecution witness under State v. Teves, 679 P.2d 136 (1984); and (2) Defendant's right to a fair trial was violated because Officer Korenic gave false testimony, and there was a reasonable possibility the false testimony contributed to Defendant's conviction. |
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| State v. Su |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-18-0000692 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) as well as the district court's judgment convicting Defendant of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII), holding that certain evidence was inadmissible under Haw. R. Evid. 608(b).. At trial, Defendant's counsel sought to impeach the credibility of police officer Jared Spiker under Rule 608(b), arguing that the "specific instances of conduct" evincing Officer Spiker's untruthfulness were contained in transcripts from three other proceedings in which Officer Spiker was a witness for the state. The district court refused to allow defense counsel to cross-examine Officer Spiker concerning these proceedings. The ICA upheld the evidentiary rulings, holding that the district court had in its possession materials concerning the three other proceedings and therefore did not abuse its discretion in preventing further cross-examination of Officer Spiker concerning his testimony in those proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in finding that two of the prior proceedings were not probative of Officer Spiker's credibility; and (2) to the extent the ICA suggested that the district court reached its judgment by taking into account evidence it had excluded, such suggestion is wrong. |
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| State v. Williams |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-13-0001285 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Michael D. Wilson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the intermediate court of appeals' (ICA) judgment on appeal and the circuit court's judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that Defendant's fundamental due process right to present a complete defense was violated when the circuit court prohibited Defendant from presenting state of mind evidence relevant to his self-defense claim. Defendant was convicted of the attempted murder in the second degree of David Quindt, Jr. The attempted murder charge arose from an altercation between Defendant and Quindt, and the primary disputed issue at trial was whether Defendant acted in self-defense. The ICA affirmed the convictions. Before the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred by prohibiting him from presenting evidence relevant to his self-defense claim, in violation of his constitutional right to present a complete defense. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in altering and excluding Defendant's state of mind evidence, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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| State v. Zowail |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-18-0000777 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Mark E. Recktenwald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for violating Revised Ordinances of Honolulu (ROH) 29-5.1 for engaging in business on any public sidewalk where Defendant's operation tended to or did impede or inconvenience the public or any person, holding that the conviction was not supported by substantial evidence. Defendant set up a table at the edge of the sidewalk along Kalakaua in Waikiki to perform a painting demonstration and showcase his art for sale. A crowd formed to watch as Defendant worked, and some pedestrians were forced to detour around the spectators. The district court convicted Defendant for violating ROH 29-5.1. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erroneously included the spectators as part of his "operation." The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) a defendant's operation does not include spectators over which a defendant has no control; and (2) because there was no evidence that Defendant's operation, excluding spectators, impeded or inconvenienced any person, Defendant's conviction was not supported by substantial evidence. |
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| People v. Legoo |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2020 IL 124965 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Thomas L. Kilbride Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Legoo was charged with the misdemeanor offense of being a child sex offender in a public park (720 ILCS 5/11- 9.4-1(b)). An officer, attending his grandson’s T-ball game at Mendota's Strouss Park, recognized Legoo and believed he was a registered sex offender. Legoo rode his bicycle through an area between three baseball diamonds. Another officer Corrigan testified went to Legoo’s residence later that night. When asked about his presence in the park, Legoo stated he went there to look for his son. Legoo’s son, C.G., later testified that he was watching a baseball game in the park when Legoo arrived and told him to go home. Legoo then left the park. Legoo testified that he rode his bicycle to the park looking for C.G. and left the park after less than five minutes. Legoo testified that no one else was available to retrieve C.G. from the park that night. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Legoo’s conviction. An exception to liability, found in section 11-9.3(a10) applies when a child sex offender, in a public park, approaches, contacts, or communicates with a child under 18 years of age unless the offender is a parent or guardian of a person under 18 years of age present in the building or on the grounds. The exception does not apply to the section under which Legoo was convicted. |
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| People v. Radford |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2020 IL 123975 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Mary Jane Theis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Following the death of his 26-month-old daughter from traumatic brain injuries, Radford was convicted of endangering the life or health of a child, 720 ILCS 5/12-21.6(a) in Kankakee County. His conviction and sentence were affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed that the trial court did not violate the defendant's right to a public trial by partially closing the courtroom during jury selection and that no jury instruction error occurred. The trial court observed “emotions running high” due to the “nature of the case” when it determined that a partial closure was necessary. The court expressed concern about the possibility of having to declare a mistrial if members of the public expressed emotion in a way that impacted the venire. The court was aware that this case would require a large venire in order to find a suitable jury and there were limited seats in the courtroom. The trial was expected to last two weeks and was to begin before the Thanksgiving holiday. Media coverage had been granted; the parties had listed approximately 50 potential witnesses. Neither side objected to the court’s solution of allowing only two family members from each side to remain in the courtroom during jury selection. The court reopened after jury selection. Because the court gave the pattern jury instructions, which did not require a definitional instruction on “willfully” and tracked the language of both the statute and indictment, it did not commit clear error when instructing the jury. |
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| People v. Robinson |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2020 IL 123849 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Neville Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Robinson and two others were charged with the 1997 shooting death of Giles. Tucker testified that Robinson told him that he had killed Giles and had given details about the killing and the disposal of the body and of evidence. Muhammad testified that she had driven the men to the scene where the body was burned. McClendon testified that she was Robinson’s girlfriend and that Robinson told her they had burned Giles’s body and that he had shot Giles in the head. McClendon identified a picture of a rifle and testified that she had seen that weapon twice within the month before the shooting. After being advised of his rights, Robinson, then 18, had confessed to shooting Giles and burning the body. The state did not present physical evidence linking him to the crime; Robinson did not present a defense. His convictions were affirmed. His first post-conviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, was unsuccessful. In 2015, Robinson sought leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, 725 ILCS 5/122-1, alleging actual innocence. He asserted that he was not involved in the crimes and that Giles was murdered by Tucker. He attached his own affidavit plus four others. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded, in favor of Robinson. The only issue is whether Robinson may file his successive post-conviction petition alleging he is actually innocent. The new evidence supporting the petition need not be completely dispositive of innocence but need only be of such a conclusive character as to probably change the result upon retrial. Robinson satisfied the pleading requirements for granting leave to file a successive petition, so his claim must be advanced to second-stage proceedings. The court noted reasons for questioning the credibility of the witnesses at trial and reasons why the affiants might be credible. |
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| People v. Swenson |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2020 IL 124688 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Rita B. Garman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Swenson was convicted of disorderly conduct after a telephone conversation with the advancement director of a private school, during which he asked about the school’s security measures and spoke extensively about shootings and violence. The directed testified that “[h]e said if he were to show up at the campus with a gun what would be the protocol of our school?” He asked whether the school gave teachers “PEZ dispensers to defend themselves” and what the students would think “of seeing a gun pointed in their teacher[’]s face.” The conversation caused a soft lockdown at the school and police response. The director indicated that she thought Swenson was on campus and she did not know why Swenson shared with her that he had been kicked out of the school as a child. Swenson testified that he did not own any weapons. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Swenson’s statements were objectively threatening under the circumstances; he was subjectively aware of the threatening nature of his speech. The director reasonably perceived the questions and statements as a threat. Swenson’s speech constituted a true threat, unprotected by the first amendment. A rational trier of fact could conclude that the elements of disorderly conduct were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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| State v. Shorter |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-1142 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Oxley Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of violating Iowa Code 724.4C, which criminalizes carrying a dangerous weapon while intoxicated, holding that the jury instructions were erroneous because section 724.4C prohibits only carrying, which requires more than mere possession. On appeal, Defendant argued that the jury instructions improperly allowed the jury to convict him based on conduct not covered under the statute. Specifically, Defendant argued that the jury could have convicted him on a finding of possession alone, rather than carrying a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the jury instructions that allowed the jury to convict Defendant if he either carried or possessed a dangerous weapon misstated the law; and (2) the instructional error prejudiced Defendant and required reversal. |
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| State v. Adams |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 120475 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Wilson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's postsentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea after it found that the record conclusively showed Defendant's plea was knowing and voluntarily made, holding that the district court correctly denied the motion. Defendant pled guilty to premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, felony theft, forgery, and misdemeanor theft. In his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Defendant argued that he had a mental illness that rendered his plea involuntary. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing and that his counsel was ineffective because he did not have Defendant undergo a mental health evaluation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to show the manifest injustice necessary to allow him to withdraw his plea; and (2) counsel's decision to forgo a mental health evaluation did not constitute deficient representation. |
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| State v. Dinkel |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 113705 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Eric S. Rosen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for two counts of rape of a child under the age of fourteen, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that rape of a child has no mental culpability requirement so Defendant's intent was irrelevant. On appeal, Defendant argued that K.H., the alleged victim, raped her and that she continued the sexual contact because K.H. was blackmailing her and she had a mental disease or defect. The court of appeals concluded that whether K.H. forced the sexual encounter was irrelevant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if Defendant's rape defense was not relevant to a mental culpability requirement, it was relevant to the actus reus requirement. The Court remanded the case to the district court for a Van Cleave hearing to determine whether defense trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the State never established the voluntary act requirement. |
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| State v. Garcia |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 112502 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Carol A. Beier Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated its decision reversing the lower courts' conclusions that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) did not preempt Defendant's prosecution for identity theft, holding that, in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court on certiorari in this case, Defendant's prosecution was not preempted by the IRCA. A district court judge found Defendant guilty after denying his motion to dismiss charges based on representations in his W-4 employment form and I-9 form. On appeal, Defendant argued that the IRCA preempted identify theft prosecutions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that IRCA preempted Defendant's prosecution. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that state law prosecutions for identity theft were not preempted by the IRCA. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court. |
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| State v. Glover |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 116446 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Marla J. Luckert Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated its judgment reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, which reversed the district court's ruling granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop, holding that the district court's judgment is affirmed in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court. The district court determined that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of illegal activity when he stopped the vehicle, making the seizure of Defendant a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari and reversed, holding that the investigative traffic stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the Kansas Supreme Court vacated its judgment reversing the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Morales |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 111904 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Carol A. Beier Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated its decision reversing the judgment of both the court of appeals and district court concluding that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) did not preempt Defendant's prosecution for identity theft and making false information, holding that, in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court on certiorari in this case, Defendant's prosecution was not preempted by the IRCA. A district court judge found Defendant guilty after denying his motion to dismiss charges based on representations in his W-4 employment form. On appeal, Defendant argued that the IRCA preempted identify theft and making false information prosecutions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that IRCA preempted Defendant's prosecutions. The United State Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that state law prosecutions for identity theft and making false information were not preempted by the IRCA. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed in accordance with the decision of the United States Supreme Court. |
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| State v. Tucker |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 119242 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Marla J. Luckert Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court ordering Defendant to pay $5,000 in restitution, holding that Defendant met his burden to present some evidence of compelling circumstances to prove the restitution was unworkable. Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of capital murder. The district court sentenced Defendant to prison for life without parole and ordered him to pay restitution but without explicitly ordering payments from prison. The district court judge who had previously found Defendant indigent stated, "[a]nd I understand with the restitution of 5,000 that it will never be paid." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances, the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution. |
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| State v. Asante |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 90 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Humphrey Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgments of conviction for both murder and robbery, holding that the instructions on the elements of robbery misstated the law and thereby also rendered erroneous a portion of the court's instructions on self-defense, requiring a new trial. Defendant was convicted of intentional or knowing murder and robbery. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's jury instructions allowed the State to obtain a conviction without proof of every element of robbery as charged. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding (1) the instructions on the elements of robbery made it possible that the jury reached a verdict based on impermissible criteria; (2) the error in the robbery instruction also affected the judgment of conviction of murder; and (3) the error seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the proceedings and may have affected the verdicts. |
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| State v. Chan |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 91 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Horton Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court after a jury found Defendant guilty of burglary and theft by unauthorized taking, holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress portions of a surveillance video recording because other portions of the recording were not preserved and that the court committed obvious error by failing to intervene after several allegedly improper comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's finding that the State did not act in bad faith when it failed to preserve the remainder of the recording did not constitute clear error, and therefore, the court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress; and (2) the majority of the prosecutor's statements challenged on appeal did not rise to the level of misconduct, and as to the remaining statement, the court's instructions clarified any misimpression that the prosecutor's comments may have created. |
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| Commonwealth v. Beverly |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12814 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Kafker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the entry of continuance without a finding and immediate dismissal of the criminal case but held that the disposition cannot be imposed in any such future case because, without the imposition of terms and conditions or probation, the continuance without a finding constituted an illegal sentence and that this disposition shall apply prospectively from the date of this decision. Defendant was charged with counterfeit drug possession with intent to distribute and other crimes. Defendant admitted to sufficient facts as to the crime. As to the counterfeit drug charge, the sentencing judge found sufficient facts and entered a continuance without a finding. The Commonwealth filed a motion requesting that the sentencing judge revise or revoke the entry of the continuance without a finding because the order was an "illegal disposition" contrary to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 18. The judge denied the motion without a hearing. The Supreme Judicial court affirmed, holding (1) because the sentencing judge did not impose any terms or conditions on the record, the continuance without a finding was an illegal disposition; and (2) this holding shall apply prospectively from the date of this decision. |
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| Commonwealth v. Dilworth |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12764 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice denying the Commonwealth's petition, filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, for relief from an interlocutory order the superior court in an underlying criminal case without deciding the merits, holding that the single justice did not abuse her discretion in denying the petition. Defendant was indicted on numerous firearm and ammunition charges. Defendant filed in the trial court a motion for discovery pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) seeking Boston police department records concerning social media surveillance on Snapchat. In his motion, Defendant asserted that the Boston police department was using Snapchat as an investigatory tool almost exclusively against black males and sought discovery he claimed would support a claim of racial discrimination. The superior court judge allowed the motion. The Commonwealth filed its Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition, arguing that the judge erred in concluding that Defendant had met his burden in asserting selective prosecution that would warrant the requested discovery. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the matter did not warrant the exercise of the Court's extraordinary general superintendence power. |
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| Commonwealth v. Ellsworth |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12816 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Kafker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court held that the sentencing judge imposed illegal sentences by entering continuances without a finding and immediately dismissing criminal charges without imposing any terms and conditions or probation, but the Court declined to remand the case for resentencing as to the legal sentences because ordering Defendant to be resentenced would not be just. Defendant was charged with several offenses in connection with three separate instances. The judge sentenced Defendant to thirty days in a house of correction for the charge of assault and battery and entered continuances without a finding and dismissed all remaining charges. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing that the continuances without a finding, which were immediately dismissed without any terms and conditions, constituted illegal sentences under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 18. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the continuances without a finding constituted illegal sentences because they contained no terms and conditions; but (2) it would be unfair to Defendant to vacate a disposition reflecting what appeared to be a common practice, and so this ruling applies prospectively from the date of this decision. |
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| Commonwealth v. Rossetti |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12815 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Kafker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court declined to remand this case for resentencing, holding that the sentencing judge imposed an illegal sentence by entering a continuance without a finding and immediately dismissing a charge absent any terms and conditions or probation but that this holding shall apply prospectively from the date of this decision. Defendant was charged with five counts, including breaking and entering, and admitted to sufficient facts as to all five counts. The sentencing facts found facts sufficient for a guilty plea and entered a continuance without a finding as to the breaking and entering charge. The judge ordered the dismissal of the charge for 4 p.m. that day and did not set any conditions or terms on the dismissal. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the continuance without a finding amounted to an illegal sentence; but (2) this holding applies prospectively from the date of this decision. |
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| Ramos v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12924 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice denying, without a hearing, Defendant's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying relief. After Defendant's motion to suppress was allowed, the Commonwealth applied for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal. A single justice allowed the application and directed the appeal to the Appeals Court. An interlocutory appeal was entered more than a year after the single justice granted the Commonwealth leave to appeal. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the underlying charges, arguing that his speedy trial and due process rights had been violated. The motion was denied. Defendant then filed his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition seeking leave to cross-appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not show that the ordinary process of trial and appeal was inadequate for him to obtain review of his speedy trial and due process claims. |
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| State v. Beam |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 156 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Laurie McKinnon Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court revoking the suspended portion of Defendant's sentence for failing to complete sex offender treatment while in prison, holding that because there was no requirement that Defendant complete sex offender treatment prior to his release on probation the district court lacked the authority to revoke Defendant's sentence. The district court revoked Defendant's sentence after finding that Defendant had not completed sex offender treatment. The court then imposed a six-year Department of Corrections commitment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the treatment condition of Defendant's suspended sentence did not specify when treatment was to be completed, the district court lacked authority to revoke Defendant's sentence and impose a new sentence on the basis that Defendant had refused treatment while in custody. |
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| State v. Stillsmoking |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 154 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Gustafson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the sentencing order and judgment issued by the district court following Defendant's conviction of assault on a peace officer, a felony, holding that Defendant did not use a "weapon" pursuant to Montana law and thus could not be convicted for a violation of Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-210(1)(b). The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of assault on a peace officer, a felony, in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-210(1)(b), holding that there was insufficient evidence to convicted Defendant of assault on a peace officer. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State did not present sufficient evidence to convict him because he did not use a weapon during the incident. Rather, Defendant used a "nonfunctioning CO2 pellet gun." The Supreme Court agreed with Defendant, holding that the non-operational BB gun did not qualify as a "weapon" under the facts of this case. |
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| In re Interest of Vladimir G. |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 127 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the juvenile court adjudicating Abigail G.'s son, Vladimir G., to be a child within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a), holding that although Abigail could invoke her Fifth Amendment right not to testify in this adjudication, any error on the part of the juvenile court in requiring her testimony was not reversible. During the adjudication hearing, Abigail objected to testifying based on Fifth Amendment grounds. The court overruled Abigail's objection. After the hearing, the county court filed an order finding Vladimir to be a child within the meaning of section 43-247(3)(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even if the court erred in failing to determine that at least part of Abigail's testimony was incriminating and therefore protected by Abigail's invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege, such error was not reversible because there was sufficient evidence to support the adjudication without such testimony and because Abigail's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the adjudication that Vladimir was a child within the meaning of section 43-247(3)(a). |
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| State v. Vann |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 91 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Papik Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. On appeal, Defendant challenged the State's use of exhibit 7 to prove that Defendant had a prior felony conviction. Specifically, Defendant argued that because exhibit 7 did not affirmatively show that he had or waived counsel at the time of his guilty plea in the prior case, exhibit 7 should not have been admitted into evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction; and (2) the district court did not err in admitting into evidence certified court records showing that Defendant had counsel at the time he was sentenced for his prior conviction but was silent as to whether he had counsel at the time he entered his plea. |
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| Honea v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 32 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Stiglich Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for sexual assault of a minor under sixteen years of age, holding that the district court erred in instructing the jury, and the jury instruction errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, Defendant argued that that the district court erred by instructing the jury that the age of consent to sexual penetration is sixteen years old and that consent is not a defense to the crime of sexual assault of a minor under the age of sixteen. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the victim's age, by itself, was not dispositive of any element of sexual assault, and therefore, the district court's instructions as to the victim's age were incorrect statements of law; and (2) the district court erred by rejecting Defendant's proposed inverse jury instruction; and (3) the district court's jury instruction errors were not harmless. |
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| Bey v. Rasawehr |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3301 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Donnelly Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that a civil-stalking protection order enjoining future online postings about Plaintiffs imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs each filed a petition for a civil-stalking protection order (CSPO) against Defendant. The trial court granted the petitions and issued CSPOs that, among other things, prohibited Defendant from posting about Plaintiffs on any social media service, website, or discussion board. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment to the extent that it upheld the trial court's CSPOs enjoining future postings about Plaintiffs or postings that express, imply or suggest that Plaintiffs were culpable in the deaths of their husbands, holding that this portion of the CSPOs did not survive strict scrutiny. |
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| State ex rel. King v. Fleegle |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3302 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus against Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark Fleegle, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Appellant, an inmate, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing Judge Fleegle to "correct" his sentence. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim. Appellant appealed, arguing that he met the elements for a writ of mandamus because his sentence was void and he had no adequate remedy at law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy by way of appeal to challenge any alleged sentencing error. |
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| State v. McFarland |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3343 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions on charges relating to the murder of Robert Williams, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Defendant was convicted and sentenced for aggravated murder, conspiracy, aggravated burglary, and kidnapping. At issue on appeal was whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts that Defendant, who did pull the trigger killing Williams, had conspired to murder Williams and had been complicit in the acts leading to his death. The Supreme Court concluded that the verdicts were based upon sufficient evidence, holding that the evidence of Defendant's involvement in the crimes associated with the killing of Williams was sufficient to find her guilty of the crimes. |
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| State v. Pendergrass |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3335 Opinion Date: June 17, 2020 Judge: DeWine Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalty for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor does not apply when previous alleged criminal conduct predates the prior conviction, but rather, the enhancement only applies if, at the time of the offense, the offender has previously been convicted of a qualifying sex crime. In 2016, Defendant was convicted of one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2907.04. In 2017, Defendant was again indicted for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. The 2017 indictment alleged that the criminal behavior occurred before the 2016 conviction. The 2017 indictment sought to enhance the charges under section 2907.04(B)(4), which elevates the penalty for violating section 2907.04 if the defendant "previously has been convicted of" certain sex crimes. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the enhancement does not apply when the alleged criminal conduct predates the prior conviction. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in order for the enhancement to apply, a defendant must have a qualifying conviction when he commits the charged offense. |
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| Pennsylvania v. McIntyre |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 25 EAP 2019 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Debra McCloskey Todd Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| On April 1, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a per curiam order reversing the judgment of sentence of Appellant Jerome McIntyre who had been convicted for failing to register as a convicted sex offender. Appellant’s challenge to his sentence was raised in proceedings under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Because the Supreme Court found his challenge to be meritorious, but because his prison sentence expired on April 7, 2020, thus terminating the Court's jurisdiction to grant relief as of that date, the Court took the unusual action of issuing its April 1, 2020 order, with an opinion to follow. The Court set forth its reasons in support of that order. Appellant argued that, after the Court’s decision in "Neiman," the registration statute, Section 4915, became null and void dating back to its inception, and, thus, it was as if this statute never existed. Consequently, he maintained it would violate due process to uphold his conviction and to permit his incarceration thereunder. Appellant highlighted that the Court recognized the principle that a statute which was stricken for constitutional infirmity had to be regarded as void ab initio and treated as if it never existed. To this, the Supreme Court concurred and held Appellant was entitled to reversal of his sentence and discharge from his conviction. |
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| Pennsylvania v. Torsilieri |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 37 MAP 2018 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Max Baer Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| On July 3, 2017, a jury convicted Appellee George Torsilieri of one count each of aggravated indecent assault, and indecent assault. The trial court deferred sentencing until completion of a presentence investigative report and a sexually violent predator assessment by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”). While sentencing was pending, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), holding that the registration and notification provisions of the then-applicable SORNA were punitive. A majority of the Court consequently concluded that the punitive provisions violated the constitutional protections of Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause when applied retroactively to sexual offenders who were convicted prior to December 20, 2012, the effective date of SORNA. In September 2017, the SOAB concluded that Appellee did not meet the criteria for designation as a sexually violent predator (“SVP”). Between the SOAB’s determination and Appellee’s sentencing, the Superior Court declared a different aspect of SORNA unconstitutional. After review, the Supreme Court vacated that portion of the trial court's order declaring the registration requirements of SORNA unconstitutional, and remanded for further proceedings: "Unfortunately, the procedural posture of this case prevents tidy resolution of the matter by this Court. While Appellee presented a colorable argument that the General Assembly’s factual presumptions have been undermined by recent scientific studies, we are unable to affirm the trial court’s several conclusions finding Revised Subchapter H unconstitutional." |
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| Williams v. Wetzel |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 95 MAP 2019 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Thomas G. Saylor Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellee James Williams, a Pennsylvania state inmate, filed a petition for mandamus relief in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction. He alleged he was subjected to a search upon leaving his employment post in the prison kitchen, and an officer discovered several pounds of sugar concealed in his boots. The petition further asserted that, after a unit manager conducted a support team hearing at his cell door, Appellee was removed from his position of employment in the kitchen. Appellee claimed the Department’s failure to follow procedures pertaining to misconducts set forth in its prison regulations resulted in a denial of due process. The Commonwealth Court granted summary declaratory and injunctive relief and directed the Department of Corrections to comply with the regulations’ procedural requirements. The dissent to the Commonwealth Court's decision opined the majority's decision went against the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Bronson v. Central Office Review Committee, 721 A.2d 357 (1998), which held that the Commonwealth Court lacked original jurisdiction to entertain a prisoner’s due process challenge to the actions of prison officials, where the inmate failed to assert a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest. The dissent maintained inmates had no constitutionally-protected interest in maintaining prison employment. The Supreme Court found Appellee has never advanced a colorable defense on the merits: he repeatedly confirmed he tried to leave the kitchen with half pounds of sugar secreted in his boots. As such, the Supreme Court revered the Commonwealth Court, and remanded for dismissal of Appellee's petition for review. |
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| Graham v. State |
| Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 19-55 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Gilbert V. Indeglia Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Appellant's application for postconviction relief, holding that Appellant's claims lacked merit. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, discharging a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, and conspiracy. Appellant later filed a pro se application for postconviction relief, arguing that newly discovered evidence required a new trial, that the trial justice impermissibly amended the indictment, and that a consecutive life sentence for discharging a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence should not have been imposed. The hearing justice denied the application for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing justice correctly found that Appellant's evidence did not meet the test for newly discovered evidence; and (2) Appellant's remaining claims were barred by res judicata and also lacked merit. |
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| State v. Querido |
| Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 18-134 Opinion Date: June 17, 2020 Judge: Maureen McKenna Goldberg Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court suppressing the DNA results of a buccal swab taken from Defendant pursuant to a valid search warrant while he was incarcerated, holding that the trial justice erred in suppressing the buccal swab evidence. Three years after the murder of Robert Bullard Defendant was apprehended and taken into custody. A criminal complaint was filed, and Defendant was held without bail at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI). Thereafter, a detective obtained search warrants to collect Defendant's DNA at the ACI using a buccal swab. When Defendant refused to comply with the search warrants law enforcement officers used force to obtain the buccal swab. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the DNA evidence, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order, holding that the use of force was objectively reasonable because the intrusion into Defendant's Fourth Amendment interests was minimal and was far outweighed by countervailing government interests. |
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| State v. Mousseaux |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 35 Opinion Date: June 17, 2020 Judge: Kern Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's the order of the circuit court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of Defendant's arrest, holding that the circuit court erred when it refused to consider the application of the attenuation doctrine and suppressed the evidence. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine and false impersonation. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of her interaction with police officers on the grounds that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain her. The circuit court granted the motion to suppress. Despite the State's argument that the attenuation doctrine applied, the circuit court did not analyze the applicability of the attenuation doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the connection between Defendant's detention and the subsequent search was interrupted by the discovery of the existence of a valid, preexisting and unrelated warrant, the attenuation factors weighed in favor of the State. |
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| Keller v. Casteel |
| Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket: E2017-01020-SC-R11-CV Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Kirby Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the court of appeals and the trial court that a municipality's personnel manual gave a firefighter a property interest entitled to due process protection, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he had a property interest entitled to protection under either the due process clause of the United States Constitution or the law of the land clause of the Tennessee Constitution. After Plaintiff was terminated from his employment as a firefighter he filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that his due process rights were violated. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment on his due process claim, holding that the City personnel manual constituted a contract and that the termination of Plaintiff's employment was based on inappropriate procedure. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he had a property interest entitled to protection under the Tennessee or the United States Constitutions. |
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| State ex rel. Wade v. Honorable David W. Hummel, Jr. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 19-1047 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Jenkins Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's requested writ of prohibition prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing a ruling that found an audio/video recording of a voluntary statement made to law enforcement officers by H.D., the defendant in the underlying criminal proceeding, violated H.D.'s privilege against self-incrimination, holding that a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by the admission into evidence and/or publication to the jury during a criminal proceeding of an audio/video recording of the defendant's voluntary statement made to law enforcement officers. Because H.D. was in a non-custodial setting when he made his incriminating statement and affirmatively waived his rights, H.D. may not now assert the privilege against self-incrimination in his criminal proceeding to avoid the admission into evidence and/or publication to the jury of that recording. |
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| State v. Drakes |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 18-0207 Opinion Date: June 12, 2020 Judge: Margaret L. Workman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Petitioner's conviction for one count of second-degree murder and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the circuit court erred in instructing the jury for both second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. A jury convicted Petitioner of second-degree murder, and the circuit court sentenced Petitioner to the maximum term of forty years in prison. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that it could convict Petitioner of second-degree murder if it found intent to kill or to cause great bodily injury; and (2) the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that it could not convict Petitioner of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of second-degree murder without proof of sudden provocation and heat of passion. |
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| State v. Legg |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 19-0875 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Armstead Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court answered four certified questions regarding West Virginia's conspiracy statute contained in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, W. Va. Code 60A-4-414 and remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. Petitioner was indicted for the offense of conspiracy. Only one other con-conspirator was named in the indictments. As to the certified questions, the Supreme Court held (1) an indictment alleging a conspiracy involving a single defendant and only one other co-conspirator is sufficient to put the defendant on notice that he may be held responsible under section 60A-4-414(f) for the quantity of drugs delivered or possessed with intent to deliver solely by the co-conspirator to other persons not named in the indictment; (2) for purposes of a crime under section 60A-4-414(b), section 60A-4-414(f) requires that overt acts have to be in furtherance of the conspiracy before the trier of fact can attribute to the defendant all of the controlled substances possessed with intent to deliver or manufacture by other participants or members of the conspiracy; and (3) the amount of substances attributable to a Defendant under section 60A-4-414(b) is subject to the foreseeability principles of Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). The final certified question answered a question about conflict of interest. |
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| State v. Smith |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 19-0143 Opinion Date: June 16, 2020 Judge: Walker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated Petitioner's kidnapping convictions and affirmed his remaining convictions, holding that the indictment omitted an essential element of the crime of kidnapping. A grand jury indicted Petitioner on two counts of kidnapping, three counts of wanton endangerment, and one count of breaking and entering. A jury convicted Petitioner on all counts. Petitioner moved for a new trial, arguing that counts one and two of the indictment omitted the essential element of "transportation" of the crime of kidnapping. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the part of the circuit court's order as to Petitioner's kidnapping convictions and otherwise affirmed, holding that the indictment omitted an essential element of the crime of kidnapping, which rendered the kidnapping counts of the indictment insufficient under W. Va. Const. art. III, 14 and W. Va. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). |
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| Skindzelewski v. Smith |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2018AP000623 Opinion Date: June 18, 2020 Judge: Ann Walsh Bradley Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant, Plaintiff's former criminal defense attorney, on Plaintiff's legal malpractice claim, holding that nothing about Plaintiff's case warranted developing an exception to the actual innocence rule. The actual innocence rule requires a criminal defendant who brings a legal malpractice action against his defense attorney to establish that the defendant did not commit the crime of which he was convicted. Plaintiff conceded that he was guilty but argued that Wisconsin courts should create an exception to the actual innocence rule. The circuit court declined to adopt a novel exception to prevailing law, applied the actual innocence rule, and granted summary judgment for Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of establishing a compelling reason to change existing law; and (2) because Plaintiff conceded guilt, his claim of legal malpractice was legally barred. |
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| Tamblyn v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 76 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Kautz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor, third-degree sexual abuse of a minor, and incest, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the victim competent to testify as a witness and that Defendant was not denied his constitutional right to confront a witness against him. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion in finding the victim competent to testify and that, due to her incompetency, as well as her behavior at trial, he was denied his right to confront her as a witness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the victim competent to testify; (2) Defendant was not denied his right to effectively cross-examine the victim; and (3) any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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| Wanberg v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 75 Opinion Date: June 15, 2020 Judge: Kautz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court remanded this matter to the district court for correction of its written sentencing order, holding that the district court's written sentence differed from its oral pronouncement, requiring a remand. Defendant pled no contest to aggravated battery. The district court imposed a three to five year sentence. The court then stated that it would suspend incarceration and place Defendant on supervised probation for a period of three years. Thereafter, the district court signed a written judgment and sentence stating that "probation shall continue for a period of 5 years...." The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion to withdraw his no contest plea; and (2) the sentence was improper to the extent it differed from the district court's oral pronouncement. |
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