Can a President Who Is Reelected After Being Acquitted in One Impeachment Case be Retried by a Subsequent Senate?

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois law dean and professor Vikram David Amar considers whether a President who has been impeached and acquitted may, if reelected, be retried by a subsequent Senate. Amar acknowledges that it is unclear whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ criminal procedural protections apply to impeachment proceedings, but he offers two key reasons that re-litigation of impeachment allegations after presidential reelection would be improper.

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Vera v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 18-2345

Opinion Date: December 30, 2019

Judge: Susan Laura Carney

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, International Law

BBVA appealed the district court's judgment entered following the Second Circuit's mandate in Vera v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., 729 Fed. App'x 106 (2d Cir. 2018). The judgment rendered final several of its previous orders requiring BBVA to turn over funds to petitioners from a blocked electronic fund transfer originated by the Cuban Import‐Export Corporation, an instrumentality of the Republic of Cuba. The turnover orders rested on the district court's grant of full faith and credit to default judgments that petitioners secured against Cuba in the Florida state courts. The Florida state courts had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The court reversed the judgment, vacated the turnover orders, and remanded with instructions, holding that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the enforcement proceeding under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA). In this case, petitioners failed to show under 28 U.S.C. 1605A either that (1) Cuba was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism "as a result" of the pre‐1982 acts underlying their judgments or that (2) the acts underlying their judgments occurred after 1982. Therefore, without either showing, the state-sponsored terrorism exception did not permit the district court to exercise jurisdiction over Cuba's assets under section 201(a) of TRIA.

Inclusive Communities Project v. Department of Treasury

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-10377

Opinion Date: December 30, 2019

Judge: Jerry E. Smith

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law

ICP filed suit against Treasury and OCC, alleging claims under Section 3608 of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Fifth Amendment. ICP alleged that defendants failed to regulate the federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program so as to promote fair housing. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on three grounds. The court held that ICP lacked standing to sue either OCC or Treasury, because ICP could not establish causation or redressability. In this case, neither defendant regulates ICP. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to ICP's claims against OCC and Section 3608 claims against Treasury. Because the district court reached the merits of ICP's Fifth Amendment claim against Treasury, the court vacated the summary judgment and rendered a judgment of dismissal for want of jurisdiction.

United States ex rel. Alexander Volkhoff, LLC v. Janssen Pharmaceutica NV

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 18-55643

Opinion Date: January 2, 2020

Judge: Milan D. Smith

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

Volkhoff appealed the district court's dismissal of the qui tam complaint filed by relator under the False Claims Act (FCA) and analogous state false claims laws. The Ninth Circuit dismissed Volkhoff's appeal based on lack of appellate jurisdiction, because Volkhoff was not a party to relator's complaint, and it was not clear from Volkhoff's notice of appeal, as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), whether relator also sought to take an appeal.

Caballero v. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaria

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-4037

Opinion Date: December 27, 2019

Judge: Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Personal Injury

Antonio Caballero filed the underlying lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah seeking a “judgment on a judgment” he had obtained from a Florida state court. The complaint asserted he expected to proceed against assets located in Utah pursuant to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”). Caballero served defendants with process in the federal suit; none answered or otherwise participated i the Utah action. The federal district court registered the Florida state-court judgment under 28 U.S.C. 1963, but denied all other relief because Caballero did not establish personal jurisdiction over the defendants. As a result, Caballero could not utilize federal district court collection procedures. Caballero moved to alter or amend the judgment, which the district court denied. He appealed both orders. The Tenth Circuit determined section 1963 applied only to registration of federal-court judgments in federal courts, not to state-court judgments. Consequently, the Court reversed the district court’s judgment registering the Florida state-court judgment in Utah federal court. The Court determined Caballero’s civil cover sheet filed with the district court indicated the basis of jurisdiction was federal question; Caballero might have been able to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the TRIA if permitted to amend his complaint. The Tenth Circuit reversed to allow Caballero to amend his complaint.

McCowan v. Morales

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 18-2169

Opinion Date: December 27, 2019

Judge: David M. Ebel

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law

In an interlocutory appeal, Defendant Mark Moralez, a Las Cruces, New Mexico police officer, challenged a district court’s decision to deny him summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity from two of Plaintiff Warren McCowan’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. Those claims alleged that the officer: (1) used excessive force against McCowan while driving him to the police station after having arrested him for drunk driving; and (2) was deliberately indifferent to McCowan’s serious medical needs (his injured shoulders) while at the police station, before transporting McCowan to the county detention center where medical care was available. McCowan based his excessive-force claim on his assertion that Officer Moralez placed McCowan in the back seat of a patrol car, handcuffed behind his back and unrestrained by a seatbelt, and then drove recklessly to the police station, knowing his driving was violently tossing McCowan back and forth across the backseat. This rough ride, McCowan contended, injured his shoulders, after McCowan had advised the officer before the trip to the station that he had a previous shoulder injury. McCowan’s second claim alleged that Officer Moralez was deliberately indifferent to McCowan’s serious medical needs by delaying McCowan’s access to medical care until he arrived at the county detention center. The Tenth Circuit affirmed as to both counts; the allegations alleged a clearly established violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Officer Moralez qualified immunity.

Mountain Dudes v. Split Rock Holdings

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 18-4049

Opinion Date: December 27, 2019

Judge: David M. Ebel

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure

At issue in this appeal was Mountain Dude’s claims brought under Utah’s Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”). Mountain Dudes was the creditor to Split Rock, Inc. (“SRI”). Mountain Dudes obtained a $1.75 million judgment against SRI as the result of a dispute over a home Mountain Dudes purchased from SRI. At the same time of the Mountain Dude/SRI dispute, a land developer in St. George, Utah went over $50 million in debt during the 2008 recession. SRI transferred all of its remaining assets to a newly formed business, Split Rock Holdings, LLC (“SR Holdings”). Though the transaction occurred between two entities, many of the same individuals were involved on both sides of that deal. Mountain Dudes, as SRI’s creditor, had hoped to levy periodic payments that SR Holdings agreed to make to SRI on a $2.7 million obligation. Before any such payments were due, however, SRI and SR Holdings modified the original Sale of Asset Agreement. Ultimately, SR Holdings paid SRI a total of $188,000 under the Modification’s terms. Over approximately the same time period, SR Holdings disbursed $1.1 million to three of the individual Defendants—Platt, Bylund and Manning. Mountain Dudes filed suit relating to the Modification pursuant to the UFTA. Resolution of this appeal turned primarily on a procedural matter involving how the sufficiency of evidence presented at a civil jury trial could be challenged. The Tenth Circuit determined the district court deprived Mountain Dudes LLC of that opportunity. Instead, after the jury was unable to reach a verdict on Mountain Dudes’ UFTA claims, the district court invoked Rule 50(b) to grant Defendants judgment as a matter of law on grounds the court raised sua sponte after the jury deadlocked. That, the Tenth Circuit held, It therefore reversed the judgment the district court entered sua sponte in Defendants’ favor. However, the Court affirmed the district court’s other rulings rejecting the grounds the various parties did raise seeking judgment as a matter of law.

New Mexico Health Connections v. HHS

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 18-2186

Opinion Date: December 31, 2019

Judge: Scott Milne Matheson, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Insurance Law

Among its reforms, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) required private health insurers to provide coverage for individuals regardless of their gender or health status, including preexisting conditions. Congress anticipated these reforms might hamper the ability of insurers to predict health care costs and to price health insurance premiums as more individuals sought health insurance. To spread the risk of enrolling people who might need more health care than others, Congress established a risk adjustment program for the individual and small group health insurance markets. Congress tasked the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) with designing and implementing this risk adjustment program with the states. HHS developed a formula to calculate how much each insurer would be charged or paid in each state. The formula relied on the “statewide average premium” to calculate charges and payments. Plaintiff-Appellee New Mexico Health Connections (“NMHC”), an insurer that was required to pay charges under the program, sued the HHS Defendants-Appellants under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), alleging that HHS’s use of the statewide average premium to calculate charges and payments in New Mexico from 2014 through 2018 was arbitrary and capricious. The district court granted summary judgment to NMHC, holding that HHS violated the APA by failing to explain why the agency chose to use the statewide average premium in its program. It remanded to the agency and vacated the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 rules that implemented the program. After the district court denied HHS’s motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), HHS appealed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: (1) determined NMHC’s claims regarding the 2017 and 2018 rules were moot, so the matter was remanded to the district court to vacate its judgment on those claims and dismiss them as moot; (2) reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to NMHC as to the 2014, 2015, and 2016 rules because it determined HHS acted reasonably in explaining why it used the statewide average premium in the formula. Because the Court reversed the district court on its summary judgment ruling in favor of NMHC, it did not address the denial of HHS’s Rule 59(e) motion.

Halyard Health, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B294567(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 2, 2020

Judge: Baker

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

After Kimberly-Clark spun off its healthcare division to create a new Delaware company called Halyward Health, Halyward filed suit in Los Angeles Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not have to provide indemnity for the punitive damages awarded in a recently filed class action concerning surgical gowns sold by Kimberly-Clark. The Court of Appeal held that the indemnification dispute was not sufficiently related to California for courts of the state to exercise personal jurisdiction over Kimberly-Clark. In this case, the litigation did not arise out of or relate to Kimberly-Clark's medical gown sales and marketing in California. Furthermore, the distribution agreement was not a "California-directed" contract conferring personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of Kimberly-Clark's motion to quash the service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Ojjeh v. Brown

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A154889(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 31, 2019

Judge: Fujisaki

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Communications Law, Contracts

Defendants solicited and obtained $180,000 from plaintiff produce a documentary on the Syrian refugee crisis. Plaintiff sued, alleging that no “significant” work on the documentary has occurred, that defendants never intended to make the documentary, and that a cinematographer has not been paid and claims the right to any footage he has shot, putting the project in jeopardy. Defendants filed an unsuccessful anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation (Code Civ. Proc. 425.16)) motion to strike, arguing the complaint arises out of acts in furtherance of their right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest--their newsgathering related to the Syrian refugee crisis, and that plaintiff could not demonstrate minimal merit on his claims because the action is subject to an arbitration provision; plaintiff’s allegations are contradicted by the investor agreement; and the evidence establishes that substantial progress was made. The court found that plaintiff’s claims did not arise out of acts in furtherance of defendants’ protected speech but were “based on the failure to do acts in furtherance of the right of free speech." The court of appeal reversed. Defendants made a prima facie showing that the complaint targets conduct falling within the “catchall” provision of the anti-SLAPP law. Defendants’ solicitation of investments and their performance of allegedly unsatisfactory work on the documentary constituted activity in furtherance of their right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest. The court erred in denying the motion at the first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

Lewis v. Albuquerque Public Schools

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Citation: 2019-NMSC-022

Opinion Date: November 18, 2019

Judge: Barbara J. Vigil

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Following the death of Patricia Lewis (Worker), her widower Michael Lewis (Petitioner) was awarded death benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) based the award on the finding that Worker, while employed with Albuquerque Public Schools (Employer), contracted allergic bronchopulmonary aspergillosis (ABPA) which proximately resulted in Worker’s death. Employer appealed the award to the Court of Appeals. Pertinent here, the appellate court concluded: (1) the WCJ correctly rejected Employer’s argument that Petitioner’s claim for death benefits was time-barred; and (2) he WCJ erred in excluding from evidence certain medical testimony and records which Employer contended related to Worker’s cause of death. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded the case for retrial on whether Worker’s ABPA “'proximately result[ed]’” in her death. On the first issue, the New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Petitioner’s claim for death benefits was not time-barred, and affirmed. On the second issue concerning the WCJ’s exclusion of medical testimony and evidence on Worker’s cause of death, the Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of Section 52-1-51(C), but agreed based on the Supreme Court's own interpretation of Section 52-1-51(C) that the case had to be remanded for further proceedings. In all other respects, the opinion of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

In re M.E.

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2019 VT 90

Opinion Date: December 27, 2019

Judge: Carroll

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law

Juvenile M.E. appealed the family division’s dismissal of the State’s petition to declare her a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). In May 2019, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging that M.E. was without proper parental care. The CHINS petition was based on mother’s admitted use of heroin on one occasion and allegations that M.E. had been exposed to drug use and paraphernalia while in the care of her parents. The court issued an emergency care order transferring custody to DCF. After a temporary care hearing, custody was continued with DCF. A merits hearing was held; subsequently the court concluded the State failed to establish the merits and dismissed the petition. “[A]ny time the State seeks to interfere with the rights of parents on the generalized assumption that the children are in need of care and supervision, it must first produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the statutory directives allowing such intervention are fully satisfied.” The fact that there was evidence in the record to contradict the court’s findings was insufficient for the Vermont Supreme Court to reverse the trial court’s conclusion. Accordingly, the Court affirmed dismissal of the CHINS petition.