The Future of Faithless Electors and the National Popular Vote Compact: Part Two in a Two-Part Series

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

In this second of a two-part series of columns about the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in the “faithless elector cases, Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar describes some good news that we may glean from those cases. Specifically, Amar points out that states have many ways of reducing elector faithlessness, and he lists three ways in which the Court’s decision paves the way for advances in the National Popular Vote (NPV) Interstate Compact movement.

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Impoverishing Women: Supreme Court Upholds Trump Administration’s Religious and Moral Exemptions to Contraceptive Mandate

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision upholding the Trump administration’s religious and moral exemptions to the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Grossman provides a brief history of the conflict over the growing politicization of contraception in the United States and argues that the exemptions at issue in this case should never have been promulgated in the first place because they have no support in science or public policy.

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Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co.

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-1692

Opinion Date: July 13, 2020

Judge: Restrepo

Areas of Law: Class Action, Environmental Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Baptistes filed suit on behalf of a class of homeowner-occupants and renters (about 8,400 households) claiming interference with the use and enjoyment of their homes and loss in property value caused by noxious odors and other air contaminants emanating from the 224-acre Bethlehem Landfill. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. While everyone in the community—including visitors, commuters, and residents—may suffer from having to breathe polluted air in public spaces, the Baptistes have identified cumulative harms that are unique to residents, such as the inability to use and enjoy their outdoor spaces. These injuries are above and beyond any injury to the public; the Baptistes sufficiently alleged a “particular damage” to sustain a private claim for public nuisance. They also stated a claim for private nuisance. Pennsylvania law does not reject a private nuisance claim on the ground that the property affected was too far from the source of the alleged nuisance. Nor does Pennsylvania law condition an individual’s right to recover private property damages on a nuisance theory on the size of the nuisance or the number of persons harmed, as opposed to the nature of the rights affected or the degree of the harm suffered. The question remains whether the Baptistes have sufficiently pleaded a cognizable injury to state an independent negligence claim.

Hardy v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Docket: 19-1793

Opinion Date: July 15, 2020

Judge: Stoll

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Hardy owns land in Newton County, Georgia, through which CGA operated a rail line. CGA’s predecessor acquired interests in Hardy’s parcels through various deeds. In 2013, CGA applied for authority to abandon a portion of its rail line by filing a notice of exemption from formal abandonment proceedings with the Surface Transportation Board (STB). The Foundation requested interim trail use under the National Trail Systems Act, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The STB issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (NITU). In 2016, CGA notified the STB that the map attached to CGA’s notice of exemption was inaccurate and attached a corrected map. The STB accepted CGA’s revised map and modified 2013 NITU “effective on its date of service.” Hardy filed suit, alleging that the 2013 NITU caused takings by preventing CGA’s abandonment of sections of the rail line running through Hardy’s parcels. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment that Hardy has a cognizable property interest; the deeds conveyed easements rather than fee simple estates. The court vacated a holding that the NITU caused a temporary taking of parcels that were erroneously included in the description of the land. In a rails-to-trails case, a taking occurs when a “NITU is issued and state law reversionary interests that would otherwise take effect pursuant to normal abandonment proceedings are forestalled.” The court remanded for determinations of whether or when the Railroad would have abandoned the easements absent the NITU.

Bachner Company, Inc. v. Alaska Department of Administration

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-17150

Opinion Date: July 10, 2020

Judge: Peter J. Maassen

Areas of Law: Contracts, Government & Administrative Law, Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law

The Bachner Company leased office space to the State of Alaska. The lease stipulated that the State would occupy 15,730 square feet of space but would not have to pay rent on 1,400 square feet of that space during the lease’s initial ten-year term. The lease further specified that if it was extended beyond the initial term the parties would negotiate a rate for the free space and the State would pay for it. Toward the end of the initial term the State exercised its first renewal option and opened negotiations with the company over the free space’s value. The parties retained an expert to value the space, but the State questioned his methods and conclusions. The State also resisted the company’s claim that the State should begin paying rent for additional space, not identified in the lease, that the company contended the State had been occupying. The parties failed to reach agreement, and the State did not pay rent for any of the extra square footage. Eventually the State executed a unilateral amendment to the lease based on the expert’s valuation and, ten months after the end of the lease’s initial term, paid all past-due rent for the formerly free space identified in the lease. The company filed a claim with the Department of Administration, contending that the State had materially breached the lease, the lease was terminated, and the State owed additional rent. A contracting officer rejected the claim, and on appeal an administrative law judge found there was no material breach, the lease had been properly extended, and the company had waived any claim regarding space not identified in the lease. The Commissioner of the Department of Administration adopted the administrative law judge’s findings and conclusions. The superior court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision except with regard to the space not identified in the lease; it directed the company to pursue any such claim in a separate action. Both parties appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the administrative law judge's findings were supported by substantial evidence, and because the lease did not terminate under the Supreme Court's interpretation of it, the Court affirmed the Commissioner's decision except with regard to the company's claim to rent for space not identified in the lease. The Court concluded that, to the extent it sought rent after the end of the initial term, it was not waived by the document on which the administrative law judge relied to find waiver. Only that issue was remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration.

Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S248141

Opinion Date: July 16, 2020

Judge: Groban

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

In this inverse condemnation action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal reversing the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court erred in borrowing section 1260.040 from the Eminent Domain Law and using to it making a dispositive pretrial ruling on inverse condemnation liability. The public entity defendants in this inverse condemnation action asked the trial court to use Cal. Code Civ. P. 1260.40, which authorizes a pretrial motion for a ruling on "an evidentiary or other legal issue affecting the determination of compensation," in inverse condemnation procedure. The trial court granted the motions and entered judgment in the defendants' favor. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the procedure at issue did not meaningfully supplement existing pretrial procedures governing a summary judgment motion. Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court declines to import section 1260.070 into inverse condemnation procedure; and (2) the trial erred in entering judgment on the defendants' "Motion for Legal Determination of Liability," holding that the trial court erred in using the procedures because the summary judgment statute was available for that purpose, and any disputes could have been resolved in a bench trial.

Vasquez v. LBS Financial Credit Union

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B292390(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 14, 2020

Judge: Feuer

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

In a quiet title action, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of homeowners and Brighten Lending. The court held that the homeowners did not have inquiry or constructive notice of the LBS abstracts recorded under a different first name. The court explained that the burden was on LBS to record the abstracts of judgment against the previous homeowner (Guerrero) under the name appearing on the title of his property, not on the homeowners to identify the LBS abstracts recorded on a variation of Guerrero's name using his middle name as a first name.

Bliss v. Minidoka Irrigation District

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46374

Opinion Date: July 15, 2020

Judge: Roger S. Burdick

Areas of Law: Business Law, Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Victor Bliss appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Minidoka Irrigation District (“MID”). Bliss filed a complaint against MID in April 2017, alleging: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) trespass; (4) declaratory relief; and (5) wrongful prosecution/infliction of extreme emotional distress. The complaint encompassed multiple events stemming from his decades-long relationship with MID. The district court granted MID’s motion for summary judgment on all claims, dismissing Bliss’s complaint for lack of notice under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, lack of standing, and failure to produce evidence. Bliss timely appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment.

Cazier Revocable Trust v. Cazier

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46852

Opinion Date: July 15, 2020

Judge: Bevan

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Lola L. Cazier Revocable Trust (“Trust”) brought a quiet title action against Charles Drake Cazier (“Drake”) and Land Renewal Management, Inc. (“LRM”) pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-401. Drake answered separately from LRM and asserted a counterclaim against the Trust. The Trust moved to dismiss Drake’s counterclaim under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), then filed a motion for summary judgment against both defendants. LRM also filed a motion under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Trust’s cause of action against it. The district court granted summary judgment to the Trust and dismissed Drake’s counterclaim, awarding attorney fees against both defendants in the process. Drake and LRM appealed, arguing the district court erroneously dismissed Drake’s counterclaim and failed to properly dismiss LRM from the case. Drake and LRM also appealed the district court’s award of fees and costs, arguing several evidentiary errors and that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Trust and affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings.

Gregory v. Stallings

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil

Docket: 46818

Opinion Date: July 15, 2020

Judge: Roger S. Burdick

Areas of Law: Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law

Jonathon Gregory appealed a district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of Richard and Eileen Stallings (collectively, “the Stallings”) in a breach-of-contract action stemming from the parties’ oral agreement to develop real property in Rexburg, Idaho. The property was sold in December 2012. Gregory, believing the Stallings wrongfully withheld a portion of the proceeds, filed a complaint in September 2017. The district court granted the Stallings’ subsequent motion for summary judgment, concluding that Gregory’s cause of action was barred by Idaho Code section 5-217’s four-year statute of limitations. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Stallings because Gregory's cause of action was indeed barred by the statute of limitations in Idaho Code 5-217. Further, Gregory’s equitable-estoppel claim failed because he could not show that he pursued his claim in a reasonable amount of time.

AIM Development (USA), LLC, Appellant, v. City of Sartell

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A18-0443

Opinion Date: July 15, 2020

Judge: McKeig

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals defining AIM Development, LLC's nonconforming-use rights on a property containing a facility for nonhazardous, non-toxic industrial waste based on the terms of a state permit in effect at the time that it purchased the property, holding that a property owner's nonconforming-use rights are defined by the uses lawfully existing at the time of the adverse zoning change. In 2013, AIM Development purchased the property containing the waste facility, which had operated as a nonconforming use since 1989. At issue was the scope of AIM Development's nonconforming-use rights and whether the waste facility may accept waste from more than one source. Based on the terms of a state permit in effect when AIM Development purchase the property the court of appeals determined that the facility was limited to accepting waste from a recently demolished paper mill. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in defining the scope of the nonconformity by the state permit; and (2) accepting waste from more than one source does not, standing alone, constitute an impermissible expansion of AIM Development's nonconforming-use rights.

White Bear Lake Restoration Ass'n, ex rel. State v. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A18-0750

Opinion Date: July 15, 2020

Judge: David L. Lillehaug

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this case brought by two associations against the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) arising out of alleged mismanagement of the groundwater-appropriation permitting process, the Supreme Court held that the two associations stated a claim under Minn. Stat. 116B.03 and that one of the associations failed to state a claim under the public trust doctrine. Two associations brought this suit against the DNR, alleging violations of the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act under section 116B.03 based on alleged pollution and impairment of White Bear Lake. The associations alleged that the DNR mismanaged the groundwater-appropriations permitting process, resulting in the lake's water levels reaching historic lows. One of the associations added a claim that the DNR had violated the common-law public trust doctrine. The district court found that the DNR had violated by section 116B.03 and the public trust doctrine. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) erred in concluding that the associations did not state a claim under section 116B.03; and (2) did not err in concluding that the one association failed to state a claim under the public trust doctrine.

Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co.

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 UT 47

Opinion Date: July 13, 2020

Judge: Thomas R. Lee

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the district court against Rocky Ford Irrigation Company on its lawsuit against Kents Lake Reservoir Company seeking clarification regarding the priority of the parties' rights and Kents Lake's obligations as to the Beaver River administration and measurement, holding that the district court erred in denying Rocky Ford's motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's denial of Rocky Ford's motion for summary judgment, holding that Rocky Ford was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the second point on which it sought a declaration of rights; (2) affirmed the court's decision refusing to declare that Kents Lake could not store its efficiency gains; (3) reversed the court's denial of Rocky Ford's request for declaratory judgment as to Kents Lake's measurement obligations under a 1931 Beaver River Decree, holding that the clarification Rocky Ford sought was warranted; (4) affirmed the court's decision refusing to rescind the agreement entered into by the parties in 1953; and (5) reversed the decision awarding attorney fees to Kents Lake and Beaver City, holding that there was no basis for a determination that Rocky Ford filed or pursued its claims in bad faith.