| Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez |
| Court: US Supreme Court Docket: 18-8369 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Elena Kagan Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) established the three-strikes rule, which generally prevents a prisoner from bringing suit in forma pauperis (IFP) if he has had three or more prior suits dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Colorado inmate Lomax sued prison officials to challenge his expulsion from the facility’s sex-offender treatment program and moved for IFP status. He had already brought three unsuccessful legal actions during his time in prison. The district court and Tenth Circuit rejected Lomax’s argument that two of the dismissals should not count as strikes because they were without prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed. Section 1915(g)’s three-strikes provision refers to any dismissal for failure to state a claim, whether with prejudice or without. A Section 1915(g) strike-call hinges exclusively on the basis for the dismissal, regardless of the decision’s prejudicial effect. Courts can and sometimes do dismiss frivolous actions without prejudice. |
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| United States v. McBride |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-2197 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to, and possessing the firearm in furtherance of, a drug trafficking crime (Count Three), holding that Defendant's arguments on appeal were unavailing. In determining Defendant's guilt on Count Three, the jury was asked one special interrogatory and determined that the government had not proven that the firearm was discharged. In challenging his conviction on Count Three, Defendant argued that the indictment was constructively amended in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Clause and that the jury's verdict on Count Three and the special interrogatory answer were irreconcilably inconsistent. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was no constructive amendment of the indictment; and (2) the jury verdict on Count Three and the special interrogatory answer were not inconsistent. |
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| United States v. Mendoza-Maisonet |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1190 Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Torruella Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence for possession of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking crimes and of possession with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine base, holding that Defendant was not entitled to reversal on any of his claims. Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the evidence of Defendant's guilt was sufficient to support the jury's verdict; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the statements he provided to law enforcement or the evidence seized from the residence; (3) the district court did not clearly err in imposing the sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice because Defendant perjured himself; and (4) the district court did not err in rejecting Defendant's request for a reduction in his offense level based on his claimed minimal participation in the offenses. |
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| Adar Bays, LLC v. GeneSYS ID, Inc. |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3023 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Barrington D. Parker Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Securities Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals: 1) Whether a stock conversion option that permits a lender, in its sole discretion, to convert any outstanding balance to shares of stock at a fixed discount should be treated as interest for the purpose of determining whether the transaction violates N.Y. Penal Law 190.40, the criminal usury law. 2) If the interest charged on a loan is determined to be criminally usurious under N.Y. Penal Law 190.40, whether the contract is void ab initio pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law 5-511. |
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| United States v. Davis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-874 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Robert A. Katzmann Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's motion for a reduced sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. Defendant was sentenced in August 2009 after pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. The court held that Section 404 eligibility depends on the statutory offense for which a defendant was sentenced, not the particulars of any given defendant’s underlying conduct. In this case, because Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 modified the statutory penalties for the offense for which defendant was sentenced, the court held that defendant was eligible for Section 404 relief. |
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| United States v. Estevez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 17-4159 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Amalya Lyle Kearse Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for being in possession of a firearm. The court held that the general unanimity charge delivered by the district court was correct and adequate. Even if there was error, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence that defendant possessed the firearm. The court also held that defendant's sentence was not procedurally unreasonable and there was no error nor abuse of discretion in applying the USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement. Furthermore, defendant's 100-month sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and imposed a sentence that was well within the district court's discretion. |
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| United States v. Thompson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-2545 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: John M. Walker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana. The district court sentenced defendant to 10 years in prison under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B), which specified a mandatory minimum of 10 years' imprisonment for defendants with a prior conviction for a felony drug offense. The court held that the district court erred in treating defendant's prior N.Y. Penal Law section 220.31 conviction as a predicate felony drug offense under the categorical approach because section 220.31 criminalized conduct beyond the scope of the federal analog. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Vargas |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-463 Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Gerard E. Lynch Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| A district court has the power to deny a government motion under USSG 3E1.1(b). The Second Circuit held that the district court committed procedural error in sentencing defendant after she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute narcotics. In this case, the district court erred as a matter of law in denying the government's motion to accord defendant an additional one-level downward adjustment for timely acceptance of responsibility under USSG 3E1.1(b). Therefore, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| Davis v. Samuels |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 18-1204 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Jordan Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| While imprisoned at Moshannon Valley Correctional Center ()MVCC), Davis, a Jamaican national, requested permission to marry a non-inmate U.S. citizen. MVCC apparently imposed requirements on those wishing to get married, beyond the requirements specified in the Federal Bureau of Prison regulations. Davis alleges that, despite having complied with all requirements, including MVCC’s additional requirements, Warden Wigen denied the request. MVCC almost exclusively houses foreign nationals who have been ordered to be deported or are facing immigration proceedings. Davis claims that federal defendants and officials of GEO, a company that operates private prisons on behalf of the government, conspired to ensure that no MVCC inmate can get married; marriage could complicate, and perhaps stop, removal and other immigration proceedings. The Third Circuit vacated the dismissal of section 1983 claims, reasoning that the complaint did not allege a purely private conspiracy, so a basic premise of the district court’s decision on the availability of relief was erroneous. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Bivens claim as asking for an unsupportable extension of Bivens liability; the Supreme Court has never recognized or been asked to recognize, a Bivens remedy for infringement of the right to marry. The court affirmed the dismissal of other 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and 2000d claims. |
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| United States v. Scripps |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 18-2663 Opinion Date: June 10, 2020 Judge: Rendell Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Scripps was convicted of wire fraud for transferring millions of dollars from the bank accounts of his mother and autistic uncle—heirs to the family’s publishing fortune—into his own account. During sentencing arguments, the court repeatedly indicated that Scripps could address the court without personally asking Scripps if he wished to speak. The court asked defense counsel (Dezsi) whether Scripps wished to address the court. Dezsi stated that Scripps did not. The judge later concluded that “[t]here’s nothing in this record from which I could fairly conclude there’s any remorse” and sentenced Scripps to 108 months’ imprisonment, the maximum period of incarceration within the Guidelines range. On appeal, with Scripps represented by Dezsi, the Third Circuit affirmed. Scripps filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C 2255 motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, including by failing to argue that the judge erred by not personally inviting Scripps to speak during sentencing. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) requires a sentencing judge to “address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.” The Third Circuit reversed. The district court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. It is possible that appellate counsel’s failure to raise Rule 32 error “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” The Supreme Court has held that a Rule 32 query, directed towards counsel, does not satisfy the requirement that the court personally address the defendant. |
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| United States v. Torres |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-2940 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Porter Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| New York City Officer Pickel was patrolling an area known for violent crime, when a man flagged him down, pointing to the only pedestrian on a bridge (later identified as Torres). The man stated that Torres fired a gun into an old factory across the street. Pickel radioed for backup and followed Torres in his car, believing that Torres posed a potential danger to others and that any delay would make it difficult to locate Torres. As other officers arrived, Pickel activated his emergency lights, exited his patrol car, drew his service pistol, and ordered Torres to “get to the ground.” Torres complied. Officer Hatterer knelt and asked Torres if he had a firearm. According to Hatterer, Torres indicated that it was in his right pocket. Hatterer handcuffed Torres; another officer retrieved the firearm. The district court denied a motion to suppress, reasoning that the gun was found during a constitutional “Terry” investigatory stop rather than during an arrest and that Pickel had reasonable suspicion. Convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, Terry received the mandatory-minimum sentence, 180 months’ imprisonment, based on enhanced sentencing under 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act. Although Torres' prior state drug possession offenses were part of a federal drug distribution conspiracy conviction, the conspiracy conviction counted as a separate predicate offense. The Third Circuit affirmed. A drug conspiracy conviction counts as an ACCA predicate offense, if it was distinct in time from the underlying substantive offenses. |
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| United States v. Van Donk |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Dockets: 19-4588, 20-4167 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Albert Diaz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of a condition of supervised release requiring defendant to comply with the rules of his sex-offender treatment program, which ban him from viewing any materials that sexually arouse him. The court held that the ban is permissible under 18 U.S.C. 3583(d) and is not overbroad because the district court made an individualized assessment, based on the testimony of defendant's treatment provider, that it was necessary. Furthermore, it is enforced in a way that avoids the issues with which the vagueness doctrine is concerned, and it is not an impermissible delegation because only the district court will decide whether defendant violated his conditions of release. |
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| Alexis v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-60748 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: James Earl Graves, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's decision finding petitioner removable under Section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and denying petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Fifth Circuit held that petitioner failed to show a realistic probability that his conviction for possession of cocaine under the Texas statute criminalizes a broader range of conduct than the federal generic definition for cocaine. The court also held that petitioner failed to demonstrate error in the BIA's denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review of the final order of removal and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the petition for review of his eligibility for relief and protection. |
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| United States v. Harris |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-40635 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Priscilla R. Owen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit held that sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for two counts of carjacking where a reasonable jury could infer that defendant had the intent to kill if necessary at the moment that he took the vehicle. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions. Furthermore, because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict defendant on both underlying carjacking counts, defendant's convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) stand. The court also affirmed the district court's imposition of special conditions of supervised release, because the district court's oral adoption of the conditions in the presentencing report satisfied the district court's pronouncement obligations to the extent it was required to do so. |
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| United States v. Ramos Juarez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-20535 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal and dismissed his original appeal. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because defendant failed to demonstrate either excusable neglect or good cause for untimely filing his notice of appeal. In this case, the district court, immediately after imposing defendant's sentence, orally advised him of his right to appeal and of his right to counsel on appeal; expressed confidence that his present counsel would advise him of his appeal rights; and signed and gave to defendant a written notice of his appeal rights. |
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| United States v. Reyes |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10291 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Jerry E. Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence after she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. The court held that the officer who pulled defendant over had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop for a canine sniff where the government offered several specific facts in support of reasonable suspicion. In this case, among other things, defendant was pulled over in a well known drug-trafficking corridor, she drove a truck registered in someone else's name, she took unusual measures to protect the truck, she offered inconsistent and implausible stories about the purpose of her travel, and she had a conviction for possession of meth. The court also held that defendant was not entitled to Miranda safeguards during the routine traffic stop. |
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| United States v. Staggers |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-31213 Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Carolyn Dineen King Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| On appeal, Defendants Staggers and Session argued that they should be resentenced because their convictions for their involvement in a drug conspiracy were not final when the First Step Act became effective. The Fifth Circuit held that the relevant provisions of the First Step Act do not apply to defendants who were sentenced before the Act's effective date. The court also held that Defendants Staggers and Morrison are not entitled to a new trial on their 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) convictions for possessing firearms as convicted felons. The court further held that Morrison's argument regarding his motion to suppress is the only single-defendant issue having any merit. Because a credibility determination was necessary, the court vacated the district court's decision to deny Morrison's motion to suppress and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. |
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| United States v. Dunnican |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3092 Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Bush Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Sixth Circuit affirmed Dunnican's convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g); possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D); and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court upheld the introduction of data extracted from Dunnican's cellular telephone and text messages. The stipulations of Federal Rule of Evidence 902 were met and the evidence was properly authenticated. Dunnican’s text messages are not hearsay because they are Dunnican’s own statements, regardless of the medium. Text messages regarding Dunnican's other drug transactions were relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show a necessary element of the charge: Dunnican’s intent to distribute the drug. The court properly allowed a DEA agent to offer expert opinion testimony that the marijuana appeared to be packaged for distribution. The agent offered no opinion on Dunnican’s mental state or intent but, drawing upon his training, experience, and the evidence, simply shared his subjective assessment of the facts. Dunnican was not entitled to a new trial following the dismissal of the only African-American jury member for health reasons. Dunnican’s speculation that there was “documented misconduct” during jury deliberations had no basis. A 21-month upward variance on Dunnican’s sentence was appropriate; the court reasonably concluded that an above-Guidelines sentence was necessary to advance the objectives of protecting the public and deterring Dunnican from future criminal conduct |
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| United States v. Smith |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3236 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Readler Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Smith was indicted for knowingly and intentionally distributing a mixture of heroin, fentanyl, and carfentanil, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The government filed a notice that Smith was subject to an increased statutory maximum sentence under section 841(b)(1)(C) due to a prior state felony drug-trafficking offense. Pleading guilty, Smith waived his right to appeal the conviction and sentence save for five enumerated circumstances, including the right to appeal the determination that he was a career offender. The PSR indicated that Smith was a career offender based upon one prior state felony drug trafficking conviction and a state felony conviction for five counts of aggravated robbery. Smith argued that the First Step Act rendered his section 841(b)(1)(C) statutory enhancement invalid and that his state convictions were no longer predicate offenses for determining career-offender status. Smith asked to withdraw his guilty plea, citing the First Step Act and his contention that his state aggravated-robbery conviction was not a crime of violence. The district court rejected Smith’s request to withdraw his plea and imposed a within-Guidelines 150-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Arguments regarding the First Step Act’s application to section 841(b)(1)(C) were not among the five issues Smith preserved for appeal. Employing the categorical approach, Smith’s violation of Ohio Revised Code 2925.03(A)(2) is a controlled substance offense under the Sentencing Guidelines. |
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| Wilson v. Williams |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 20-3447 Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Gibbons Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Inmates housed in the low-security Elkton Correctional Institution, on behalf of themselves and others, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to obtain release from custody to limit their exposure to the COVID-19 virus. They sought to represent all current and future Elkton inmates, including a subclass of inmates who—through age and/or certain medical conditions—were particularly vulnerable to complications, including death, if they contracted COVID-19. The district court entered a preliminary injunction in April 2020, directing the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to evaluate each subclass member’s eligibility for transfer by any means, including compassionate release, parole or community supervision, transfer furlough, or non-transfer furlough within two weeks; transfer those deemed ineligible for compassionate release to another facility where testing is available and physical distancing is possible; and not allow transferees to return to Elkton until certain conditions were met. The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction. While the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2241, that section does not permit some of the relief the petitioners sought. The court rejected the BOP’s attempts to classify the claims as “conditions of confinement” claims, subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The district court erred in finding a likelihood of success on the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim. There was sufficient evidence that the petitioners are “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” but the BOP responded reasonably to the known, serious risks posed by COVID-19. |
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| United States v. Brasher |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-1997 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: ROVNER Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Brasher was part of a narcotics conspiracy, headed by Shelton, centered in Louisville. Shelton typically “fronted” heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine to Brasher and accepted payment from the proceeds of Brasher’s subsequent re-sales of the substances. Brasher became Shelton's “number one customer.” Brasher sometimes supplied kilogram quantities of cocaine to Shelton that he obtained from his own supplier in Texas. Brasher and 14 others were charged with conspiracy to distribute narcotics in and around the Southern District of Indiana, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1). Only Brasher proceeded to trial. He was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that there was a material variance between the conspiracy as charged and as proven at trial, that the government’s proof constructively amended the indictment, that the government improperly exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude two African American venire members during jury selection, that the prosecutor made prejudicial remarks in closing argument, that the government made improper use of evidence obtained via court-authorized wiretaps, and that the court erroneously precluded Brasher from challenging a prior narcotics conviction that triggered his mandatory term of life imprisonment. |
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| United States v. Carter |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3713 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: HAMILTON Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Four months after escaping from a work-release facility, an intoxicated Carter walked into an Illinois bar. He told an employee that a white-supremacist gang was searching for him and then walked out. The employee called the police, who stopped Carter on the street and discovered an active arrest warrant related to his escape. As he was being handcuffed, Carter stated that he was “strapped” and gestured towards his pants. Officers seized a stolen, loaded semiautomatic pistol from Carter’s waistband. Carter pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court calculated his Sentencing Guideline range based on a finding that he had previously sustained at least two felony convictions for “crimes of violence,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2), and imposed a sentence of 105 months' imprisonment, at the top of the guideline range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Carter had at least two prior felony convictions (a California conviction for assault with a deadly weapon and an Iowa conviction for aggravated assault) that qualify as crimes of violence under the categorical approach. The court noted that district judges may and should use their sound discretion to sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) on the basis of reliable information about the defendant’s criminal history even where a strict categorical classification of a prior conviction might produce a different guideline sentencing range. |
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| United States v. Manyfield |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2096 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Manyfield pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography; he was sentenced to 120 months in prison. Within a year of his release from prison, Manyfield was twice found in possession of a cell phone with internet connectivity, in violation of his conditions of release. He had created accounts and accessed pornographic websites. He had hard-copy photos of what “appear[ed] to be minor females in sexually provocative poses.” Manyfield had not attended a sex-offender-treatment program; he followed Twitter accounts advertising images of underage girls. The probation officer recommended 18 months’ imprisonment (above the four-10 months’ Guidelines range) plus lifetime supervised release. Manyfield, then 67, did not dispute the allegations but argued that the recommended sentence was excessive under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), emphasizing his medical conditions. The court revoked Manyfield’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months' imprisonment, the maximum allowed under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), explaining that he was a danger to the community and that his criminal history—including abusing his minor stepdaughter—was “relevant.” The court imposed “lifetime supervised release with the same conditions that were imposed before.” The court neither read the conditions aloud nor asked whether Manyfield waived reading. The written judgment contained conditions that had not been proposed in the revocation petition. Several have been questioned since Manyfield’s original sentencing (prohibitions on “excessive” alcohol use and “frequenting” places where controlled substances are sold). The Seventh Circuit remanded for further consideration of the release conditions; the court properly justified the prison sentence and term of supervised release. |
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| United States v. Alaniz |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1439 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's reduction of defendant's sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court held that there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in a discretionary sentence reduction and thus the Due Process Clause does not afford procedural protections to those who seek one. Therefore, the court rejected defendant's claim that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing before it ruled on his motion. The court also held that there is enough information on the record for meaningful appellate review where the district court quoted the eligibility report and described, among other things, that defendant was the leader of a large drug conspiracy and issued multiple threats to codefendants, an attorney, and a government agent in an attempt to obstruct the investigation against him. |
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| United States v. Bruguier |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1375 Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Kobes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for four counts of sexual abuse, eight counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, and three counts of abusive sexual contact for abusing four different victims. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the statements made by defendant's girlfriend before she died failed to meet the requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 807(b) for the necessary circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The court also held that the district court did not err by applying a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1 for each of the four charged victims. Finally, the court rejected defendant's argument that the district court's application of the obstruction of justice enhancements made his sentence substantively unreasonable. |
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| United States v. Coleman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2068 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Jane Louise Kelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that defendant's plea was neither knowing nor intelligent because he did not have real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process. Furthermore, defendant's plea also violated Rule 11 because the district court did not advise him of the knowledge-of-status element established by Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). However, the court held that defendant's constitutionally invalid plea was not structural error and a defendant can only satisfy plain error review by showing that the error affected his or her substantial rights. In this case, defendant has not shown that either the constitutional error or the Rule 11 error affected his substantial rights and therefore he is not entitled to relief on plain error review. |
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| United States v. Harris |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2031 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: James B. Loken Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's reduction of defendant's sentence pursuant to the First Step Act. The court held that the district court accurately noted that the sentence sought to be reduced was a substantial downward variance from the applicable guideline range and concluded the initial variance had eliminated excessiveness the First Step Act was intended to remedy. Furthermore, in evaluating the existing sentence, the district court also considered post-sentence rehabilitation and the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors. The court also held that there was no procedural or legal error in defendant's 216 month sentence, and the district court did not abuse its substantial sentencing discretion or impose a substantively unreasonable sentence by declining to reduce defendant's sentence below 216 months imprisonment. |
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| United States v. Hodgkiss |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1423 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant argued on appeal that his possession of a firearm in June 2018 did not render him ineligible for the "safety valve" on his drug offense from April 2018. The court noted that even aside from 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(2) and possession of a firearm, the parties disagreed on whether defendant met the requirement of section 3553(f)(5) to provide certain truthful information to the government by the time of the sentencing hearing. In this case, the district court did not resolve the dispute and did not address whether it would sentence defendant to a term of less than 120 months even if the statutory minimum did not apply. The court addressed only the meaning of "offense" in section 3553(f)(2) and held that the term unambiguously limited the offense of conviction. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings on whether defendant possessed a weapon in connection with the offense of conviction and was thus ineligible for safety-valve sentencing. |
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| United States v. Little |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2729 Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for escaping from custody after he arrived two days late at a halfway house following a blizzard. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to show he willfully left the extended limits of confinement, because a reasonable jury could not infer that defendant willfully failed to call authorities or arrive at the halfway house as the furlough application required. In this case, there is no evidence that defendant had access to a phone at any of his stopover points. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Montano |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1636 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm as a person previously convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The court held that the district court did not err in imposing a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1, based on defendant's false testimony at the sentencing hearing; whether defendant assaulted and attacked someone was plainly material to the district court's sentencing determination under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a); the district court did not err in denying defendant's request for a sentence reduction under USSG 3C1.1 based on acceptance of responsibility; and defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered proper factors and reached a reasonable judgment. |
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| United States v. Shelledy |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1993 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Bobby E. Shepherd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for one count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine, and some amount of hydromorphone and oxycodone. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant conspired to distribute methamphetamine, hydromorphone, or oxycodone. The court rejected defendant's evidentiary challenges, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of his affiliation with a gang, by permitting the government to introduce evidence of his prior convictions under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), and by limiting his ability to use Fed. R. Evid. 609 evidence to cross examine government witnesses. |
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| United States v. Smith |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Dockets: 19-3362, 19-3520 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: William Duane Benton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted in 2003 of producing, transporting, and reproducing child pornography and sentenced to 235 months in prison, followed by 5 years of supervised release. After defendant violated three conditions of supervised release, the district court imposed a new condition requiring polygraph testing. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of the new condition, holding that defendant's unwillingness to obey rules restricting his access to child pornography shows that polygraph testing is necessary to protect the public from further crimes. The court also held that defendant waived any challenges to the district court's denial of his motions for relief in Appeal No. 19-3362. |
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| United States v. Smith |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2513 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: William Duane Benton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to modify defendant's two conditions of supervised release imposed after he was convicted in 2003 of producing, transporting, and reproducing child pornography. The court held that, although the district court erred by denying defendant a hearing before modifying Conditions 6 and 7, the error was harmless. In this case, Condition 6 concerned defendant's contact with minors and Condition 7 concerned possession and access to pornography. |
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| Tejeda v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 13-74391 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| A conviction for being under the influence of a controlled substance, in violation of California Health and Safety Code 11550(a), is divisible with respect to controlled substance such that the modified categorical approach applies to determining whether a conviction under the statute is a controlled-substance offense as defined by federal law. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal from the IJ's decision finding him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for having been convicted of a controlled-substance offense as defined by federal law. The panel explained that, where, as here, the controlled-substance requirement of a state statute is divisible and where, as here, the relevant substance is shown by application of the modified categorical approach to be federally controlled, then there is "a direct link between an alien's crime of conviction and a particular federally controlled drug" such that section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is satisfied. Furthermore, the divisibility of the actus reus element of Section 11550(a) is irrelevant, because under the modified categorical approach a conviction for using or being under the influence of amphetamine relates to a federally controlled substance. |
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| United States v. Perez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Dockets: 13-50014, 15-50241, 15-50243, 15-50246, 18-50181 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Richard C. Tallman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Defendants Eduardo Hernandez, Leonidas Iraheta, and Vladimir Iraheta; affirmed in part and reversed in part the convictions of Javier Perez; vacated Perez's sentence; and remanded for resentencing. Defendants' convictions and sentences stemmed from their involvement in the Columbia Lil Cycos clique of the 18th Street gang. The panel held that the post-verdict filing made in camera by a third party did not contain Brady material and there was no abuse of discretion in not allowing Leonidas and Hernandez's attorneys to view it; in the few instances in which admission of the witnesses' testimony was error, Leonidas and Hernandez suffered no prejudice; the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute may reach a crime committed abroad with sufficient nexus to the conduct of an enterprise's affairs; but VICAR does not reach all crimes committed in other countries; because California requires the formulation of criminal intent—and a non-de-minimis act in furtherance of the crime’s commission—in California, the district court's instruction on Perez's count one, sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen was in error; the error as to count eighteen was not harmless and required reversal; and the evidence was sufficient to support defendants' underlying convictions. The panel also held that, although the district court improperly applied the firearm enhancement to Hernandez, the error was harmless, and all of Hernandez and Leonidas's other sentencing-related challenges failed; there was no error in the district court's decision to give both Hernandez and Leonidas life sentences; and remand of Perez's sentence was necessary in light of the error on his count eighteen conviction. |
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| United States v. Arterbury |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 18-5085 Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Gregory Alan Phillips Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The federal government twice charged Scott Arterbury with the same crime for the same possession of child pornography. In the original prosecution, the district court suppressed the child-pornography evidence seized from Arterbury’s personal computer. The government appealed the suppression order but withdrew its appeal without filing a brief. Once back in district court, the government obtained an order dismissing the case without prejudice. Eight months later, in a case involving a defendant in a different state, the Tenth Circuit reversed an order suppressing child-pornography evidence obtained in reliance on the same FBI search warrant as at issue in Arterbury’s case. The government re-indicted Arterbury on the original child-pornography charge. Arterbury argued that the court was bound by collateral estoppel to enforce its earlier order suppressing the evidence. But the district court disagreed and later denied the motion to suppress on the merits. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred in its analysis of criminal collateral estoppel, and vacated the order denying Arterbury’s motion to enforce the original suppression order. The matter was remanded for the district court to enforce its earlier suppression order. |
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| United States v. Merritt |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 18-1146 Opinion Date: June 10, 2020 Judge: Eid Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2016, Defendant-Appellant Timothy Merritt crashed into a vehicle containing a family of three while driving within the borders of the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation. Merritt was intoxicated at the time of the accident and had been driving in the wrong lane. Cecil Vijil, a passenger in the other vehicle, died by the time the ambulance arrived. Cecil’s wife Sallie Vijil, also a passenger, was seriously injured. Their son Creighton, who was driving, suffered minor injuries. The government charged Merritt with second-degree murder for the death of Cecil Vijil, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury for the injuries sustained by Sallie Vijil. At trial, the government introduced evidence of three other drunk-driving incidents involving Merritt. The jury convicted Merritt on both counts. Merritt appealed the murder conviction, arguing that the district court should not have allowed testimony about the facts and circumstances of 2012 and 2014 incidents, and that no evidence concerning the 2016 arrest should have been admitted. Determining that it was within the district court's discretion to admit the facts and circumstances of Merritt's 2012 and 2014 drunk driving arrests, and that any error in admitting the 2016 incident was harmless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Merritt's convictions. |
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| United States v. Morales |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-5059 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Scott Milne Matheson, Jr. Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The district court granted Defendant-Appellee Julian Trujillo Morales’s motion to suppress 4.11 kilograms of methamphetamine. Thirty-two minutes after he was stopped for a traffic violation, Morales and his passenger consented to an officer’s search of the car that yielded the methamphetamine. During the first 10 minutes after the stop, the officer questioned Morales and developed reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. He next questioned Morales’s passenger for seven minutes and then called the El Paso Intelligence Center (“EPIC”), a national law enforcement database, which took another 15 minutes. The district court said that the officer’s actions were reasonable up to the EPIC call, but the EPIC call unreasonably prolonged the detention. The Government appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the district court erred in granting the motion to suppress. |
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| United States v. Yarbrough |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-10624 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Branch Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained after officers, pursuant to arrest warrants, arrested defendant and his wife, secured them outside of their home, and then reentered the home to conduct a protective sweep without a warrant. The court found that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that a dangerous person might have been in the house and that the protective sweep was justified. In this case, multiple cars indicated multiple people on the property; the tips about the drugs indicated multiple people who may have had access to weapons; and the wife's refusal to follow police directions indicated that, if other people were in the house, they might have likewise been non-compliant. |
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| Ex parte Calvin Barnes. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Alabama Docket: 1180802 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Calvin Barnes petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate its orders revoking his bail and denying his motion to reinstate his bail. The Supreme Court determined the circuit court erred by basing the revocation on an unsupported and unsubstantiated belief that Barnes intended to delay his trial setting and had become a flight risk, rather than on evidence satisfying the requirements for revocation in Rule 7.5. Furthermore, the circuit court erred in denying Barnes's request to reinstate his pretrial bail -- a right to which he was entitled under the law, regardless of the heinousness of the crime he was accused of committing. Because the Supreme Court determined the circuit court acted beyond its authority, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ. |
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| Benton v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 237 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Karen R. Baker Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not determining that Appellant failed to state grounds demonstrating probable cause that he was being illegally detained. In his petition, Appellant argued that the general principle in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) that mandatory life-without-parole sentences should not apply to juveniles under the age of eighteen should apply to him because he was still young and immature. The circuit court denied relief, finding that Miller has not be applied to extend relief to offenders over the age of eighteen. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly denied Appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus; and (2) Appellant did not establish that he was entitled to a hearing. |
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| Burnell v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 244 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Rhonda K. Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court admitting, at Defendant's sentencing trial for the murder of his wife, a Defendant's letter requesting the proceeds of his wife's insurance policy, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial impact. Defendant stabbed his wife to death outside their home and pleaded guilty to first-degree murder. Defendant reserved sentencing for a jury. At sentencing, the State introduced a letter to Defendant from the provider of Defendant's wife's life insurance policy informing him that he was a named beneficiary. Defendant wrote at the bottom of the letter that "I....would like to receive the payment payable to me from my wife [sic] policy." The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court to admit the letter, holding that the letter was properly admitted to provide evidence of Defendant's motive for the murder and to display Defendant's conduct after the murder. |
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| Childers v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 241 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Josephine L. Hart Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of two specifications of cruelty and maltreatment and two specifications of failure to obey an order or regulation entered by the Arkansas Army National Guard in a court-martial proceeding, holding that there was no court-martial jurisdiction for those offenses under Ark. Code Ann. 12-64-801. On appeal, Defendant, a member of the Arkansas Guard, argued that because he was not in a "duty status" at the time of the incident that led to his court-martial, the court-martial lacked jurisdiction over him. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed the lower tribunal's determination on jurisdiction, and dismissed, holding that because the offenses occurred while Defendant was not in a duty status, there was no court-martial jurisdiction. |
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| Morgan v. Payne |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 239 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus and denied Appellant's petition for writ of certiorari, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err when it denied Appellant's habeas petition. In his habeas petition, Appellant alleged that the trial court in his criminal case did not conduct a plea hearing and therefore lacked the authority to enter a judgment of conviction. The circuit court concluded that Appellant failed to demonstrate probable cause that the writ should issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not clearly err when it denied Appellant's habeas petition; and (2) Appellant's petition for writ of certiorari is denied. |
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| Oliver v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 233 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Kemp Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis in his criminal case, holding that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding fingerprint evidence. Petitioner was convicted of second-degree unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle and possession of firearms by certain persons and was sentences as a habitual offender to an aggregate term of 360 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. In his coram nobis petition, Petitioner raised a Brady claim, asserting that the State withheld evidence that was both material and prejudicial. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the State withheld material evidence. |
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| California v. Bettasso |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E072173(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Menetrez Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Michael Bettasso was convicted by jury of driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol causing injury, hit and run driving causing death, driving with a suspended license, and second degree implied malice murder. The jury also found true a great bodily injury enhancement associated with the DUI count. Bettasso was sentenced to a total term of 19 years to life. On appeal, Bettasso challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the second degree murder conviction and also contended the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the injury on vehicular manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that vehicular manslaughter was not a lesser included offense of murder. In the unpublished portion, the Court rejected Bettasso’s substantial evidence challenge, and accordingly affirmed the judgment. |
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| California v. Federico |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E072620(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Art W. McKinster Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| In 2008, defendant-appellant Adrian Federico pled guilty to assault with a firearm. He admitted he personally used the firearm in the commission of the offense, personally inflicted great bodily injury, and committed the offense for the benefit of a street gang. The trial court sentenced him to a total term of 20 years in state prison. Ten years later, the superior court received a letter from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), recommending that the court recall and resentence defendant under section 1170(d), stating the court should not have imposed both a GBI and gang enhancement in light of California v. Gonzalez, 178 Cal.App.4th 1325 (2009). Defendant thereafter moved the court to apply Proposition 57 and transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court (he was 15 years old at the time of the offense). The trial court declined to apply Proposition 57, since defendant’s judgment was final long before Proposition 57 took effect. However, the court concluded it would provide him with Gonzalez relief by resentencing him to 17 years in state prison, consisting of four years on count 1, plus three years on the GBI enhancement, and 10 years on the personal firearm enhancement. The court imposed but stayed the 10-year gang enhancement under Penal Code section 654. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his request to apply Proposition 57 and/or Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) and remand the matter to the juvenile court. Finding no reversible error, however, the Court of Appeal affirmed. |
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| California v. Hughes |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E069445(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 10, 2020 Judge: Slough Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Michael Hughes was charged with three counts of murder, among other charges, on the theory he knew the risk of driving while intoxicated but drove anyway. He hit another vehicle whose driver failed to yield to him; three people in the car he hit died from their injuries. Hughes had been previously convicted of driving under the influence and had been drinking on the night of the accident. The critical issue at trial was whether Hughes’s drinking was a substantial factor in causing the accident. The police and highway patrol both concluded the deceased driver was the primary cause of the accident, and their testimony suggested Hughes’s speed and drinking may have played a role, but that the physical evidence suggested he was not driving at an unsafe speed and he responded appropriately in attempting to avoid the collision. After the jury heard that testimony, however, the prosecution called as an expert witness a second member of the highway patrol team which investigated the accident. The expert disagreed with his colleagues and offered new expert testimony not previously disclosed to the defense in violation of the criminal discovery statutes. Though defense counsel objected to this testimony in a timely fashion, the trial court allowed the prosecution to proceed with the questioning, and the defense had to cross-examine the expert without an opportunity to prepare adequately. The trial court ultimately denied Hughes' motion for a mistrial and attempted to remedy the discovery violation with a curative instruction to the jury. In the end, the expert’s new testimony on causation was uncontradicted, the jury convicted Hughes of three counts of murder, and the trial court sentenced him to three consecutive 15-year-to- life terms. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant the mistrial: "The trial court had the opportunity to salvage the trial by continuing it and allowing the defense to locate, prepare, and seek the assistance of an expert to rebut the surprise expert causation testimony when the defense first objected. By failing to do so and allowing the prosecution to proceed in its questioning of the expert, the trial court contributed to a situation with no adequate remedy but a mistrial." |
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| California v. Johns |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E072412(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Slough Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Gerry Johns claimed to be an offender previously convicted under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine eligible to have his murder conviction vacated if he couldn’t be convicted of murder under the new Penal Code sections 188 and 189. Johns petitioned to have his murder conviction vacated under the petitioning procedure established under Penal Code section 1170.95. The San Bernardino District Attorney’s Office opposed the petition and moved to strike it, arguing S.B. 1437 was invalid as an unauthorized amendment of two voter-approved ballot initiatives, Proposition 7 and Proposition 115. The trial court agreed, found S.B. 1437 unconstitutionally infringed on the prerogatives of the voters, and struck Johns’ petition. Johns appealed, seeking reversal and remand for the trial court to review his petition on the merits. The Court of Appeal agreed with Johns that S.B. 1437 was constitutional, and he was entitled to have the trial court consider his petition. Proposition 7 addressed the punishment appropriate for murder, not the elements of the offense, and Proposition 115 added predicates for applying the felony-murder rule, which S.B. 1437 left intact. The Court also concluded retroactive application of S.B. 1437 through the petitioning process did not violate the separation of powers doctrine or the Victims’ Bill of Rights of 2008 (Marsy’s Law), as the district attorney argued. |
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| California v. Tran |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D075280(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Richard D. Huffman Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Hung Tran was convicted by jury of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (count 1) and mayhem (count 2). With regard to count 1, the jury found true Tran personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. Tran was sentenced to prison for four years; the court struck the great bodily injury allegation and stayed the sentence under count 2. Tran appealed, contending the court erroneously admitted into evidence "doctored" videos used by the prosecution's expert witness during his testimony; substantial evidence did not support his conviction under counts 1 and 2; the court erroneously admitted lay opinion testimony from a prosecution witness; and Tran's trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective. After review, the Court of Appeal determined that none of Tran's claims had merit and affirmed. |
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| California v. Whalum |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D076384(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Joan Irion Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Artemis Whalum, then serving a prison sentence for possessing cannabis in a correctional institution in violation of Penal Code section 4573.8, appealed the denial of his petition to dismiss and recall his sentence. Whalum based his petition on the fact that, after his conviction, California voters adopted Proposition 64, making it legal for persons at least 21 years of age to possess up to 28.5 grams of cannabis except in specifically identified circumstances, and giving persons currently serving a sentence for a cannabis-related crime that was no longer an offense after Proposition 64, the ability to petition for relief in the form of recall or dismissal of their sentence. The Court of Appeal found the crime of possessing unauthorized cannabis in prison in violation of Penal Code section 4573.8 was not affected by Proposition 64. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that Whalum was not entitled to relief. |
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| DeHoyos v. Superior Court |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G056178(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Goethals Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1993, Richard Lucio DeHoyos was convicted by jury of kidnapping, raping and murdering a nine year old girl, for which he was sentenced to death. In April 2018, DeHoyos petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate after the trial court denied his motion for an order permitting his federal habeas counsel to contact jurors who had served on his trial jury. The Court summarily denied his petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue an alternative writ directing the trial court to either vacate its order and issue a new order granting relief with respect to three jurors DeHoyos identified as having previously discussed the case with his investigators, or to show cause before this court. In its order, the Supreme Court cited Townsel v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th 1084 (1999). The trial court refused to vacate its order denying the motion. Having considered the arguments made by the Attorney General in support of the court’s refusal, the Court of Appeal granted the petition and issued a writ of mandate ordering the trial court to vacate its order and to schedule a hearing to establish a reasonable procedure to facilitate contact with the three jurors to ascertain their current willingness to speak with DeHoyos’s counsel. As explained in Townsel, if any of those jurors consent to speak with counsel, the trial court may not prohibit it. If any juror declines contact, the issue with respect to that juror will be resolved. |
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| In re Haden, |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A158376(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Stuart R. Pollak Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1998, Haden pleaded no contest to infliction of corporal injury on a spouse and admitted a special allegation of personal use of a deadly weapon The trial court found true special allegations under the Three Strikes Law and sentenced him to 25 years to life. Haden had two robbery convictions in North Dakota The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the convictions could constitute strikes although the elements of robbery under North Dakota law differed from those under California law. Haden unsuccessfully sought habeas relief several times. In 2015, Haden filed another habeas petition, arguing that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 “Descamps” decision, the court made improper factual findings when treating the North Dakota convictions as strikes. In 2016, the California Supreme Court denied his petition “without prejudice to any relief … after this court decides” Gallardo. The 2017 Gallardo decision rejected the court's own 2006 “McGee” decision and held that a trial court considering whether to impose a sentence enhancement based on a defendant’s prior conviction may not make factual findings concerning the defendant’s conduct to impose the enhancement. In 2018, Haden filed another habeas petition, arguing the imposition of the North Dakota robberies as strikes contravened Gallardo because the court examined the record to determine the factual nature of those convictions. The court of appeal denied relief. Gallardo does not apply retroactively to Haden’s conviction. |
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| People v. Jessup |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B295924(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Tangeman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The attachment of a gang enhancement to a marijuana-related felony conviction does not render that conviction ineligible for redesignation. The Court of Appeal vacated the trial court's order denying defendant's application to redesignate his conviction for possession of marijuana for sale from a felony to a misdemeanor. The court held that the trial court erred when it concluded that the gang enhancement attached to defendant's conviction made him ineligible for redesignation. |
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| People v. Padilla |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B297213(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 10, 2020 Judge: Nora M. Manella Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Defendant was convicted of a murder he committed when he was 16 years old and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to LWOP at a second resentencing. In the interim, Proposition 57 was passed, prohibiting prosecutors from charging juveniles with crimes directly in adult court. The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed defendant's sentence and remanded for him to receive a transfer hearing in the juvenile court. Because defendant's original sentence was vacated and his sentence is no longer final, and because Proposition 57's primary ameliorative effect is on a juvenile offender's sentence, the court held that the measure applies to preclude imposition of sentence on defendant as an adult, absent a transfer hearing. The court held that, regardless of his current age, defendant fits within the Supreme Court's holding that the voters intended Proposition 57 to apply as broadly as possible. |
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| People v. Rosas |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B295921(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Steven Z. Perren Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and held that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless searches of his person and vehicle because the People did not meet their burden to justify either search under the Fourth Amendment. The court held that it is well-settled that the probation exception to the warrant requirement cannot be satisfied under these circumstances. In this case, both searches were premised upon erroneous information that defendant was on probation. Even assuming that the officers who conducted the searches reasonably concluded from this information that defendant was on probation, the court held that they had no reason to believe he was subject to search terms as a condition of that probation. Furthermore, the People offered no evidence to meet their burden of proving that the evidence was nevertheless admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. |
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| People v. Ruiz |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B296742(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Arthur Gilbert Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| In Penal Code section 1473.7, the Legislature broadened the standards to challenge guilty pleas involving advisements concerning immigration consequences. Defendant appealed an order denying her recent motion to vacate her 1991 conviction for possession for sale of cocaine base following her no contest plea pursuant to Penal Code 1473.7. Defendant claimed that her counsel did not advise her that a mandatory consequence of her plea would make her "permanently ineligible to ever become a legal resident of the United States." The Court of Appeal held that defendant may pursue her current motion to vacate the conviction. The court held that, although defendant had filed an earlier unsuccessful motion to vacate the conviction in 2017, the prior motion did not bar the current motion because it was based on a different ground and on an earlier version of section 1473.7. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions. The court noted that the changes the Legislature made in 2019 were intended to retroactively target convictions based on the type of inadequate immigration advisements that occurred in this case. |
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| People v. Sandoval |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F076902(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Jennifer R.S. Detjen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted of battery, as a lesser included offense of battery with serious injury, and of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury during the commission of which he personally inflicted great bodily injury. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the jury instructions correctly defined great bodily injury. |
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| Stanley v. Superior Court |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A160151(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Stuart R. Pollak Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Stanley was charged with sexual intercourse with a child 10 years old or younger with enhancements for prior serious felony convictions. Following an August 2019 mistrial, the court set a new trial for April 2020. Stanley waived his statutory right to a speedy trial until that date. On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency in response to the COVID-19 outbreak,. On March 16, the Contra Costa County Health Officer issued a “shelter in place” order. Days later, the Governor ordered all Californians to stay at home except for limited activities. On March 23, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye issued an emergency order suspending all jury trials and extending by 60 days the Penal Code 1382 time period for holding a criminal trial, stating that courts cannot comply with health restrictions and that potential jurors would be unavailable. On May 4, Stanley filed an unsuccessful "speedy trial" motion to dismiss. The court determined there was good cause under Penal Code 1382(a) to extend the trial date and set a jury trial for July 13, 2020, and stated the last day for the start of trial under Penal Code 1382 is July 29, 2020. The court of appeal affirmed. While it is unlikely that the orders are unlawful, the court did not address that issue. The severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact it has had within the state independently support the trial court’s finding of good cause. |
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| Campbell v. Colorado |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 49 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Monica M. Márquez Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| An expert from the Denver Crime Lab testified that a DNA sample taken from Brandon Campbell matched a DNA profile developed from a soda can found at a burglary scene, as well as a profile developed from a partially eaten plum found at another residential burglary. The plum profile had been developed at an out-of-state lab; the technician who tested the plum did not testify. Although Campbell objected to evidence of the other burglary on CRE 404(b) grounds, he did not argue that allowing the Denver Crime Lab expert to testify about the plum profile violated his confrontation rights. The jury convicted Campbell of second degree burglary and first degree criminal trespass; he was also charged with three other habitual offender counts. Campbell appealed, arguing for the first time that the admission of the Denver Crime Lab expert’s surrogate testimony about the plum DNA profile violated his confrontation rights. Campbell also renewed his contention that the trial court erroneously allowed the prosecution to constructively amend the habitual offender charge against him. The court of appeals rejected both contentions. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held: (1) any error in allowing the Denver Crime Lab expert to testify about the plum DNA profile was not plain; and (2) the mislabeled offense in the habitual offender count did not result in a constructive amendment requiring reversal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals and remanded with directions to return the case to the trial court for resentencing and correction of the mittimus in accordance with the court of appeals’ decision. |
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| Colorado in Interest of J.D. |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 48 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Coats Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| The State sought review of an appellate court's judgment reversing a district court order voiding a juvenile magistrate's ruling. The district court found that the juvenile magistrate lacked jurisdiction to grant J.D.’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, further, that J.D.’s sole remedy for a failure of his counsel to render effective assistance in advising him concerning his deferred adjudication was to file a petition with the court for reinstatement of his review rights nunc pro tunc. By contrast, the court of appeals found that the juvenile magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain J.D.’s Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was a motion in a delinquency case the magistrate had been appointed to hear, and it was not a motion seeking review of any prior order of the magistrate. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ruling that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction over the juvenile’s Crim. P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Although on different grounds, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. |
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| Campbell v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC60-72622 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court instructed the Clerk of this Court to reject any future pleadings, petitions, documents, motions, or other filings submitted by Defendant relating to case number 86-038693, unless such filings are signed by a member of The Florida Bar in good standing, holding that through his persistent filing of frivolous, meritless and repetitive requests for relief, Defendant has abused the judicial process and burdened this Court's limited juridicial resources. Further, the Court found that Defendant's motion to reopen his direct appeal due to fraud or collusion occurring during his direct appeal proceedings was a frivolous proceeding brought before the Supreme Court by a state prisoner. |
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| Cave v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC18-1750 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court denying Appellant's successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Appellant was not entitled to postconviction relief based on his intellectual disability claim and on his claim seeking relief under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). In 1982, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery with a firearm, and kidnapping. Appellant was sentenced to death for the murder, and the sentence of death became final in 1999. In 2017, Appellant filed a successive postconviction motion claiming that he was intellectually disabled and a claim seeking relief under Hurst. The circuit court summarily denied the motion, finding that Appellant's intellectual disability claim was time barred and that Hurst did not apply retroactively to Appellant's case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly denied relief. |
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| Lawrence v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC18-1172 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the postconviction court summarily denying Defendant's second successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief. In 1995, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, auto theft, and petty theft. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder. In 1998, the death sentence became final. In 2018, Defendant filed a second successive postconviction motion claiming that he was intellectually disabled. The Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court's summary denial of Defendant's intellectual disability claim, holding that Defendant's argument lacked merit. |
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| Wheeler v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-1916 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's petition for review of an unelaborated order from the Second District Court of Appeal striking Petitioner's brief as unauthorized, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction to review the Second District's order and that this Court lacked discretionary review jurisdiction under the Florida Constitution to review this type of case. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Second District Court of appeals issued an unelaborated order denying the petition. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for rehearing and an amended motion to rehearing, along with an initial brief. The Second District denied the amended motion for rehearing and issued an order striking the brief. The Supreme Court dismissed petition for review, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction to review the order. |
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| State v. Ikimaka |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-16-0000003 Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Sabrina S. McKenna Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court remanded this criminal matter to the circuit court for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court erred by denying Defendant's motion to suppress as to certain drug evidence. Defendant was convicted of one count of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree and one count of unlawful use of drug paraphernalia. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. On certiorari, the Supreme Court noticed plain error affecting Defendant's substantial rights with respect to the circuit court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The Court held (1) a dog sniff conducted by the Kauai Police Department (KPD) was unrelated to the initial stop and seizure of the truck driven by Defendant for evidence of the alleged theft of a purse; (2) KPD did not have independent reasonable suspicion to believe the truck contained drugs; and (3) therefore, the dog sniff violated Defendant's constitutional right against unreasonable searches. |
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| Idaho v. Chambers |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 47309 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Stegner Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Steven Chambers appealed his conviction entered upon his "Alford" plea to battery with intent to commit a serious felony. Chambers was initially charged with forcible rape against a young woman. Pursuant to I.R.E. 412, Chambers moved to introduce evidence of a purportedly false allegation "N.S." made against a different individual approximately six months after her alleged rape by Chambers. The State objected to the admission of such evidence. After a Rule 412 hearing, the district court excluded evidence of the purportedly false allegation. The Idaho Court of Appeals heard Chambers’ appeal and held that false allegations made after the charged conduct could be admissible. However, the appellate court concluded that Chambers had failed to prove falsity at the Rule 412 hearing. After its review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred when it determined that Rule 412 contained a temporal requirement that the false allegation must precede the events giving rise to the charge. Further, the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong balancing test. The Supreme Court announced guidelines and procedure for the district court to use on remand to determine whether evidence of the purportedly false allegation was admissible. Judgment of conviction was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Idaho v. Dix |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 47112 Opinion Date: June 10, 2020 Judge: Brody Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Over a period of several months, William Dix bought several thousand dollars’ worth of goods from Grainger Supply on credit. On the same days he bought the goods, he pawned them. Dix was charged with grand theft and burglary, and pleaded not guilty to both counts. At trial, the State argued that Dix committed theft by obtaining the goods on credit without intending to pay for them, and committed burglary by receiving loans from the pawn shop in exchange for the goods based on false representations that he owned them. After the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Dix moved for a judgment of acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rule 29 on both charges, arguing that under Idaho v. Bennett, 246 P.3d 387 (2010), he became the owner of the goods once he obtained possession of them from Grainger, and as the owner, he could lawfully pawn them. The district court denied Dix’s motion, and the jury subsequently returned guilty verdicts on both counts. After trial, Dix renewed his Rule 29 motion on the burglary charge, and this motion was also denied. The district court entered an order withholding judgment and placing Dix on probation for eight years. Dix timely appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon certiorari review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed Dix’s convictions and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on both counts. |
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| Idaho v. Haggard |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 47577 Opinion Date: June 10, 2020 Judge: Roger S. Burdick Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Clinton Haggard appealed a district court’s decision to affirm a magistrate court’s judgment of conviction. After a trial, the magistrate court found Haggard guilty of misdemeanor domestic battery in violation of Idaho Code section 18-918(3)(b). The issue presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review was whether aggard effectively waived his right to a jury trial. The Court found Haggard’s waiver was ineffective because the magistrate court did not, in open court, inquire into whether the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s decision and remanded this case with instructions to the district court to remand this case to the magistrate court with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction. |
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| Idaho v. Nava |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 47439 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Stegner Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Quentin Nava appealed after he was convicted on one count of lewd and lascivious conduct and one count of sex abuse. The charges arose from an approximately two-day period in July 2016 when Nava was staying in the home of a female friend, her twelve-year-old daughter, her twelve-year-old niece, as well as other friends and relatives who were staying at the woman’s house. He argued that the district court erred when it denied his motion to sever the two counts. Nava argued the similarities between the two counts did not constitute a common scheme or plan as to justify joinder of the two charges. The Idaho Court of Appeals agreed, and vacated Nava’s judgment of conviction. The State petitioned for review, and finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Idaho v. Rodriguez |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 46333 Opinion Date: June 10, 2020 Judge: Brody Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| John Rodriguez sold a firearm to an individual who had visible gang tattoos and had previously identified himself as a member of the Norteno gang, but who was actually an informant paid by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). The State charged Rodriguez with two counts of providing firearms to criminal gang members under Idaho Code section 18-8505 and a sentencing enhancement for providing the firearm to further criminal gang purposes under Idaho Code section 18-8503(1)(b). After trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to Count I but not guilty as to Count II and answered "no" to the sentencing enhancement question. The district court suspended a unified sentence of ten years and placed Rodriguez on probation for ten years. Rodriguez appealed, arguing his conviction should have been vacated because criminalizing the sale or transfer of firearms to gang members without the intent to further gang activity, Idaho Code section 18-8505 violated rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution: the freedom of association under the First Amendment, the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment, and the due process requirement of personal guilt under the Fourteenth Amendment. Finding that Rodriguez forfeited his constitutional challenges by failing to present them to the trial court, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| State v. Davis |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-0022 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Thomas D. Waterman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this criminal action, the Supreme Court vacated the restitution awarded and clarified State v. Albright, 925 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 2019), holding that defendants may seek appellate review of interim restitution orders in a direct appeal of right from the judgment of conviction. Appellant filed a direct appeal from his judgment of conviction, challenging only the restitution award, which was awarded without a determination of his reasonable ability to pay and without a final order of restitution. The State argued that under Albright, which held that "any temporary, permanent, or supplemental order regarding restitution is not appealable or enforceable until the court files its final order of restitution," the appeal must be dismissed. The Supreme Court vacated the restitution orders, holding (1) interim restitution orders are not enforceable until the district court determines the defendant's reasonable ability to pay all items of restitution and enters the final order of restitution; (2) there is no right of direct appeal from interim restitution orders preceding the court's final order of restitution, but defendants may seek appellate review of interim restitution orders in a direct appeal of right from the judgment of conviction; and (3) because the district court did not have the benefit of Albright, this case is remanded for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Schiebout |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-0081 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: McDermott Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this criminal case arising from Appellant's act of writing checks without authorization from a bank account that was not hers the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion for acquittal, holding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence supporting a conviction under Iowa Code 714.1(6). Appellant was convicted under section 714.1(6), which forbids knowingly presenting a check that will not be paid when presented. The checks the State charged Appellant with writing were paid when presented. On appeal, Appellant argued that presenting a check without authorization was different than providing a check one knows will not be paid when presented. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Appellant knew the checks would not be paid when presented, and therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support Appellant's conviction under section 714.1(6). |
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| State v. Staake |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-0451 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the order of restitution in this criminal case for the reasons explained today in State v. Davis, __ N.W.2d __ (Iowa 2020), concluding that interim orders on components of restitution requiring a reasonable ability to pay are neither appealable nor enforceable, but because the district court did not have the benefit of State v. Albright, 925 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 2019) in issuing the restitution order, the order is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. Defendant entered a guilty plea to sexual abuse in the third degree. The court placed Defendant on probation, ordered him to register as a sex offender, and ordered that Defendant pay $204 in court costs, stating that additional amounts could be assessed at a later date. Defendant filed this direct appeal from his judgment of sentence, arguing that the district court erred in ordering him to pay restitution when it did not know the total amount of those costs and had not conducted a reasonable-ability-to-pay determination. The State argued in response that Defendant's appeal was unripe because no final restitution order had been entered. The Supreme Court vacated the restitution order and remanded the matter for further proceedings because the district court did not have the benefit of Albright. |
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| State v. Hachmeister |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 114796 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Stegall Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for the premeditated murder of his mother, holding that the prosecutor erred in one respect during closing argument but that the erroneous comment was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against Defendant. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in admitting evidence of the victim's missing wedding ring and Defendant's possession of child pornography and charges stemming from this possession; (2) the prosecutor's statement during closing argument that the victim "could breathe just fine" crossed the line into speculation and was inflammatory, but the error was harmless in light of the trial as a whole; (3) Defendant's remaining claims of prosecutorial misconduct were without merit; and (4) the single error was insufficient to support reversal under the cumulative effect rule. |
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| Greene v. State |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 7/19 Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Barbera J. Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals holding that a police-initiated procedure resulting in the identification of Defendant was not governed by constitutional criminal procedure law concerning out-of-court identifications made by an eyewitness, holding that the identification of Defendant was a "confirmatory identification" not subject to constitutional scrutiny. Shortly after a murder, investigating detectives focused on Defendant as the suspected killer. The detectives were aware that the murder victim's current girlfriend, Jennifer McKay, knew Defendant and until recently had been in an intimate relationship with him. When interviewing McKay at the police station the detectives asked her to review camera footage captured with a surveillance camera mounted on a building adjacent to the apartment where the murder occurred. McKay did so and determined that a person depicted on the footage looked like Defendant. Defendant moved to suppress McKay's identification of him, arguing that the identification was obtained during an impermissible suggestive process. The circuit court granted the suppression motion. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the identification at issue in this case did not implicate the constitutionally-based identification law paradigm. |
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| Commonwealth v. Leiva |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12166 Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Lowy Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree and felony murder and declined to exercise its authority to reduce or set aside the murder verdict, holding that the record revealed no basis to support relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) there was no error, constitutional or otherwise, regarding the manner in which defense counsel and the trial judge invoked Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1416 (2015), and related procedures approved in Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535 (2003); (2) the trial court did not err by allowing the testimony of a substitute medical examiner; (3) the trial judge's failure to sever Defendant's trial from that of his codefendant did not result in prejudicial error; and (4) Defendant's conviction of and sentencing for both felony-murder, with attempted armed robbery as the predicate felony, and armed assault with the intent to rob did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. |
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| Commonwealth v. Miranda |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-11690 Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Kafker Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree and other crimes, affirmed orders denying Defendant's pretrial and postconviction motions, and declined to grant extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding that no reversible error occurred in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial judge did not err in deciding not to instruct the jury on self defense; (2) although it was error to require that Defendant's testimony take narrative form without his attorney's express prior invocation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3(e), there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arising out of this error; (3) the trial judge did not err in denying Defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictments; and (4) the trial judge properly denied Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress certain statements he made to officers at the police station without the benefit of prior Miranda warnings. |
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| Commonwealth v. Watt |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-11693 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Budd Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendants' convictions and the orders denying their motions for a new trial and for postconviction relief but remanded the matter of Sheldon Mattis's sentence for an evidentiary hearing, holding that the record was insufficient to address the issue of whether a term of life without the possibility of parole for an individual between the age of eighteen and twenty-two years old violates the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. Defendants, Nyasani Watt and Sheldon Mattis, were convicted of murder in the first degree and related crimes. In addition to other claims, Mattis appealed from his mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole, arguing that, due to his age of eighteen, the sentence was unconstitutional. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) there was no prejudicial error in the trial judge's challenged evidentiary rulings; (2) the judge did not err in failing to provide an involuntary manslaughter instruction; (3) remand was required for development of the record with regard to research on brain development after the age of seventeen; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendants' motions for a new trial; and (5) there was no reason to grant either defendant extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. |
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| State v. Fredrickson |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 81 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Freudenberg Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal challenging the order of the district court granting Defendant the right to proceed with his criminal appeal in forma pauperis, holding that the order was not a judgment nor was it a final order. Defendant entered a no contest plea to robbery. After Defendant was sentenced he filed his notice of appeal. The district court later entered an order finding Defendant was entitled to court-appointed appellate counsel. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction over the State's interlocutory appeal. Defendant then filed an application to proceed with his appeal from the conviction and sentence in forma pauperis. The court granted the application. The State appealed the district court's approval of Defendant's application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. |
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| State v. Price |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 306 Neb. 38 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences for aiding and abetting robbery and for aiding and abetting first degree assault, holding that Defendant's assignments of error were either without merit or could not be considered in this appeal. Defendant was convicted in a second jury trial after his first trial ended in a deadlocked jury and a mistrial was declared. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in the first trial by failing to ask the jury whether it was deadlocked on each count and when it overruled Defendant's plea in bar filed after the declaration of a mistrial and before the second trial. Defendant further claimed that in the second trial, (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion for a new trial, (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, (3) counsel was ineffective, (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction, and (5) the trial court imposed excessive sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some of Defendant's allegations of error could not be considered in this appeal and that, as to the remaining allegations, the district court did not err or abuse its discretion. |
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| New Hampshire v. Moore |
| Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2018-0602 Opinion Date: June 10, 2020 Judge: James P. Bassett Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Bruce Moore pled guilty to burglary. He was ordered to pay restitution to the owners of the home that he had burglarized. A portion of the ordered restitution was for the cost of a home security system that the homeowners had installed in their home after the burglary. The specific question presented for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's review was whether the cost of the security system installed by the homeowners was an “economic loss,” as defined by RSA 651:62, III(a), and was therefore a compensable expense under New Hampshire's restitution statute. The Court concluded the cost of the system was not an "economic loss" and reversed the superior court's judgment. |
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| An Order to Show Cause to Address the Release of Certain Individuals Serving Sentences in State Prisons and Juvenile Facilities |
| Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey Docket: m-1093-19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Stuart Rabner Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| The Office of the Public Defender and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) applied directly to the New Jersey Supreme Court for relief relating to the spread of the novel coronavirus in state prison and juvenile facility settings. They essentially asked the Judiciary to order a framework for the early release of several groups. Under the proposed framework, judges or court-appointed special masters would decide whether to grant release or a furlough in individual cases. Two days after the Public Defender and ACLU wrote to the Court, the New Jersey Governor issued Executive Order 124 creating a mechanism to identify inmates in state prison to be considered for parole or a medical furlough. The Supreme Court determined Executive Order 124 created a sufficient expectation of eligibility for release through a furlough program to call for certain due process protections. Inmates may challenge the DOC’s action, a final agency decision, by seeking review before the Appellate Division. The agency’s decision is entitled to deference on appeal. Individual inmates may also seek relief independently under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2). They do not have to exhaust the remedies available under the Executive Order before they may file a motion in court. As to sentences imposed on juveniles who are in the custody of the Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC), those individuals may seek relief from the court on an individual basis. To the extent the opinion called for trial judges to rule on motions and the Appellate Division to review agency decisions, the Supreme Court exercised its supervisory authority to require that applications be heard and decided in a matter of days and urged the Commissioner and the Parole Board to act as expeditiously as possible. |
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| People v. Page |
| Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 03265 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Feinman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals reversed the decisions of the courts below granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered from a vehicle search, holding that the lower courts erred in relying on this Court's decision in People v. Williams, 4 N.Y.3d 535 (2005), in granting the motion to suppress. Using the emergency lights on his unmarked vehicle, a federal marine interdiction agent with the United States Customs and Border Protection stopped the driver of a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger for driving dangerously on a public highway. The agent waited in his truck for members of the police department, who searched the vehicle upon their arrival. Defendant moved to suppress the gun recovered from the search as stemming from an unlawful seizure. Relying on Williams, Defendant argued that the stop was not a valid citizen's arrest because the agent used his emergency lights to effectuate the stop. Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the agent's conduct did not violate the Legislature's prescribed limits on a peace officer's arrest powers because he was not, in fact, a peace officer; and (2) thus, this Court's decision in Williams was inapposite. |
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| Chavez v. McFadden |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 437PA18 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by failing to summarily deny the applications for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus submitted by Petitioners, Carlos Chavez and Luis Lopez, for its consideration in this case. A sheriff entered into an agreement with the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement pursuant to section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1357, that certified deputies to perform specific immigration enforcement functions, including the detention of undocumented aliens. Petitioners, who were being held in pretrial detention pursuant to immigration-related arrest warrants and detainers, filed petitions seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court issued writs of habeas corpus. The court of appeals vacated the trial court orders, concluding that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus for alien petitions not in state custody and held under federal authority. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that state judicial officials acting in counties in which the sheriff has entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government do not have the authority to grant applications for the issuance of writs of habeas corpus for and to order the release of individuals held pursuant to immigration-related arrest warrants and detainers. |
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| State v. Bennett |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 406PA18 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Ervin Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming superior court judgments denying Defendant's Batson motion, holding that Defendant presented a sufficient record to permit meaningful appellate review of Defendant's Batson challenge and that Defendant established the existence of a prima facie case of discrimination necessary to require the performance of a complete Batson analysis. The trial court allowed Defendant to make a Batson motion but subsequently denied the motion, finding that there was no prima facie showing justifying the Batson challenge. The court of appeals also rejected Defendant's Batson claim, stating that, "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that defendant's argument is properly before us, we find no error in the ruling of the trial court and affirm." The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings in the superior court, holding (1) the record was sufficient to permit appellate review of the merits of Defendant's Batson claim; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to find the existence of a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. |
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| State v. Burke |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 181A93-4 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| For the reasons articulated in State v. Ramseur, N.C. Jun. 5, 2020, the Supreme Court vacated the orders of the trial court concluding that the claims in Defendant's second motion for appropriate relief (MAR) pursuant to the North Carolina Racial Justice Act (RJA) and amended RJA MAR were void due to the repeal of the RJA, holding that the evidentiary provisions contained in the original, unamended RJA applied to the adjudication of Defendant's RJA claims. In 1993, Defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. In 2010, Defendant filed his second RJA MAR arguing that he was entitled to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In 2012, the General Assembly amended the RJA. Thereafter, Defendant filed an amendment to his RJA MAR. In 2013, the General Assembly repealed the RJA. Defendant then filed a second amendment to his RJA MAR. The trial court denied as being without merit and as being procedurally barred all of Defendant's claims under the RJA. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's orders, holding (1) the RJA repeal and the 2012 amendments to the RJA cannot be constitutionally applied in Defendant's case; and (2) the trial court erred by denying Defendant's RJA claims without a hearing. |
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| State v. Capps |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 206A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Paul M. Newby Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals that vacated Defendants' convictions for certain charges, holding that when the prosecutor moved to amend the arrest warrant to correctly state the name of the property owner and did so by filing a statement of charges form after arraignment, the superior court properly considered and allowed the change. At issue was whether the prosecutor lost the right to amend the criminal warrant in this case when the amendment was filed on a statement of charges form after Defendant's arraignment. The court of appeals held that because Defendant was tried under a statement of charges that was filed after arraignment and because the sufficiency of the original arrest warrant had not been contested, the statement of charges was untimely and the superior court had no jurisdiction to try the case under that charging document. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) regardless of the label, such a change is still an amendment and no statutory provision limits the filing of a statement of charges in this way; and (2) therefore, the trial court did not err in proceeding under the amended pleading. |
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| State v. Fields |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 170A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that Defendant could not be separately convicted and punished for the offenses of both habitual misdemeanor assault and felony assault inflicting serious bodily injury stemming from the same act. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of habitual misdemeanor assault and felony assault. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgment on the offense of habitual misdemeanor assault, holding that the trial court erred in entering judgment and sentencing Defendant for both habitual misdemeanor assault and felony assault given that both offenses arose from the same act. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that (1) Defendant could not be separately convicted and punished for both misdemeanor assault and felony assault based on the same conduct; but (2) Defendant's conviction for habitual misdemeanor assault should have been arrested rather than vacated. |
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| State v. Keller |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 201A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Cheri Beasley Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for solicitation by computer or electronic device of a person believed to be fifteen years of age or younger for the purpose of committing an unlawful sex act and appearing at the location where he was supposed to meet the person he believed was a child, holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment. On appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on entrapment was not error because the evidence failed to support the instruction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant presented evidence which a reasonable juror could find credible to demonstrate that he did not have a willingness or predisposition to engage in sexual activity with a minor; (2) Defendant's arguments at trial were consistent with the defense of entrapment and should not bar the availability of the defense; and (3) the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on entrapment was prejudicial, and Defendant was entitled to a new trial. |
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| State v. Ramseur |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 388A10 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Earls Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Defendant's motion seeking relief pursuant to the newly enacted North Carolina Racial Justice Act (RJA) on the basis that the RJA had been repealed before the trial court ruled on Defendant's motion, holding that applying the repeal retroactively violates the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. In 2010, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Defendant subsequently brought his RJA motion, claiming that race was a significant factor in the decision to seek or impose the death penalty. In 2012, the General Assembly amended the RJA. In 2013, the General Assembly repealed the RJA in its entirety. The trial court dismissed Defendant's RJA claims, concluding that this repeal rendered Defendant's pending motion void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the RJA repeal and the provisions of the amended RJA altering the evidentiary requirements for an RJA claim constitute impermissible ex post facto laws and cannot constitutionally be applied retroactively to Defendant's pending RJA claims. |
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| State v. Taylor |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 32A19 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Morgan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's determination that Defendant failed to demonstrate a fair and just reason for the withdrawal of his guilty plea, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied Defendant's motion. The court of appeals affirmed after considering and applying the factors identified by the Supreme Court in State v. Handy, 391 S.E.2d 159 (N.C. 1990). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea based upon the trial court's ruling that Defendant failed to show any fair and just reason for the withdrawal of his guilty plea; and (2) this Court disavows the dicta contained in the court of appeals' decision regarding the subject of prejudice to the State after the court's stated conclusion that Defendant had not satisfied the Handy factors. |
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| City of Brook Park v. Rodojev |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3253 Opinion Date: June 10, 2020 Judge: Stewart Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for driving his vehicle fifteen miles per hour over the posted speed limit, holding that the results of a speed-measuring device using either radar or laser technology are admissible in court without expert testimony establishing, or the court taking judicial notice of, the reliability of the scientific principles underlying that technology. During Defendant's bench trial, the trial court admitted into evidence and considered the results of the laser speed-detection device that was used in calculating Defendant's excessive speed without establishing the reliability of the scientific principles underlying the device's technology. The trial court convicted Defendant without specifically taking judicial notice of the device's reliability. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the results of a radar speed-measuring device may be admitted into evidence without expert testimony establishing the reliability of the scientific principles underlying the technology or the court taking judicial notice of the scientific principles underlying that technology; and (2) the fact-finder is required to determine whether the evidence concerning the accuracy of the particular speed-measuring device and the qualifications of the person who used it are sufficient to support a conviction based on the device's results. |
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| State ex rel. Miller v. May |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3248 Opinion Date: June 10, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's habeas corpus petition against the warden of the Richland Correctional Institution (RCI), holding that the court of appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for failure to attach all the relevant commitment papers, as required by Ohio Rev. Code 2725.04(D). Appellant, an inmate at RCI, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the prison sentences he was serving had expired and that, therefore, he was entitled to immediate release. The warden filed a motion to dismiss Appellant's petition but did not raise the sufficiency of the commitment papers attached to the petition as grounds for dismissal or summary judgment. Nonetheless, the court of appeals dismissed the petition on the basis that Appellant had failed to comply with section 2725.04(D). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, by failing to attach all the relevant commitment papers to his petition, Appellant did not comply with section 2725.04(D). |
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| State ex rel. Simmons v. Breaux |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3251 Opinion Date: June 10, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus against Summit County Court of Common Pleas Judge Alison M. Breaux, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on his propositions of law. Appellant was convicted of rape and domestic violence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court summarily vacated the lower courts' judgments and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. After a new sentencing hearing the trial court issued a new sentencing entry. Appellant filed a motion to correct a void sentence arguing that the trial court had exceeded the scope of the Supreme Court's remand order when it purportedly imposed a harsher sentence than it had imposed in the original sentencing entry. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant subsequently sought a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to conduct a new sentencing hearing. The court of appeals granted Judge Breaux's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's propositions of law either lacked merit or were not cognizable in mandamus. |
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| State ex rel. Thomas v. Gaul |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3257 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus sought by Appellant to compel Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Daniel Gaul to vacate his convictions, holding that the court of appeals was correct in concluding that Appellant's mandamus request failed as a matter of law. Appellant was found guilty of multiple rape and kidnapping counts and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of fifty years to life. Appellant later filed a mandamus complaint to compel Judge Gaul to vacate his convictions, alleging that the trial court dismissed the first indictment against him on speedy-trial grounds and that he was protected against reindictment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims were barred by res judicata. |
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| State v. Howard |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-3195 Opinion Date: June 9, 2020 Judge: Maureen O'Connor Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court revoking Defendant's community control and imposing the prison sentence that it had notified Defendant of at his initial sentencing hearing, holding that consecutive sentences were not properly imposed in this case. The court of appeals concluded (1) because the trial court had notified Defendant at his initial sentencing hearing of the specific prison terms that the court could impose if Defendant were to violate his community-control conditions, it was not required to repeat that notification before it imposed the prison terms at a second revocation hearing; and (2) the trial court had not been required to make consecutive-sentences findings required under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(c) when it revoked Defendant's community control and imposed consecutive prison terms. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court provided Defendant sufficient notice of the specific prison terms he could receive if his community control were to be revoked; but (2) a trial court must make statutorily required consecutive-sentences findings when it imposes consecutive sentences following the revocation of community control. |
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| In re Joseph I. Lamontagne |
| Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 18-290 Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Gilbert V. Indeglia Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the superior court adjudicating Defendant to be in criminal contempt, holding that the trial justice's two-year consecutive sentence was clearly beyond the six-month maximum. Defendant was convicted for first-degree robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon in a dwelling. At sentencing, the trial justice deviated from the sentencing benchmarks and sentenced Defendant to thirty-five years' incarceration. When Defendant acted out in the presence of the court, the trial justice found Defendant in contempt of court. The trial justice sentenced Defendant to an additional two years' incarceration for criminal contempt, to be served consecutively with his sentence to serve on the underlying charges. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial justice was clearly within her authority in adjudicating Defendant in criminal contempt; but (2) Defendant's sentence for contempt was unlawful. |
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| South Carolina v. Massey |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27981 Opinion Date: June 10, 2020 Judge: Donald W. Beatty Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| John Massey, Jr. was indicted for first-degree burglary, grand larceny, and criminal conspiracy. The circuit court granted a defense motion to quash the indictment for first-degree burglary on the basis the premises entered did not qualify as a dwelling. The court of appeals affirmed. The State contended on appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court that, beyond the fact that the circuit court did not have the authority to quash a facially valid indictment on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds, the court of appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's ruling on the merits. To this, the Supreme Court agreed, and reversed. The matter was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Jeremy S. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 19-0006 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Armstead Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for incest, sexual assault in the third degree, and sexual abuse by a parent, guardian, custodian or person in a position of trust to a child, holding that there was no error. Defendant's first trial resulted in a hung jury, and his second trial resulted in a conviction on nine counts. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the first trial did not result in Defendant's acquittal based on the circuit court's manner of polling the jury; (2) the circuit court did not err when it continued Defendant's first trial past the first term of court over Defendant's objection; (3) there was no error in the circuit court's decision to allow the jury to hear the State's DNA evidence; (4) the circuit court did not err in refusing to dismiss a juror who admitted to knowing the victim and the prosecutor; and (5) the doctrine of cumulative error did not apply in Defendant's case. |
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| State v. Mills |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 18-1132 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Armstead Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court denying Defendant's' motion to dismiss the indictment in his case, holding that West Virginia's felon in possession of a firearm statute is not void for vagueness. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant later appealed the order of the circuit court denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing (1) the felon in possession of a firearm statute, W. Va. Code 61-7-7(b), is void for vagueness; or (2) in the alternative, the predicate statute that served as the basis for his conviction was not a crime of violence against the person of another. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 61-7-7(b) is constitutional; and (2) a prior felony conviction for wanton endangerment in the first degree is a crime of violence against the person of another within the meaning of section 61-7-7(b). |
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| State v. Rexrode |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 18-0498 Opinion Date: June 8, 2020 Judge: Armstead Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming Defendant's conviction for one count of domestic battery, holding that law enforcement officers' entry into Defendant's home was reasonable under the emergency doctrine exception to the warrant requirement. After a magistrate court jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of domestic battery of his wife and sentenced to ten days in jail. The circuit court affirmed, holding that the officers' entry into Defendant's home fell under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment and that, therefore, the officers acted reasonably. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the warrantless entry into Defendant's home fell within the emergency doctrine exception to the warrant requirement; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to reversal on his remaining allegations of error. |
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| State v. Varlas |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 19-0005 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Walker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated a 2018 sentencing order entered by the circuit court after a third trial that failed to suspend Petitioner's sentence of ten to twenty-five years' incarceration in favor of probation, holding that the sentence was an impermissible increase in penalty under State v. Eden, 256 S.E.2d 868 (W. Va. 1979). In 2014, Petitioner was convicted of attempted sexual abuse in the first degree and sexual assault in the second degree. For sexual assault in the second degree, Petitioner was sentenced to ten to twenty-five years' incarceration, suspended in favor of five years' probation. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. A second trial ended in a mistrial. In 2018, after a third trial, Petitioner was again convicted of attempted sexual abuse in the first degree and sexual assault in the second degree. In its new sentencing order, the circuit court failed to suspend the sentence of ten to twenty-five years' incarceration in favor of probation. The Supreme Court vacated the 2018 sentencing order, holding that the sentence violated Petitioner's due process rights. |
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| State v. Coffee |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2018AP001209-CR Opinion Date: June 5, 2020 Judge: Patience D. Roggensack Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of Defendant's vehicle incident to his lawful arrest for operating while intoxicated (OWI), holding that the search was lawful because the police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In affirming the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, the court of appeals concluded that the lawful arrest for OWI, in and of itself, supplied a sufficient basis to search the passenger compartment of Defendant's vehicle and, specifically, a bag located behind the driver's seat that contained marijuana. The Supreme Court affirmed but on other grounds, holding (1) Defendant's lawful arrest for OWI, in and of itself, did not supply a sufficient basis to search the passenger compartment of Defendant's vehicle; but (2) based on the totality of the circumstances, the police had reasonable suspicion that the passenger compartment, and specifically, the bag might contain evidence of OWI. |
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| Warren v. Meisner |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2019AP000567-W Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Ann Walsh Bradley Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals denying Appellant's petition for habeas corpus after Appellant previously sought Wis. Stat. 974.06 postconviction relief without success, holding that the circuit court is the appropriate forum for Appellant's claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to assert an ineffective trial counsel claim and that the language in State v. Starks, 833 N.W.2d 146 (Wis. 2013), is withdrawn to the extent it contradicts this conclusion. In both his habeas petition and postconviction motion, Appellant claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for alleged errors that took place after his conviction. In ruling on Appellant's postconviction motion, the circuit court concluded that Appellant had sought relief in the wrong forum and should have instead filed a habeas petition. Appellant filed a habeas petition, which the court of appeals denied on the grounds that appellant should have instead filed an appeal of the circuit court's denial of his postconviction motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Knight/Rothering framework remains the correct mythology for determining the appropriate forum for a criminal defendant to file a claim relating to ineffective assistance of counsel after conviction; and (2) Appellant's original section 974.06 motion in the circuit court was properly filed. |
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| Fairbourn v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 73 Opinion Date: June 11, 2020 Judge: Gray Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree and attempted murder in the first degree, holding that Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial or his right to a fair trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant was not denied his statutory or constitutional right to a speedy trial; (2) Defendant failed to establish that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel; and (3) Defendant failed to establish that he was denied his constitutional right to due process of law or a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. |
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