| Ramos v. Louisiana |
| Court: US Supreme Court Docket: 18-5924 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Neil M. Gorsuch Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 48 states and in federal court, a single juror’s vote to acquit is enough to prevent a conviction; Louisiana and Oregon punish people based on 10-to-2 verdicts. Ramos was convicted in a Louisiana court by a 10-to-2 jury verdict and was sentenced to life without parole. The Supreme Court reversed. The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense. Juror unanimity is a vital common law right. The Court rejected an “invitation” to “perform a cost-benefit analysis on the historic features of common law jury trials and to conclude that unanimity does not make the cut.” In overturning its 1972 “Apodaca” decision, the Court stated that the reasoning, in that case, was “gravely mistaken” and “sits uneasily with 120 years of preceding case law.” The fact that Louisiana and Oregon may need to retry defendants convicted of felonies by non-unanimous verdicts whose cases are still pending on direct appeal “will surely impose a cost, but new rules of criminal procedure usually do.” |
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| United States v. Diaz-Rivera |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1461 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Torruella Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's upwardly variant sentence for one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and one count of using a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, holding that the sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to drug-related crimes. After a sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Defendant to an upwardly variant sentence of 180 months of imprisonment, thus declining to impose the government's requested sentence. On appeal, Defendant challenged both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the 180-month sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. |
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| United States v. Cotto |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-2970 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Leval Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| A conviction for retaliating against a witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1513 does not require that the Government prove that defendant had knowledge of the federal nature of the proceeding. The Second Circuit rejected defendant's arguments to the contrary and affirmed his conviction for retaliating against a witness. The court remanded for revision of the provision of the sentence relating to the substance abuse treatment condition of supervised release; instructed the district court to consider on remand whether the court's forthcoming order in United States v. Traficante, No. 18-1962 (2d Cir., submitted Oct. 25, 2019) requires modification of the risk notification provision of supervised release; and granted the parties leave to reinstate this appeal to permit review of the district court's decision on remand as to the risk notification provision. |
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| United States v. Rosa |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 17-2004 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Nardini Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Where a district court offers no explanation for its sentence, and where neither the adopted presentence report nor the statement of reasons adequately demonstrates the court's reasoning, the court has committed plain error in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3553(c). The Second Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The court held that the district court failed to state its reasons for sentencing defendant as required under section 3553(c); the error is clear or obvious; and the error affected defendant's substantial rights. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| Fogle v. Sokol |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-1066 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Matey Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1976, the body of 15-year-old “Kathy” was found near her Indiana County, Pennsylvania home. Kathy’s death involved a brutal assault, rape, and a gunshot to the head. Kathy's sisters, ages nine and 12, stated that she had gotten into a car with a man with blue eyes, black hair that came below his ears and curled at the ends, sideburns, heavy eyebrows, and a heavy mustache. Fogle had “straight reddish-blonde hair that dropped down his back and a matching, full beard that reached his waist.” After three years, Fogle became a suspect because a psychiatric patient described seeing Kathy get in a car with Fogle and his brother. The story was largely inconsistent with statements by Kathy’s sisters. Jailhouse informants were recruited and counseled by law enforcement with promises of leniency. The prosecutors “either knew about, encouraged, or permitted” this strategy. A jury found Fogle guilty of second-degree murder. In 2015, Fogle obtained DNA evidence excluding both himself and his brother as the source of semen collected from Kathy. His conviction was vacated. The Commonwealth declined to pursue new charges, describing the case as lacking “prosecutorial merit.” Fogle, having spent three decades in prison, sued the prosecutors and Indiana County under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of their motions to dismiss based on absolute immunity. Only truly prosecutorial functions, not investigative conduct, justify complete protection from suit. Fogle’s complaint alleges actions that fall outside the narrow doctrine of absolute immunity. |
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| James v. New Jersey State Police |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 18-1432 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Porter Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Stephens called 911 and reported that Gibbons hit her and had a gun in his truck. The police responded. Stephens obtained a temporary restraining order, prohibiting Gibbons from possessing firearms and from returning to Stephens’s house. The next day, Gibbons went to Stephens’s house. Stephens was talking on the phone; the friend called the police. Gibbons left Stephens’s house. Trooper Conza arrived. Stephens stated that Gibbons had waved a gun throughout their argument. Conza told Stephens to go to the police barracks and reported over the radio that Gibbons had brandished a firearm. Conza, with Troopers Bartelt and Korejko, visited the nearby home of Gibbons’s mother, James. James stated that she did not know where Gibbons was and that he might be off his schizophrenia medication. While driving to the barracks, Stephens saw Gibbons walking alongside the road and called 911. The Troopers responded. Bartelt parked his car and, exiting, observed that Gibbons was pointing a gun at his own head. Bartelt drew his weapon, stood behind his car door, and twice told Gibbons to drop his weapon. Gibbons did not comply. Bartelt shot Gibbons twice within seconds of stopping his car. Gibbons died that night. In James’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Third Circuit held that Bartelt is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate Gibbons’s clearly established rights. Bartelt’s pre-standoff knowledge of Gibbons differs from that of officers involved in cited cases. Bartelt could reasonably conclude that Gibbons posed a threat to others. |
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| Bazemore v. Best Buy |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-2196 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Quattlebaum Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, Best Buy, claiming that she was harassed because of her race and gender and subjected to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff's complaint stemmed from an incident where a coworker made a racist and sexually charged joke to a small group of coworkers that included plaintiff. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's motion to dismiss and held that, in the case of allegedly harassing comments by a co-worker, an employee must allege plausible facts that the employer knew, or should have known, about the harassment and failed to take action reasonably calculated to stop it. Because plaintiff failed to do this, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. In this case, the coworker's conduct was not imputable to Best Buy where Best Buy took steps that were not only reasonably calculated to end such behavior, but that it did in fact end it. |
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| United States v. Akande |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-6833 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Diana Jane Gribbon Motz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his conviction based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court denied the motion. The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and reversed the district court's judgment. The court held that, given counsel's specific misadvice regarding defendant's rights to preserve his appellate rights, on which defendant understandably relied, the district court's general admonishments did not amount to the careful explanation that addresses the particular issue necessary to cure the error. In this case, the plea colloquy did not correct counsel's erroneous advice and the error prejudiced defendant. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. |
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| United States v. Chambers |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-7104 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Floyd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant was erroneously sentenced as a career offender, he moved to reduce his sentence to time served under the First Step Act. The district court denied defendant's motion to reduce his custodial sentence, though it granted the motion as to his supervised release term. The Fourth Circuit held that the First Step Act does not constrain courts from recognizing Guidelines errors. The court explained that First Step Act motions fall under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B), a distinct exception to finality, and that section 404(b) of the First Step Act expressly allows a court to impose a reduced sentence in order to give retroactive effect to sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act. Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors apply in the section 404(b) resentencing context, and the resentencing court has discretion within the section 404(b) framework to vary from the Guidelines and, in doing so, to consider movants' post-sentencing conduct. In this case, the district court seemingly believed that it could not vary from the Guidelines range to reflect post-sentencing information. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's sentencing order. Finally, the court held that any Guidelines error deemed retroactive, such as the error in this case, must be corrected in a First Step Act resentencing. |
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| United States v. Ferebee |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4266 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Traxler Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered from a backpack, and the district court's conclusion that defendant abandoned the backpack and any legitimate expectation of privacy in its contents. The court rejected defendant's claim that the collective-knowledge doctrine has any bearing on the propriety of the district court's conclusion that defendant abandoned the backpack. The court also held that the district court is not precluded from finding abandonment in cases where the defendant, as here, has physical possession of the property he has disavowed. In this case, the record supported the district court's conclusion that defendant clearly and unequivocally disavowed ownership of the backpack. Even if the district court erred by finding that defendant abandoned the backpack, reversal would not be required because the search of the backpack was a proper search incident to arrest for which no warrant was required under the facts of this case. |
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| United States v. Nance |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4585 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Pamela Harris Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's above-Guidelines sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to two federal drug- and firearm-related offenses. The court held that defendant's sentence was not procedurally unreasonable where the district court took into account defendant's extensive criminal history; his pattern of reoffending upon release; his disciplinary infractions in custody and inability to comply with the terms of his release; and the fact that the offenses of conviction occurred over the course of days, in which he was arrested once, released, and then arrested again just days later. The court also held that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court conducted a thorough, individualized assessment of defendant and his offense conduct in light of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and did not abuse its discretion in formulating the sentence. |
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| United States v. Johnson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 17-60852 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Priscilla R. Owen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and 924(e) by knowingly possessing a firearm after he had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The court held that the district court committing plain error by violating Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 when it relied on factual allegations in the confidential sentencing recommendation that were not in the presentence report and that were not disclosed by defendant. The court explained that the use of undisclosed facts to justify an above-guidelines sentence seriously affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. Therefore, the court remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. McGinnis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10197 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which prohibits individuals subject to certain domestic violence protective orders from possessing firearms or ammunition for any purpose, is facially constitutional under the Fifth Circuit's two-step NRA framework. Even assuming arguendo that the conduct at issue -- the keeping and possessing of firearms by individuals subject to domestic protective orders -- falls within the Second Amendment right, defendant's facial challenge fails. The court applied intermediate scrutiny and held that section 922(g)(8) is reasonably adapted to the government interest of reducing domestic gun abuse. The court also held that if the commonly understood definitions of terms in the protective order include acts involving "physical force," the protective order is sufficient to support a conviction under section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). In this case, the jury plausibly found that the order satisfied the statute and the court declined to reverse defendant's conviction on this basis. However, the court remanded for the limited purpose of conforming defendant's written judgment to the district court's oral pronouncement. |
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| Valentine v. Collier |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 20-20207 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law |
| Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that TDCJ's adoption and implementation of measures guided by changing CDC recommendations in regards to the COVID-19 pandemic do not go far enough. Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, seeking a preliminary injunction. The Fifth Circuit granted TDCJ's motion to stay the district court's preliminary injunction, which regulates the cleaning intervals for common areas, the types of bleach-based disinfectants the prison must use, the alcohol content of hand sanitizer that inmates must receive, mask requirements for inmates, and inmates' access to tissues (amongst many other things). The court held that TDCJ is likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal because: (1) after accounting for the protective measures TDCJ has taken, plaintiffs have not shown a "substantial risk of serious harm" that amounts to "cruel and unusual punishment"; and (2) the district court committed legal error in its application of Farmer v. Brennan, by treating inadequate measures as dispositive of defendants' mental state. In this case, even assuming that there is a substantial risk of serious harm, plaintiffs lack evidence of defendants' subjective deliberate indifference to that harm. The court also held that TDCJ has shown that it will be irreparably injured absent a stay, and that the balance of the harms and the public interest favor a stay. Finally, the court held that plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies as required in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and the district court's injunction goes well beyond the limits of what the PLRA would allow even if plaintiffs had properly exhausted their claims. |
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| United States v. Dowl |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-2469 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Dowl pleaded guilty to presenting false tax returns, 18 U.S.C. 286. He received a sentence of 30 months of imprisonment plus 24 months of supervised release. On supervised release, Dowl was charged with four new state crimes; failing to inform his probation officer that he had police contact; communicating with his co-defendant despite instructions to the contrary; failing to make payments on his restitution, fine, or special assessment; and failing to get a job. At a hearing, the court reviewed the evidence and allowed Dowl to tell his side of the story. The court deferred judgment on three of the four new state criminal law violations and dismissed the fourth and found Dowl gainfully employed. Dowl had failed to notify his probation officer about police contact, impermissibly communicated with his co-defendant, and did not pay his fines. After considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, the court returned Dowl to prison for 11 months, giving Dowl and his attorney the opportunity to raise any objections. Dowl had none. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Dowl’s argument that the court committed reversible error by not directly addressing him to solicit an allocution. The court employed the “plain error” standard because Dowl did not raise any objection during his revocation hearing. |
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| United States v. Fowler |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 19-3071, 19-3070 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Donald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2018, Fowler pled guilty to possession of child pornography and violations of the conditions of his supervised release from a previous conviction for the same. In addition to possessing child pornography, Fowler had failed drug testing, had threatened his parole officer, and had tried to harass his girlfriend to recant her testimony. The district court ordered Fowler to pay a $5,000 special assessment for possession of child pornography under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. 3014. The court also varied upward and sentenced Fowler to the maximum statutory penalty for violating the conditions of his supervised release, imposing a 120-month sentence for possessing child pornography and a consecutive 36-month sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. The Sixth Circuit vacated as to the assessment and remanded for a determination of indigency. The district court committed plain error by failing to address Fowler’s ability to pay; the parties did not contemplate the $5,000 special assessment as a part of the waiver provision in the plea agreement. The court affirmed the sentence. The district court did not consider an impermissible factor (whether Fowler had actually touched a child) and Fowler had no other challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence, |
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| United States v. Sumlin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-3819 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Bush Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Sumlin was convicted of the distribution of drugs that caused the 2015 death of Carrie Dobbins, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), which carries enhanced penalty provisions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his convictions and his sentence to life in prison. The district court properly denied Sumlin’s suppression motion, given that the affidavit established a sufficient nexus between his drug trafficking activity and residence that was searched. The court properly admitted testimony by the victim’s sister, Kelly, who was Sumlin’s former girlfriend and had purchased drugs from him. Kelly’s testimony about Sumlin's drug-trafficking and that Sumlin was with Carrie on the day of her overdose was intrinsic proof that was relevant for providing background information and contextualizing the government’s case against Sumlin. Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict that Sumlin distributed the drugs that caused Carrie’s death. |
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| United States v. Vance |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5160 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Bush Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Spriggs’ bank account was established to receive social security checks. The Spriggs’ great-grandson, Vance, filled out an application in Mr. Spriggs’s name for a debit card to draw on the checking account. Mr. Spriggs had never used a debit card. The Spriggses did not authorize Vance to do so. Bank cameras photographed Vance using the card to withdraw cash. Vance also used the card for personal expenses. At another bank, Vance used Mr. Spriggs’s social security number to establish an account and obtain a $15,000 cash advance. Vance made other, unsuccessful loan applications. Upon being notified by the banks about suspicious activities involving his identity, Mr. Spriggs filed a police report. The police arrested Vance. While searching Vance’s car, the police located a large stash of personal and financial documents belonging to the Spriggses, including bank statements, tax return forms, property-tax bills, and a car title. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Vance’s convictions for access-device fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(5), and two counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), and his 65-month sentence. The court rejected arguments that the district court failed to make adequate findings of fact after the bench trial, improperly denied a motion for judgment of acquittal, and failed to correctly calculate the loss amount connected to Vance’s charges under Sentencing Guidelines 2B1.1. |
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| Winburn v. Nagy |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 19-2399, 19-2398 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Winburn represented himself at his trial for armed robbery, home invasion, and conspiracy. Based on Winburn’s disruptive behavior, the judge removed him from the courtroom and revoked Winburn’s permission to represent himself, then granted a competency evaluation and a mistrial. While Winburn awaited his second trial, the judge permitted Winburn’s stand-by attorney to withdraw because Winburn had sued her and enjoined Winburn from filing complaints or grievances against his new attorney, except to discharge her. Although represented by a new attorney, Winburn moved pro se to dismiss his charges on double jeopardy grounds. The trial judge denied the motion because Winburn’s attorney had not filed it. Winburn filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 challenging his retrial and another section 2241 petition challenging the injunction. The district judges denied both and declined to issue certificates of appealability. Winburn filed a notice of appeal for one petition and sought a certificate of appealability for the other. The Sixth Circuit held that state pretrial detainees proceeding under section 2241 may not appeal without certificates of appealability and granted Winburn a certificate on the injunction claim. A reasonable jurist could conclude that the unusual order was constitutionally infirm. The court denied relief with respect to double jeopardy. Winburn failed to exhaust his state-court remedies by a motion to dismiss. |
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| Lund v. City of Rockford |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1945 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: ROVNER Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Lund, a reporter for the Rockford Scanner, heard, by police scanner, of multiple traffic stops in Midtown. He did not have a driver’s license, so he rode a motorized bicycle to Midtown to take photographs. He suspected a prostitution sting operation. An officer noticed Lund and radioed the team. Officers Welsh and Campbell knew of Lund's previous anti‐police speech. They directed Lund to “move on.” Lund asked if he was breaking any laws. Campbell informed him that he was not, but that his continued presence would constitute obstruction of a police detail and result in arrest. Lund started his bicycle and called out, loudly, “goodbye officers.” Concerned that Lund might post pictures on social media while the sting operation was ongoing and create a danger for unarmed undercover officers, the officers followed Lund and arrested him for driving the wrong way on a one‐way street, operating a vehicle without insurance, obstructing a police officer, felony aggravated driving on a revoked license, and operating a motor vehicle without a valid drivers’ license. News stories listed Lund’s name as an arrestee in the prostitution sting. The charges against Lund were dismissed. Lund sued the officers and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on First Amendment retaliation and malicious prosecution under Illinois law, citing the Supreme Court’s intervening "Nieves" (2019) holding, that, in most cases, probable cause to arrest defeats a claim of retaliatory arrest. There was probable cause to arrest Lund. |
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| United States v. Perez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3156 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: KANNE Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Beloit officers facilitated a recorded controlled buy of heroin from Perez, a suspected high-level drug dealer. Perez sold 98 grams of heroin to an informant. Based on that transaction alone, Perez pled guilty to distributing heroin. At Perez’s sentencing hearing, the judge expressed concern that the guidelines range of 33–41 months’ imprisonment did not reflect the full scope of his drug trafficking. The PSR described conduct that suggested that Perez was responsible for distributing large quantities of heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine. The judge continued the hearing, directing the government to file a memorandum, detailing which offense conduct it could support by a preponderance of the evidence. When the hearing reconvened, the government presented witness testimony that elaborated on conduct described in the PSR, including drug ledgers, Perez’s post-arrest conversation with his girlfriend, large sums of cash, a money counter, cell phones, and Perez’s passport. The judge calculated a higher guidelines range and imposed a 121-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentencing judge should have recused himself. Perez has not demonstrated that a reasonable observer would have questioned the judge’s impartiality nor did he allege that the judge was biased based on events outside the proceedings. The judge’s continuance was laudable, not prejudicial. |
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| Jackson v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1131 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Lavenski R. Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct petitioner's sentence. The court held that the district court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing as to petitioner's claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to conduct adequate pretrial investigations. In this case, petitioner failed to identify any specific witnesses or evidence that counsel failed to uncover. Furthermore, petitioner failed to show that counsel's representation prejudiced his case. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing as to petitioner's claim that his new counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena witnesses, for convincing petitioner not to testify, for failing to object to or appeal the district court's answer to a jury question, and for failing to object to the district court's designation of petitioner as a career offender. |
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| United States v. Bolman |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2759 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Jane Louise Kelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for involuntary manslaughter after he struck and killed his nephew with his truck. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, because a reasonable jury could find defendant grossly negligent beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err by failing to instruct the jury that actual knowledge is an essential element of the offense that is separate from gross negligence, because the instructions, viewed as a whole, accurately and adequately defined the essential elements of the offense. |
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| United States v. Boyd |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3528 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Kobes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the facts underlying defendant's prior arrests were part of his history and characteristics under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and thus the district court could consider defendant's arrest records and the circumstances of those arrests. The court explained that the arrests were listed in the presentence report and gleaned from prior police reports. Furthermore, specific facts underlying the arrests may be considered for an upward departure and should be considered fair game for a variance where defendant did not object to them. The court also concluded that there is nothing here that suggested a corrected misstatement improperly influenced the district court's sentencing decision. Finally, the court held that the upward variance was not unreasonable in consideration of defendant's previous assaults, coupled with the facts underlying his arrest in this case. |
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| United States v. Gonzalez-Esparsa |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1477 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Grasz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for unlawful use of an identification document and misuse of a social security number. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions where a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant knew the permanent resident card bearing his name and photograph had been forged, counterfeited, falsely made, or unlawfully obtained when he used it to secure employment. Furthermore, a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant made the false representation regarding his purported social security number in order to deceive Midwest Concrete in order to obtain a job with the company. |
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| United States v. Sanchez-Velasco |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3568 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: James B. Loken Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress his responses to an ICE agent's two questions at the Treasurer's Office, because he was not in custody at the time of questioning. Although defendant was in custody at the ICE facility, the court held that an agent's questions were not custodial interrogation because the agent could not have known his questions were likely to elicit incriminating information regarding the two criminal charges that were eventually brought against defendant. The court noted that the Attorney General's regulations carefully distinguish between the warrantless arrest of an alien for a criminal violation of the immigration laws, and what is called the "administrative arrest" of an alien who is reasonably believed to be illegally present in the United States. The court agreed with the district court that the agent's questioning was a request for routine information necessary for basic identification purposes that is not interrogation under Miranda, even if the information turns out to be incriminating. |
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| Anthony v. TRAX International Corp. |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-15662 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Kim McLane Wardlaw Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to TRAX in a disability discrimination action brought by plaintiff under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). After TRAX terminated plaintiff from her position as a Technical Writer allegedly due to an inability or unwillingness to accommodate her disability, TRAX discovered during the course of litigation that plaintiff lacked the requisite bachelor's degree for her position. The panel held that, although McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995), held that after-acquired evidence cannot establish a superseding, non-discriminatory justification for an employer's challenged actions, after-acquired evidence remains available for other purposes, including to show that an individual is not qualified under the ADA. Because plaintiff did not satisfy one of the prerequisites for her position, she is not "otherwise qualified," and TRAX was not obligated to engage in the interactive process. |
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| City of Almaty v. Khrapunov |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-56451 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Marbley Areas of Law: Criminal Law, International Law, White Collar Crime |
| The City of Almaty, in Kazakhstan, filed suit against defendant and his family under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), alleging that they engaged in a scheme to defraud the city of millions of dollars. The City claimed that it was forced to spend money and resources in the United States to trace where its money was laundered. The district court dismissed the City's claim on the basis that it failed to state a domestic injury pursuant to the Supreme Court's recent decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). The Ninth Circuit held that the City failed to state any cognizable injury other than the foreign theft of its funds, and its voluntary expenditures were not proximately caused by defendants' acts of money laundering. In this case, the City's expenditure of funds to trace its allegedly stolen funds is a consequential damage of the initial theft suffered in Kazakhstan and is not causally connected to the predicate act of money laundering. |
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| United States v. Baldon |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-10411 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Bennett Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, the district court sentenced him to 184 months in prison. The Ninth Circuit held that defendant's prior convictions for carjacking under section 215 of the California Penal Code are not categorical crimes of violence under USSG 4A1.1(e). Therefore, the district court incorrectly calculated defendant's criminal history by improperly including two points for his prior carjacking convictions. However, the panel held that the district court did not err in finding that defendant possessed a firearm under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1). Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Costanzo |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-10291 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Michael Daly Hawkins Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of five counts of money laundering, holding that a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the money laundering transactions, in which payment was made via bitcoin, affected interstate commerce in some way or to some degree. In this case, the transfer involved the use of an Internet or cellular network connected Personal Computer Device (PCD) to transfer bitcoin (together with the digital code necessary to unlock the bitcoin) to the digital wallet of another Internet or cellular network connected PCD. |
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| United States v. Manzanares |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 18-2010 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Mary Beck Briscoe Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-Appellant Archie Manzanares appealed a district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion challenging his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Under the ACCA, an offense qualified as a violent felony by satisfying at least one of three definitions, which have come to be known as the Elements Clause, the Enumerated Clause, and the Residual Clause. Manzanares asserted that without the Residual Clause, his underlying New Mexico convictions (armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and aggravated battery) no longer qualified as violent felonies. The district court denied the motion, concluding that all three underlying convictions satisfied the Elements Clause. Manzanares appealed the classification of the armed robbery conviction as a violent felony to the Tenth Circuit, and sought to expand the certificate of appealability to allow him to appeal the decision regarding the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and aggravated battery convictions. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Manzanares’s 2255 motion, and denied his motion to expand the COA. |
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| United States v. Delaney |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 18-3093 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: David S. Tatel Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The DC Circuit vacated the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The court held that officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they seized defendant because they lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. In this case, a seizure occurred when the officers pulled into the parking lot, partially blocked defendant's vehicle, and activated their take-down light. The court held that any inference of suspicion that the officers drew from encountering defendant soon after hearing the nearby gunshots were undermined by the government's failure to identify specific and articulable facts supporting the officers' estimation of where the various shots came from. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Antenor v. Alaska, Department of Corrections |
| Court: Alaska Supreme Court Docket: S-17005 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Carney Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| Several Alaska Department of Corrections inmates challenged the DOC's policy to charge for local telephone calls, arguing the rates they and call recipients had to pay for calls violated their constitutional right to rehabilitation, their statutory right to reasonable telephone access, and DOC’s contractual obligations under a prior settlement and consent decree. In addition, one of the prisoners challenged DOC officers’ decision to deny him access to a computer programming book he ordered from outside the prison. He contended that DOC placed a content-specific restriction on the educational materials and publications prisoners were allowed, violating the Alaska Constitution’s free speech provisions as well as prisoners’ right to reformation. Each of these challenges reached the Alaska Supreme Court after inmates exhausted the administrative process from prison. Inmates then appealed to the superior court, which denied relief. The Alaska Supreme Court determined the superior court record did not provide enough evidence for it to meaningfully determine the reasonableness of the rates charged inmates for local telephone calls; therefore the Court reversed denial of relief and remanded for further fact-finding by the trial court. The Court concluded that the facility's restrictions on programming-related books were rationally related to a legitimate interest, and because they did not infringe on the right to rehabilitation, it affirmed denial of a prisoner's motion to enforce his claimed right to a particular text about computer programming. |
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| Berger v. Bryant |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 357 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Rhonda K. Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition to proceed in forma pauperis on a petition for writ of mandamus and a motion for declaratory judgment, holding that Appellant failed to state a colorable cause of action. In 1998, Appellant was convicted of rape. In his petition for a writ of mandamus, Appellant asserted that he sought information pursuant to the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act regarding his rape conviction but received no response. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even if Appellant had requested disclosable information, he would not be entitled to inspect it as an incarcerated person; and (2) Appellant did not demonstrate a legitimate claim given the facts presented and therefore failed to establish a colorable cause of action to support his request to proceed in forma pauperis. |
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| Carroll v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 360 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's motion for leave to file a petition for writ of error cram knobs, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue the writ. Appellant pled guilty to rape and was sentenced as a habitual offender to 720 months' imprisonment. In his coram nobis petition, Appellant alleged several grounds for relief, including claims of actual innocence, an invalid arrest warrant, a coerced guilty plea, and prosecutorial misconduct. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not demonstrate that that the writ should issue and failed diligently to proceed on his claim for coram nobis relief. |
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| Cave v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 356 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Josephine L. Hart Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the petition. Appellant was found guilty of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance and one count of maintaining a drug premises. In his habeas petition, Appellant argued that he was actually innocent because his arrest and conviction was based on the false testimony of a witness who had a lengthy criminal history. Appellant further argued that the writ should issue because he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's claims regarding the witness's credibility do not constitute a valid assertion that he was being unlawfully detained; and (2) Appellant did not actually connect an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel to his allegation that he was unlawfully detained. |
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| Chatmon v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 355 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Josephine L. Hart Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Appellant's appeal from the order of the circuit court denying his petition to proceed in forma pauperis on the grounds that Appellant failed to state a colorable cause of action in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's in forma pauperis petition. In his habeas petition, Appellant alleged that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in his criminal case. Before this case was submitted to the Supreme Court, Appellant filed two motions, including a "Judicial Notice of a Void Judgment" and a "Notice to the Court." The Supreme Court denied the motions, holding that neither motion was cognizable under the Court's rules. The Court then affirmed the Supreme Court's denial of Appellant's in forma pauperis petition, holding that the circuit court correctly found that Appellant did not assert a colorable cause of action. |
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| McClinton v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 353 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Karen R. Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's second petition requesting permission to proceed in the trial court with a petition for writ of error coram nobis, holding that Petitioner's proposed attack on the judgment had no merit. Petitioner was convicted of raping a mentally handicapped sixteen-year-old girl and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In his first petition for writ of error coram nobis Petitioner alleged a number of errors in the trial procedure. The first petition was denied. In his second coram nobis petition, Petitioner alleged violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. |
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| Siegel v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 359 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal from the circuit court's orders denying her motions to declare Ark. Code Ann. 5-62-106 (disposition of animal) and Ark. Code Ann. 5-62-111 (prevention of cruelty) unconstitutional and conditionally granting her motion for return of seized property, holding that there was no final, appealable order in this case. Appellant was convicted of thirty-one misdemeanor counts of cruelty to animals. The circuit court subsequently dismissed the charges on speedy-trial grounds. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that it was not authorized. Appellant had filed motions seeking a declaration that sections 5-62-106 and -111 are unconstitutional and seeking the return of her seized property. The circuit court denied the constitutional claims and entered a conditional order granting Appellant's motion for return of seized property. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the conditional order did not make specific findings as to the return of the property or as to damages and because it expressly left open the possibility of further proceedings, there was no final, appealable order in this case. |
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| Thomas v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 354 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Josephine L. Hart Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction of capital murder, holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress tracking data generated by his cellphone. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred by denying his directed-verdict motion because the evidence supported the defense's theory of the case that he did not intend to shoot the victim. Further, Appellant argued that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the seizure of AT&T phone records. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the capital murder conviction; and (2) the circuit court correctly denied the motion to suppress. |
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| California v. Landowski |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C080210(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Andrea Lynn Hoch Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Michael Reyes, Jr., an active Norteno gang member (from the Broderick Boys subset), confronted a former Norteno gang member (from the Franklin Boys subset), "S.," about a physical altercation that occurred between S. and Reyes’s stepfather over a debt. That earlier altercation had taken place in front of Reyes’s autistic younger brother. Reyes pulled out a handgun and asked S. if he had a problem. S., who was riding his bicycle with his wife, "R.," when Reyes confronted him with the gun, stopped briefly, told Reyes to put the gun down if he wanted to fight, and then started to ride away. This angered Reyes, prompting him to fire six rounds at S. from behind. S. Was hit but survived. R. Was a short distance in front of S., but was not hit. Defendants Liberty Landowski and Lisa Humble were with Reyes at the time of the shooting and aided in his efforts to avoid being apprehended by law enforcement authorities. Reyes, Landowski, and Humble were tried together before the same jury. Reyes was convicted of one count of attempted murder (Count 1), two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Counts 2 and 4), one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5), and one count of possession of ammunition by a convicted felon (Count 6). In addition to various firearm and other enhancements, the jury found Reyes committed the crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members. The jury convicted Landowski and Humble of being accessories to Reyes’s criminal conduct (Count 9) and also found true gang enhancement allegations attached to that crime. Reyes challenged the sufficiency of the firearm evidence presented to support his conviction, and all defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their gang enhancements. The Court of Appeal determined Senate Bill 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) gave the trial court discretion to strike firearm enhancements in the interest of justice and applied retroactively; and Senate Bill 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) eliminated such enhancements, and also applied retroactively. To these issues, the Court remanded for the trial court's consideration. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. |
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| California v. May |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C084302(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Ronald B. Robie Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Raymond May was found guilty by jury of possessing an assault weapon and a machine gun based on his possession of a single AK-47 assault rifle while guarding a marijuana plantation. He was sentenced to probation, which included an electronic search condition. On appeal, defendant argued there was a lack of sufficient evidence corroborating his accomplice’s testimony and demonstrating he knew of the firearm’s illegal character. He further alleged the trial court erred in instructing the jury: that the accomplice instruction should have included language specifying that the accomplice testimony needed to prove more than defendant’s mere presence or access to the firearm. Furthermore, defendant argued the electronic search condition imposed as part of his probation failed under the standards announced in California v. Lent, 15 Cal.3d 481 (1975). The Court of Appeal agreed defendant’s electronic search condition should have been stricken, but otherwise affirmed. |
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| California v. Perez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E072260(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Miller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2009, defendant-appellant Rudy Perez pled guilty to active gang participation under Penal Code section 186.22(a), and unlawful possession of a firearm under section 12025(b)(6). In 2010, defendant pled guilty to residential burglary under section 459, and active gang participation under section 186.22(a). In August of 2018, the State filed a new felony complaint, alleging one of the prior gang participation convictions as a strike prior. In 2018, defendant moved to vacate the two prior gang participation convictions based upon changes in the law that rendered them invalid. The trial court denied defendant’s motion. In 2019, defendant asked for reconsideration, which was again denied. Thereafter, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of his motion to vacate the convictions. The Court of Appeal found that defendant pled guilty to street terrorism under Penal Code section 186.22(a) in 2009 and 2010, and it was undisputed that while committing these offenses, defendant acted alone. However, subsequent to defendant’s guilty pleas, in 2012, the California Supreme Court held that a defendant had to act in concert with a fellow gang member in order to be guilty of street terrorism. At that time, defendant could have filed a state habeas petition requesting relief, but failed to do so. "Defendants can lose remedies that are established by law when they fail to invoke such remedies in time." Section 1473.7 became effective in 2017. In defendant’s motion filed in the trial court, defendant failed to state what new evidence was discovered, instead arguing that the trial court was allowed “to vacate a conviction where the defendant is innocent as a matter of law or where vacating the conviction is in the interest of justice, even though the defendant is no longer in custody or otherwise restrained by the conviction.” The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court's reason to deny relief, determining that "while the outcome in this case may be unfortunate for defendant, we are not here to rewrite legislation. The Legislature could amend section 1473.7 to address issues raised in this case. However, under the laws, as written, we must uphold the trial court’s order." |
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| In re S.R. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B300214(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Bendix Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Father appealed the juvenile court's dispositional ruling removing daughter from his custody, arguing that his mere possession of child pornography does not demonstrate that he poses a substantial risk of harm to his daughter. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order and held that there is substantial evidence of risk of great harm to daughter—no matter how low the probability— that father will sexually abuse his daughter if he is provided unfettered access to her. |
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| People v. Bell |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B288528(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Stratton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted of one count of attempted robbery, one count of second degree murder, and one count of hit and run driving. The jury found not true the allegation that a principal was armed in the commission of the attempted robbery. The trial court found true the allegations that defendant had served four prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant raised 13 claims of error on appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement terms must be stricken and the matter remanded to the trial court for resentencing. The court also held that defendant forfeited some of his substantive claims and other lack merit. Finally, the court held that, if there is instructional error, the errors are harmless under any standard of review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction. |
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| People v. Drayton |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: H046928(Sixth Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Danner Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 1991, the Wards and their teenage daughter awoke and discovered four men, including Drayton, inside their house. Two were armed. One told the daughter he was going to rape her and placed a firearm inside her vagina. Drayton told the man not to do it. Drayton had a gun and held Mrs. Ward down during the robbery. Two others shot and killed Mr. Ward. Drayton and the others left without seeking help for the Wards. Drayton did not shoot Mr. Ward or threaten to rape the daughter. Drayton surrendered the next day. Drayton’s sole prior conviction was a misdemeanor; he had no reported history of violence. Drayton was sentenced to 29 years to life imprisonment. In 2019, Drayton sought resentencing under Penal Code 1170.95, declaring that he “was not a major participant ... or did not act with reckless indifference to human life.” Senate Bill 1437, effective January 1, 2019, restricted the circumstances under which a person can be liable for felony murder and enacted Penal Code 1170.95, which allows an individual, previously convicted of felony murder, to petition to have his murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced. The court of appeal directed the trial court to hold a hearing under section 1170.95(d) and to accept the assertions in the petition as true unless facts in the record conclusively refute them as a matter of law. If, accepting the petitioner’s assertions as true, he meets section 1170.95(a)'s requirements for relief, the court must issue an order to show cause. In assessing the prima facie showing, the trial court should not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations. |
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| People v. Robinson |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B293746(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Wiley Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant penetrated an unconscious woman with his fingers, he challenged evidentiary rulings and requests a presentence conduct credit. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court properly excluded cumulative evidence about past times the woman was intoxicated at the relevant bar, and any error in allowing a drug recognition expert to testify about whether the woman was incapacitated was harmless. However, the court held that the trial court undercalculated defendant's presentence custody credit because he was not convicted of a violent felony under Penal Code section 2933.1, which would otherwise limit those credits. Accordingly, the court directed the trial court to award defendant 104 days of presentence custody credit and to amend the abstract of judgment, affirming in all other respects. |
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| People v. Torres |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B292551(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Where, as here, the trial court factually finds that a self-represented defendant has engaged in an attempt to intimidate a witness, the constitutional right of self-representation can, in the exercise of the trial court's sound discretion, be revoked. The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for two counts of battery on an ex-girlfriend. In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant's pro se status after he asked his sister to contact the victim and have her say that she was coerced by the police detective to "press charges." |
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| Colorado v. Lujan |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 26 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Brian D. Boatright Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Abel Lujan was charged with first-degree murder for the death of his girlfriend after she was found beaten and strangled behind a friend’s house. At trial, two women testified for the State about Lujan’s prior violent behavior towards them. Prior to admitting this evidence, the trial court read a limiting instruction, telling the jury that it could only consider the evidence for the purposes of establishing Lujan’s motive, intent, or common plan. A copy of this instruction was not given to the jury for deliberations; however, the jury did receive an instruction at the close of the evidence explaining that certain evidence could only be considered for the limited purposes for which it was admitted. While deliberating, the jury submitted a question seeking clarification about the limiting instruction. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court cleared the courtroom of the public and parties, leaving only the judge, bailiff, and court reporter; the judge then brought in the jury and reread the limiting instruction that it had previously read twice in open court. The jury ultimately found Lujan guilty of second-degree murder. Lujan appealed, arguing that the court’s actions when rereading the jury instruction constituted a courtroom closure that violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. A division of the court of appeals agreed and reversed Lujan’s conviction. The State argued on certiorari review that the Colorado Supreme Court adopt a triviality standard, under which a defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial was not violated when the closure at issue was trivial. In so doing, the State argued that the brief courtroom closure here was trivial and therefore did not violate Lujan’s public trial right. The Court concurred with the State, adopted the standard and reversed the appellate court's decision. |
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| Archer v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-841 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's successive motion to vacate his sentence of death under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the Rule 3.851 motion. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and grand theft. Appellant was sentenced to death for the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but reversed Appellant's death sentence and remanded the case for a new penalty phase. After a new penalty phase, Appellant was again sentenced to death. In his successive Rule 3.851 motion, Appellant raised three claims. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) properly denied Appellant's claim that his death sentence violated the Sixth and Eighth Amendments in light of Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016); (2) correctly denied Appellant's claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment; and (3) did not err in denying Appellant's claim of newly discovered evidence. |
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| Collins v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0158 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Tommy Collins was convicted of felony murder in connection with the stabbing death of 14-year-old Rueben Hand. Friends gathered to watch the Peach Drop on New Year's Eve 2010; a disagreement ensued and Hand was stabbed near the Five Points MARTS station shortly after midnight. Appellant’s only argument on appeal was that the trial court plainly erred when it gave the jury the State’s requested instruction on “revenge for a prior wrong.” Seeing no error, "much less plain error," the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Heyward v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0399 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Larmell Heyward was convicted by jury of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the 2007 shooting death of Ramon Rogers. Heyward argued on appeal of those convictions that the trial court erred in denying his request to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court determined the trial court’s refusal to give the charge was harmless, since, in the Court's estimation, there was no realistic probability that the jury would have accepted the "slight" evidence of voluntary manslaughter in the light of the strong evidence of malice murder. |
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| Howard v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0819 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Kenneth Howard was tried by jury and convicted of the murder of Emily Ann Smith Newbegin. Howard appealed, contending that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction. Upon its review of the record and briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no merit in Howard's claim of error, and affirmed. |
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| Keller v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0006 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Randall Keller was convicted of felony murder and related crimes arising out of the beating death of his ex-wife’s two-year-old son, William Powell. On appeal, Keller raised numerous claims of error, including ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court’s rulings on motions before and during trial, several evidentiary rulings, and alleged bias on the part of the trial judge. However, finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Keller's convictions. |
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| Mills v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0364 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Roger Mills was found guilty by jury of malice murder and aggravated assault in connection with the death of Masuto Garrett. Mills contended that the trial court erred when, during jury deliberations, it excused a holdout juror without sufficient inquiry or good cause. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concurred with that contention, and reversed Mills’s convictions. The Court also concluded the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the convictions, so the State could retry Mills if it chose. |
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| Moore v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0344 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Carzell Moore, proceeding pro se, appealed a trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside a September 2017 order denying his motion for an out-of-time appeal of his 2002 resentencing on his 1977 convictions for murder and rape. Moore contended the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to set aside because he was not given proper notice of the September 2017 order. Finding that the record supported the trial court’s ruling, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Morris v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0176 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Darius Morris was found guilty by jury of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Jameson Bush. Morris appealed, arguing he was denied the right to a timely appeal, that the trial court erred in restricting voir dire as to the religious beliefs and connections of potential jurors, that the trial court erred by giving a confusing jury charge regarding statements of co-conspirators, that the trial court erred by violating his right to a public trial by ordering that the courtroom doors be closed and locked during the court’s charge to the jury, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to the closure of the courtroom. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Rickman v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0127 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Victoria Rickman was convicted by jury of malice murder and a related firearm offense in connection with the shooting death of William Carter, Jr. Rickman and Carter had a tumultuous on-again, off-again relationship with a history of verbal and physical abuse, false accusations of sexual assault, empty threats to obtain temporary protective orders, and numerous calls to 911. In the days leading up to Carter’s death, the pair was talking and meeting again despite a recent break-up. On one such 911 call, officers went to Rickman's residence responding to claims shots were fired. Rickman responded holding her small dog, hair wet, and in pajamas. She did not appear to be injured, and nothing in the home looked disturbed or out of place. Rickman told the officers, “he raped me again and I shot him.” Officers found Carter laying face up on the bed naked with multiple gunshot wounds to his body. An autopsy revealed that Carter was shot ten times – four times in the chest, three times in the back, once on the arm, and twice in the head. Rickman’s examining physician testified that he found no injuries on Rickman consistent with her description of events, and no signs of trauma to her vaginal cavity. Rickman appealed her convictions, arguing she was denied effective assistance of counsel and that the trial court erred in admitting improper character evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Robinson v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0265 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Herbert Robinson appealed his convictions for malice murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the death of Michael Moore. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred by allowing the State to use two firearms for demonstrative purposes during trial, and by allowing body-camera footage to be shown at trial. He also argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a letter written by Robinson’s cellmate being available to the jury for review during deliberations, and for failing to object to a visual aid used by the State during closing arguments. Because Robinson failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel or reversible error by the trial court, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Santana v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0563 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Cuevas Carlos Santana was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2010 shooting deaths of Israel Espinoza Mendoza, Vincente Soto Chavez, and Renato Soto Valencia. On appeal, Santana argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred by declining to grant Santana a new trial on the general grounds, and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Santana’s convictions. |
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| Sullivan v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0056 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A jury convicted Antonio Sullivan of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Wava Benton. On appeal, Sullivan contended his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to present evidence at trial to corroborate Sullivan’s testimony about prior difficulties between Sullivan and Benton, and by failing to procure expert testimony about Sullivan’s mental health—specifically about post-traumatic stress disorder— to be presented to the jury. The Georgia Supreme Court determined Sullivan failed to establish that his trial counsel was deficient in either respect, and therefore affirmed his convictions. |
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| Turner v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0247 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Ronald Turner appeals from his conviction for malice murder stemming from the stabbing death of William King. The stabbing took place outside an apartment at which Turner had driven in order to trade food for drugs. Turner testified in his own defense at trial and claimed that King hit him in the head with a beer bottle because Turner owed money to King from a prior drug transaction. Turner testified that he tried to get away from King, but that King chased him down and grabbed his jacket. According to Turner, King was getting ready to hit him again when Turner stabbed King in self-defense. Appealing his ultimate conviction, Turner contended he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in three respects. Seeing no reversible error after a review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Turner's conviction. |
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| Valrie v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0380 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Reuben Valrie was tried by jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the death of his infant daughter Aliyana. Valrie appealed, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Aliyana died as a result of closed head trauma, with a blunt-force abdominal injury as a secondary cause of death, which investigators determined was consistent with being shaken or dropped. At trial, Valrie presented the testimony of four expert witnesses who testified that Aliyana died of natural causes and that the injuries to her brain and abdomen were caused by events such as post-mortem CPR and the “rough” handling of her body by first responders. The jury rejected this defense and found Valrie guilty of murder and the other charges. Valrie contended that his trial lawyer should have raised a hearsay objection to the admission of recorded statements that his girlfriend (and Aliyana's mother) made to police investigators (as well as the testimony of one of those investigators about some of those statements). Alternatively, Valrie argued that his lawyer should have sought the redaction of certain portions of the recorded statements that impugned his character. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded Valrie failed to present evidence that his trial counsel was deficient, or that he was prejudiced by any alleged failures. According, the Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Williams v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0241 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Richard Williams, II, was tried by jury and convicted of murder in connection with the strangulation death of Cory Robinson. Williams and Robinson were involved in a sexual relationship and had been living together at an extended-stay hotel. Kelvin Spencer was a close friend of both Williams and Robinson. When Spencer met Williams at the hotel room, Williams looked angry and had scratches on his neck. Spencer saw Robinson lying on the floor in a “praying position.” Spencer did not believe Robinson was dead, and he helped Williams move clothes and other things to a U-Haul truck parked outside, in preparation for a move. Williams did not testify or present any evidence. Based on his lawyer’s opening and closing arguments, the defense theory was that Spencer killed Robinson because he was jealous of Williams’s relationship with Robinson. Williams’s sole claim on appeal was that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyer failed to present as a defense that Williams accidentally killed Robinson during consensual erotic asphyxiation. He argued that his lawyer's discomfort with the topic of homosexual BDSM activity, and his own problems with the Georgia State Bar, precluded presentation of the "true" version of events, and that Williams acceded to the lawyer's defense strategy only "through ignorance and that he did not know that a defense based on consensual erotic asphyxiation was available." Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| State v. Malave |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-18-0000332 Opinion Date: April 20, 2020 Judge: Mark E. Recktenwald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming Defendant's conviction of sexual assault in the first degree on the complaining witness pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 707-730(1)(b), holding that the ICA did not err in affirming the family court. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the jury should have been instructed to determine jurisdictional facts, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the ICA did not err in finding that there was no rational basis in the record to support providing the jury instruction of the lesser included offense of sexual assault in the third degree. |
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| State v. Malave |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-18-0000332 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Mark E. Recktenwald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the judgment of the family court convicting Defendant on two counts of sexual assault in the first degree, holding that the ICA did not err in affirming the family court. At issue on appeal was the jurisdiction of the family court to try Defendant and the propriety of instructing the jury on a lesser included offense. The ICA affirmed, concluding that the family court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 571-14(a)(1) and that there was no rational basis to support an instruction of the lesser included offense of sexual assault in the third degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the jury should have been instructed to determine jurisdictional facts, the error was harmless; and (2) the family court was not obligated to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of sexual assault in the third degree. |
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| Idaho v. Burke |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 46841 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Moeller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Prior to sentencing, defendant James Burke was committed to the state mental hospital for 56 days to restore him to competency. After being evaluated and deemed competent to proceed to trial, Burke was returned to the county jail and later pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. At the conclusion of his sentencing hearing, Burke sought credit for the 56 days of time spent in court-ordered commitment. The district court denied the motion, concluding that commitment to a state mental hospital did not fall under the definition of 'incarceration’ in Idaho Code section 18-309. After reviewing this issue carefully, the Idaho Supreme Court disagreed with the district court’s "thorough and thoughtful analysis," holding that court-ordered commitment to state custody pursuant to Idaho Code sections 18-210 and 18-211 met the functional and legal definition of “incarceration” under Idaho Code section 18-309. "The extent of the liberty interests restricted by Burke’s court-ordered commitment to State Hospital North are just too similar to imprisonment to conclude otherwise." Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s order denying Burke’s request for credit for time served and remanded the case for the district court to enter an order crediting him with the fifty-six days he spent committed to State Hospital North while the State restored his competency to face criminal charges. |
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| State v. Gibbs |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-1298 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Edward M. Mansfield Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the second degree, holding that Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were invaded when the trial judge instructed the jury that Defendant was required to notify law enforcement of his use of deadly force, but the error was harmless. During trial, Defendant asserted the defense of justification in his shooting of the victim. At issue on appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion by giving a jury instruction incorporating the terms of Iowa Code 704.2B. The instruction included a statement that a person using deadly force is required to notify law enforcement about his use of deadly force. Defendant argued before the Supreme Court that both section 704.2B and the jury instruction incorporating that section violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) instructing the jury that a homicide defendant is required to notify a law enforcement agency of his use of deadly force violates the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights; but (2) any error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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| State v. Broxton |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 114675 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Stegall Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for second-degree murder, burglary, and theft but reversed Defendant's sentences, holding that any error during the guilt phase was harmless but that the district court erred by scoring Defendant's prior Florida burglary conviction as a person felony instead of a nonperson felony. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that a trial court may instruct the jury on felony murder even though the State only charged the defendant with premeditated first degree murder. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in concluding that a district court may elect to provide a felony-murder instruction when that crime was not charged, and the district court properly found that the felony-murder instruction was not legally appropriate in this case; (2) the district court erred by excluding from evidence an exculpatory document from a Florida homicide investigation on the ground it was not relevant, but the error was harmless; and (3) the district court improperly scored Defendant's prior Florida burglary conviction as a person felony. |
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| State v. Corbin |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 119665 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court on remand resentencing Defendant to his original mandatory term of imprisonment after once again finding he was not a person with intellectual disability, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Defendant's intellectual disability motion and imposed a mandatory term of imprisonment. Defendant pled no contest to first-degree premeditated murder. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6622(b) asserting that he was a person with intellectual disability and was thus not subject to a mandatory minimum prison term. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to a hard twenty-five life sentence. While Defendant's appeal was pending, the Legislature amended Kan. Stat. Ann. 76-12b01(i), which provides new standards for deciding intellectual disability. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration of Defendant's motion using the new criteria. On remand, the district court reaffirmed its earlier ruling and again sentenced Defendant to a hard twenty-five life sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's ruling was reasonably based on the law and was supported by substantial competent evidence. |
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| State v. Frazier |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 117456 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Wilson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court affirming the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw plea of no contest to one count of possession of heroin with intent to distribute, holding that the district court's decision in finding no good cause for Defendant to withdraw his plea was based on errors of fact and law, which were grounds for finding abuse of discretion. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea of no contest based on misleading or false statements contained in the plea agreement. The court of appeals affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was enough uncertainty in this case to indicate that Defendant's plea agreement was not understandingly made; and (2) therefore, Defendant must be allowed to withdraw his plea. |
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| State v. Harris |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 117362 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Wilson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of possession fo marijuana, holding that Defendant's waiver of jury trial was legally insufficient. On appeal, Defendant argued that he did not properly waive his right to a jury and asserted three other issues. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions without addressing the three remaining issues, holding that because the district court failed properly to apprise Defendant of his right to a jury trial and failed to ensure that Defendant understood the nature of the right he was giving up, Defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial was violated in this case. |
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| State v. Uk |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 119712 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Wilson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for first-degree premeditated murder, holding that the district court did not err in its challenged instructions to the jury. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in refusing to give the jury Defendant's requested instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of first-degree murder because the instruction was not factually appropriate; and (2) the district court did not commit clear error in issuing an unmodified version of Instruction No. 11, which contained the definition of "premeditation" and mirrored PIK Crim. 4th 54.150(d) because the instruction was legally appropriate. |
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| State v. Catruch |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 52 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Andrew M. Mead Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court terminating Appellant's participation in the Co-Occurring Disorders and Veterans Court (Veterans Court), holding that the court did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating Appellant's participation in the Veterans Court. The Veterans Court is a criminal docket that provides judicial monitoring, specialized treatment, and other services for military veterans who have disorders often attributable to their military service. Appellant was charged with leaving the scene of an accident and three other offenses. Appellant was admitted to the Veterans Court. Agreeing to sentencing outcomes in a plea agreement and entering into a bail contract, Appellant pleaded guilty to all charges against him. The court later terminated Appellant's participation in the Veterans Court, finding that Appellant had violated the conditions of his bail contract. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) this matter was properly before the Court; and (2) given Appellant's failure to comply with the requirements for participation in the treatment court and his violations of the agreements, his termination from the Veterans Court was warranted. |
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| State v. Paquin |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 53 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Andrew M. Mead Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In this appeal from Defendant's conviction for eleven counts of gross sexual misconduct, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of conviction on one count, vacated the dismissal of other counts and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal on those counts, and affirmed in all other respects, holding that Defendant's convictions on both Counts 5 and 30 violated his double jeopardy protections and that the court erred in allowing the State to dismiss Counts 27, 28, and 29 during trial without Defendant's consent. The indictment charged Defendant with fifteen counts (Counts 1-13, 30-31) of gross sexual misconduct against the victim and sixteen counts (Counts 14-29) of gross sexual misconduct against a second alleged victim. During trial, the court granted Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on Counts 10-13, and the State dismissed Counts 27-29. Defendant was found guilty of Counts 1-9 and 30-31 and not guilty on the remaining counts. The court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial court erred in failing to rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred convictions on both Counts 5 and 30 and allowing the State to dismiss Counts 27, 28, and 29 rather than entering a judgment of acquittal on those counts. |
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| Watson v. State |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 51 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Joseph Jabar Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the unified criminal docket denying Appellant's petition for post-conviction review, holding that Appellant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney played a video of the ten-year-old victim's interview with police and that Appellant was adversely affected. Appellant was convicted of two counts of gross sexual assault, one count of unlawful sexual contact, and one count of visual sexual aggression against a child. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later filed a petition for post-conviction review claiming that his trial attorney's representation was deficient because introducing the videotaped recording of the victim's entire interview with law enforcement was unnecessary to provide evidence supporting the victim's potential motive to fabricate the allegations. The post-conviction court denied denied the petition. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, holding that trial counsel's conduct was deficient and that counsel's actions rose to the level of comprising the reliability of Appellant's conviction and undermining confidence in it. |
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| Commonwealth v. Mazza |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-11363 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Budd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the order of the superior court denying Defendant's motion for a new trial and set aside the jury's verdicts of first degree murder and robbery, holding that a recently discovered witness statement made to the police ago constituted newly discovered evidence that "would probably have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations." At issue was Defendant's sixth motion for a new trial, which was predicated on newly discovered evidence consisting of, among other things, a recently discovered statement made to the police in 1972. The superior court denied the motion. As to the police statement, the judge found that it did not constitute newly discovered evidence because Defendant failed to establish that defense counsel did not have possession of it at the time of trial. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) Defendant sustained his burden of establishing that defense counsel did not have the 1972 police statement prior to or at trial, and therefore, the statement constituted newly discovered evidence; and (2) there was a substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had the evidence been admitted at trial. |
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| Commonwealth v. McCarthy |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12750 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Gaziano Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motions to suppress, holding that the limited use of automatic license plate readers (ALPRs) in this case did not implicate constitutional protections against unreasonable searches. While police were investigating Defendant on suspicion of drug distribution they used ALPRs on two bridges to track Defendant's movements. The police accessed historical data via ALPR technology and received real-time alerts, the last of which led to Defendant's arrest. Defendant filed motions to suppress the ALPR data and the fruits of the arrest. The superior court denied the motions. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that while the widespread use of ALPRs in the Commonwealth could implicate a defendant's constitutional protected expectation of privacy in the whole of his public movements, that interest was not invaded by the limited extent and use of the ALPR data in the instant case. |
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| Garden v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12821 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition for extraordinary relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking an order vacating Petitioner's plea to aggravated rape and dismissing the underlying indictment, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief. The issues raised by Petitioner had all been raised and adjudicated through the normal appellate process. Petitioner then filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion was denied, and the Appeals Court affirmed. In this petition for extraordinary relief, Petitioner sought an order vacating his plea to aggravated rape and dismissing the underlying indictment. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superintendence power was not available as an additional layer of appellate review once all other avenues had been exhausted. |
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| In re Mitchell |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12910 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, Petitioner's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief. Defendant was convicted of several offenses. The Appeals Court reversed the convictions and remanded the matter for a new trial. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi as to all the charges. In his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition, Defendant alleged that no crime had been committed and that he was wrongfully prosecuted. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not demonstrate entitlement to the exercise of this Court's superintendence powers. |
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| State v. Reek |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-0153 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: G. Barry Anderson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for first-degree murder, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Appellant's right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal was not violated when the district court stated that it might reconsider its prior Spreigl ruling if the defense presented certain witnesses; (2) the jury instructions on accomplice liability were plainly erroneous, but Appellant failed to establish that there was a reasonable likelihood that the error had a significant effect on the verdict; (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in his closing arguments regarding the law of accomplice liability; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the State’s motion to admit evidence of appellant’s past convictions for impeachment purposes, including by allowing the specific convictions to be disclosed to the jury; and (5) Appellant’s pro se arguments were without merit. |
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| State v. Woodard |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-1886 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of first-degree murder and sentencing him to life in prison without the possibility of release, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to present an alternative-perpetrator defense. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Defendant's proffered evidence in support of his motion to present alternative-perpetrator evidence for lack of sufficient foundation; and (2) the district court committed an error that was plain in instructing the jury on the order in which to consider the charges against Defendant, but there was no reasonable likelihood that the instruction affected the jury's verdict and therefore did not affect Defendant's substantial rights. |
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| Huff v. Brown |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 648 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the district court's order granting in part a writ of mandamus requiring Doug Brown, the sheriff of Furnas County, to provide records to Herchel Huff pursuant to the public records statutes, holding that the district court erred when it determined that Huff had shown that Brown had a clear duty to provide the requested records. Huff, an inmate, sought, among other documents, the criminal history records of jurors who had convicted hims. Furnas County sheriff Kurt Kapperman required a deposit of $750 before fulfilling the request. Huff subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus naming Kapperman as the defendant and seeking an order compelling Kapperman to release all requested documents. The court permitted Huff to substitute Brown, the current sheriff, in the caption of the case in place of Kapperman and granted in part mandamus. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err when it substituted Brown's name for Kapperman's; but (2) erred in issuing mandamus because Huff failed to demonstrate a prima facie case that he had been denied a request for public records that the sheriff had a clear duty to provide under Neb. Rev. Stat. 84-712. |
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| State v. Montoya |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 581 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Freudenberg Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming Defendant's conviction and sentence for driving under the influence, holding that there was no error in the challenged rulings by the trial court. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not err by (1) affirming the county court's order denying Defendant's motion to suppress fruits of the stop; (2) affirming the county court's order that denied Defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of his arrest; (3) affirming the county court's order that denied Defendant's motion to suppress the results of the test of his breath alcohol content; (4) finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (5) finding that Defendant's sentence was not excessive. |
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| State v. Schroeder |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 527 Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Funke Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence of death for first degree murder, holding that there was no error in the sentence imposed by the sentencing panel. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the sentencing panel did not err in (1) allowing the State to introduce evidence on the existence of mitigating circumstances; (2) acknowledging and weighing mitigating evidence from the presentence investigation report; (3) not requesting that documentation from the Department of Correctional Services regarding Defendant's time in custody for mitigation purposes be included in the presentence investigation report; (4) sentencing Defendant to death, where the Legislature has enacted safeguards to ensure fairness and accuracy in the resulting sentence; and (5) finding Defendant should be sentenced to death after balancing the aggravating evidence and mitigating evidence. |
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| State ex rel. Kendrick v. Parker |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1509 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's request for a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus against Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas Judge E. Gerald Parker Jr., holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that Appellant's claim was barred by res judicata. Appellant sought a petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus against Judge Erik Blaine, the successor to the judge who sentenced Appellant, alleging that the sentencing court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to sentence him. Judge Parker, who had succeeded Judge Blaine, subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals granted summary judgment for Judge Parker, concluding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the sentencing court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction or that he lacked an adequate remedy at law and that res judicata barred Appellant's claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claim was barred by res judicata. |
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| State ex rel. Nelson v. Russo |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1541 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Nancy Margaret Russo to vacate the consecutive prison sentences imposed on Appellant in 1987, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law and was barred from asserting additional claims of sentencing error he could have raised in his previous mandamus action. In 1987, Appellant was convicted of four counts of rape and one count of kidnapping. Appellant was sentenced to prison terms of fifteen to twenty-five years for each of the five counts, to be served consecutively. In 2019, Appellant sought a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Russo to vacate his consecutive sentences. The court of appeals dismissed the writ action, concluding that res judicata barred Appellant's claim and that his prior appeals were an adequate remedy at law to address the alleged defect in his consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus in this case. |
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| State ex rel. Roberts v. Marsh |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1540 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's original action seeking a writ of procedendo and/or mandamus to compel Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas Judge Melba Marsh to issue a corrected sentencing entry, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the petition as moot. Appellant was convicted of murder with a repeat-violent-offender specification. Appellant later asked the trial court to correct his sentence, arguing that he had improperly been sentenced to postrelease control. On remand, Judge Marsh vacated the postrelease-control sentence. Appellant appealed that order. The court of appeals noted that the trial court had not set forth all the information required under Crim.R. 32(C) in a single document and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order. Appellant then filed this original action seeking to compel Judge Marsh to issue a corrected sentencing entry that constitutes a final, appealable order. Judge Marsh issued a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry that constituted a final, appealable order. The court of appeals then dismissed the petition as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Judge Marsh performed the act Appellant requested, the court of appeals dismissed the petition as moot. |
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| State ex rel. Steiner v. Rinfret |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1510 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus against Holmes County Court of Common Pleas Judge Robert D. Rinfret, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Appellant, who was serving consecutive prison terms for five convictions, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus arguing that Judge Rinfret improperly sentenced him to a prison term of nine years for his attempted rape conviction instead of the maximum term of eleven years. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, determining that Appellant had failed to file a mandatory affidavit of his prior civil actions and had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that relief in mandamus was not available because Petitioner had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. |
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| State v. Jeffries |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-1539 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Donnelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's convictions of four counts related to two specific instances of sexual abuse of D.S., holding that the trial court and court of appeals correctly applied Ohio's rape-shield law and determined that evidence of D.S.'s prior nonconsensual sexual assault was inadmissible. On appeal, Defendant asserted that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from introducing evidence during trial that D.S. had previously been sexually assaulted by another person, arguing that the rape-shield law applies only to an accuser's prior consensual sexual activity. The lower court held that Ohio's rape-shield law addresses all sexual activity, not only consensual sexual activity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain meaning of the term "sexual activity" as used in the rape-shield law includes both consensual and nonconsensual sexual activity; and (2) therefore, all sexual activity is barred from admission into evidence by the rape-shield, absent certain exceptions listed in the law. |
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| Pennsylvania v. Britton |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 55 MAP 2018 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Max Baer Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| California law enforcement officers interviewed Appellant Stacy Britton in her California residence and, unbeknownst to her, recorded those interviews. Over Appellant’s objection, Pennsylvania used those recordings as evidence to help convict Appellant of murder in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to examine whether the California law enforcement officers were acting as agents of the Pennsylvania State Police when they recorded the interviews with Appellant in her California home, and if so, whether Pennsylvania's constitutional and statutory protections were available to Appellant under those circumstances. The Court concluded the California law enforcement officers were not acting as agents of the Pennsylvania State Police when they interviewed Appellant, making analysis of whether any Pennsylvania-specific constitutional or statutory protections unwarranted. Because the Supreme Court concluded the Pennsylvania trial court reached the proper result in this matter, it affirmed that court's judgment. |
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| Pennsylvania v. Copenhaver |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 48 MAP 2019 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Thomas G. Saylor Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In August 2015, a deputy sheriff conducted a vehicle stop of Appellant Victor Copenhaver’s pickup truck. Upon approaching the truck, the deputy noticed an odor of alcohol and marijuana emanating from the passenger compartment. After administering field sobriety tests, he arrested Appellant for suspected driving under the influence of alcohol and controlled substances (“DUI”). Appellant was ultimately charged with DUI and other offenses. Appellant challenged the deputy’s authority to conduct a traffic stop and sought suppression of all evidence obtained during the encounter. Rather than presenting testimony at a suppression hearing, the parties stipulated that Appellant was driving the vehicle in question and that the deputy had training and qualifications equivalent to that of a police officer. The parties also agreed that the vehicle stop occurred as a result of the deputy observing the tailgate to the pickup truck being in a down position, which caught the deputy's attention. The deputy further observed the registration on the pickup truck was expired, and additionally, the registration number was identified as belonging to a vehicle other than the one on which it was attached. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether the deputy could lawfully conduct the traffic stop based on the expired registration sticker, on a theory that such a violation amounts to a breach of the peace. The Supreme Court concluded driving a vehicle with an expired registration did not entail a breach of the peace. It vacated the superior court's order insofar as it held that the expired registration was a breach of the peace, thus alone authorizing the deputy to stop Appellant's vehicle. Notably, in light of its holding, the Supreme Court found the superior court did not proceed to consider other relevant questions, such as whether the parties’ factual stipulation should have been read as indicating that the officer’s understanding that the registration sticker was associated with a different vehicle arose in the pre-stop timeframe – consistent with the Commonwealth’s position throughout this litigation. "These issues should be resolved in the first instance by the intermediate court on remand." |
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| Pennsylvania v. Tedford |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 773 CAP Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Donohue Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Donald Tedford was convicted of first-degree murder and rape on February 6, 1987. He appealed the dismissal of his second petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), on December 2, 2014, as amended by a counseled petition on May 5, 2015, and a supplemental petition filed on June 9, 2015. In connection with his initial filings, Tedford sought wholesale discovery of the prosecution’s entire file, but the PCRA court concluded that the petition (as amended) was not timely filed. Tedford also appealed the PCRA court’s order denying his supplemental PCRA petition, in which he requested discovery, an evidentiary hearing, and/or a new trial based upon the admission of expert testimony presented at trial related to microscopic hair analysis. The PCRA court concluded that pursuant to PCRA Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), it had jurisdiction to consider the merits of Tedford's newly-discovered-facts claims, but ultimately it concluded Tedford had not asserted a meritorious claim in accordance with Section 9543(a)(2)(vi). Finding no reversible error in that analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the petition for relief. |
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| Pennsylvania v. Trahey |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 38 EAP 2018 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Wecht Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The trial court granted Timothy Trahey’s motion to suppress the results of a blood test that revealed his blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”), finding no justification for the investigating officers’ failure to obtain a search warrant before conducting the test. On the Commonwealth’s appeal, the Superior Court reversed, opining that the Commonwealth’s evidence sufficiently established the existence of exigent circumstances, thus excusing the absence of a warrant. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, finding that while the exigency analysis is an objective one, "even disregarding the officers’ subjective motivations, or their candid acknowledgment that they would have obtained a search warrant if they thought it necessary, there was no time-sensitive need to conduct a warrantless blood test under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s conclusion that the test was justified by exigent circumstances was drawn in error." |
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| In re Greg Abbott |
| Court: Supreme Court of Texas Docket: 20-0291 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief to the State seeking review of a temporary restraining order (TRO) blocking enforcement of Executive Order GA-13, which changes the rules applicable to judges' decisions regarding pre-trial bail, against judges, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the judges' requested relief, even temporarily. GA-13 suspends certain statutes authorizing trial judges to release jail inmates with violent histories during the state of disaster due to the threat of the novel coronavirus. Plaintiffs alleged that GA-13 is unconstitutional and exceeds the governor's statutory emergency powers. Sixteen of the plaintiffs were Texas trial judges alleging that GA-13 improperly interferes with their judicial authority to make individualized bail decisions, and the other plaintiffs were public interest organizations and lawyer associations. The trial court issued a TRO blocking enforcement of GA-13 against judges. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that the alleged threat of a criminal prosecution in this case did not give the judges standing to seek the invalidation of GA-13, and therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order their requested relief. |
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| Stahmann v. Texas |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: PD-0556-18 Opinion Date: April 22, 2020 Judge: Barbara Hervey Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Karl Stahmann was involved in an automobile accident, after which he threw a bottle of promethazine, a controlled substance, over a nearby wire fence before law enforcement arrived. The bottle landed two to three feet past the fence in plain view. He was convicted of third-degree felony tampering with physical evidence and was sentenced to 10 years’ confinement and fined $5,000. The judge suspended his sentence and placed him on community supervision for 10 years. Stahmann appealed, arguing in part that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he destroyed, altered, or concealed the prescription bottle. The court of appeals agreed that the evidence was insufficient, but instead of rendering an acquittal, it reformed the judgment to show that Stahmann was convicted of the lesser-included offense of attempted tampering with physical evidence, a state-jail felony. After review of the evidence presented at trial, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded the evidence was indeed insufficient to prove that Appellant altered the prescription pill bottle when he threw it over the fence because the mere act of throwing the bottle did not change the bottle itself. "While a rational jury could have reasonably inferred that Stahmann intended to conceal the pill bottle when he threw it over the wire fence, the evidence shows that he failed to conceal it as he intended because the bottle landed short of the bush in plain view on top of some grass." The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. |
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| Blanke v. Board of Pardons & Parole |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 16 Opinion Date: April 16, 2020 Judge: Himonas Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's denial of Appellant's petition for extraordinary relief, holding that, under the circumstances, the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole need not afford Appellant the due process protections explained in Neese v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 416 P.3d 663 (2017), before it could determine that Appellant was a sex offender and condition his parole on sex offender treatment. Appellant was serving a prison sentence for his convictions of attempted child kidnapping and kidnapping. Because he was convicted of attempted child kidnapping Appellant was considered a sex offender under the sex offender registration statute. Further, Appellant admitted in his presentence report that he had sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old. Appellant filed a petition for extraordinary relief alleging that the Parole Board had violated his due process rights by conditioning his parole on completion of sex offender treatment even though he had not committed a sex offense. Summary judgment was granted for the Parole Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Parole Board owed Appellant no additional process before it considered unconnected sex offenses in its decision to require Appellant to undergo sex offender treatment. |
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| Washington v. Escalante |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 97268-1 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Steven González Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Alejandro Escalante was detained for hours in a secured area at a border crossing and, the State conceded, interrogated by federal agents without Miranda warnings. Statements he made during that interrogation were used by the State to convict him of drug possession. While a traveler briefly detained and questioned at the border was typically not "in custody" for Miranda purposes, "the government’s power to detain and question people at the border without implicating Miranda has limits." Here, the Washington Supreme Court determined those limits were reached. "This border detention created the type of inherently coercive environment that demands Miranda warnings to ensure an individual’s choice to speak is the product of free will." The Supreme Court held that Escalante was in custody when he was interrogated and reversed. |
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| Washington v. Haggard |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 97375-0 Opinion Date: April 23, 2020 Judge: Barbara Madsen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A class C felony "washes out" and is omitted from a defendant’s offender score as long as he or she is not convicted of any crime within five years of the last date of release from confinement. David Haggard was convicted of a misdemeanor offense within this five-year period, which was dismissed pursuant to RCW 3.66.067. When Haggard later pleaded guilty to burglary and arson, the trial court included prior class C felonies in his criminal history, finding that the dismissed misdemeanor conviction interrupted the washout period for those offenses. Haggard contended on appeal this was error. The Washington Supreme Court determined that because a dismissed conviction constituted a “conviction” under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), and misdemeanor dismissal and vacation were distinct processes, so Haggard's offender score was properly calculated. |
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| State v. Taylor |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 18-0502 Opinion Date: April 21, 2020 Judge: Walker Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court giving Petitioner credit for twelve days of time served toward the sentence he received for his felony conviction although Petitioner spent additional time in confinement for other charges that were dismissed in the universal plea agreement, holding that to grant Petitioner additional credit for time served would do little more than reward Petitioner for habitual criminal behavior. Petitioner was charged with several crimes and agreed to resolve the pending charges against him in a universal plea agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, Petitioner agreed to plea guilty to the charge of felony carrying a concealed firearm by a prohibited person. In exchange, the State agreed to drop the remaining charges. After he was sentenced, Petitioner argued that, in addition to the twelve days of credit for time served he was granted, he was constitutionally entitled to credit for time served while he was incarcerated for charges that were resolved in the universal plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner's circumstances implicated neither double jeopardy nor equal protection of the law such that additional credit for time served was constitutionally mandated. |
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| State v. Harrison |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Dockets: 2017AP002441-CR, 2017AP002440-CR Opinion Date: April 17, 2020 Judge: Patience D. Roggensack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing an order of the circuit court that granted sentence credit to Defendant, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that Defendant was not entitled to sentence credit but erred by advancing the commencement of Defendant's terms of extended supervision for Defendant's 2007 and 2008 cases. Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant was not entitled to sentence credit under Wis. Stat. 973.155(1)(a) because the days he spent in custody for which he sought sentence credit were not in connection with the courses of conduct for which those sentences were imposed; and (2) the court of appeals erred by advancing the commencement of Defendant's terms of extended supervision for his 2007 and 2008 cases to the date they would have begun but for Defendant's confinement for unrelated convictions that were later set aside, holding that whether to employ advancement is a public policy decision best left to the legislature. |
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