Latest 10 Cases: Fulton County v. Ward-Poag (Bankruptcy), Geer v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. (Civil Procedure), Lester v. Georgia ...

Here We Go Again: The Supreme Court Considers Whether to Further Narrow the Law of Personal Jurisdiction

LAURA DOOLEY, RODGER CITRON

Laura Dooley and Rodger D. Citron—both law professors at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center—comment on two consolidated cases pending before the U.S. Supreme Court that present questions of the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Dooley and Citron summarize the facts and procedural history of each case, analyze the issues raised by the defendant, and consider how the recent death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg might affect the Court’s decision.

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Fulton County v. Ward-Poag

Docket: S19G1619

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Peterson

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure

Summary judgment was awarded to Fulton County, Georgia on Sandra Ward-Poag’s civil whistleblower claims on the ground of judicial estoppel. Specifically, the superior court concluded judicial estoppel barred Ward-Poag’s claims because she took an inconsistent position regarding the nature of those claims when she failed to disclose her claims in her bankruptcy case, and then amended her bankruptcy petition to value her claims against the County as worth far less than alleged here. The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s decision, concluding that Ward-Poag’s amendment to her bankruptcy petition to list the claim in fact showed that she did not take an inconsistent position in the superior court. In making that determination, the Court of Appeals relied on its case law that created a bright-line rule that a party takes consistent positions, and thus lacks an intent to deceive the court system, when the party successfully amends a bankruptcy schedule to include a previously undisclosed asset. The Georgia Supreme Court disapproved the Court of Appeals’s analysis and its previous case law to the extent it created that bright-line rule, because "such rules have no place in the application of judicial estoppel." The Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the Court of Appeals’s ultimate conclusion that the superior court abused its discretion in applying the doctrine at this procedural stage because there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment to Fulton County.

Geer v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.

Docket: S19G1265

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

In 2017, Claude Wilson Geer IV filed a request with Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. under the Open Records Act seeking the release of minutes of its board meetings held between January 2008 and December 2017. The following day, Phoebe Putney denied the request, asserting that it was not subject to the Open Records Act and that its minutes and other documents and records were not “public records” within the meaning of the Act. Geer filed suit against Phoebe Putney in superior court seeking an injunction compelling the release of the records he had requested and other relief. Along with its answer, Phoebe Putney filed a counterclaim for attorney fees under OCGA 50-18-73(b). In response, Geer filed a motion to strike Phoebe Putney’s counterclaim for attorney fees under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute, asserting that the counterclaim was nothing more than an effort to chill his rights to petition the government and to free speech. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Geer’s motion to strike, concluding that he had not made a prima facie showing that the anti-SLAPP statute applied to the counterclaim. The trial court did not consider the merits of Phoebe Putney’s claim for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals later affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to an Open Records Act defendant’s claim for attorney fees because the anti-SLAPP statute “does not preclude a party defending a lawsuit from preserving its right to seek attorney fees and expenses if the lawsuit later is determined to lack substantial justification.” After review, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment.

Lester v. Georgia

Docket: S20A0827

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Layton Lester was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Lorrine Bozeman. Bozeman, who lived in a house with her mother and who was fifteen-year-old Lester’s great aunt, received a large amount of cash that she was planning to use to buy a piece of property. On the evening of April 29, 2007, Lester was at co-indictee Shurrod Rich’s house. Rich’s brother was present and heard Lester suggest to Rich that they “go rob” Bozeman, telling Rich that they could get $5,000 from the robbery. Between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. on the same evening, Bozeman’s front door was kicked in and she was shot twice. Bozeman’s sister, Vernel Clay, who lived several houses away, heard the gunshots and saw two people running through her backyard afterwards. When Rich and Lester returned to Rich’s house, Rich’s brother observed that Lester had changed into black clothes, was breathing hard, was nervous, and later had cash to spend for food. Rich and Lester told Sean Ross, a friend of theirs who lived in the area, that they had robbed and shot Bozeman and that she had screamed. After Lester’s mother overheard Lester talking on the phone and noticed that he was acting nervous and scared, she grew concerned and approached law enforcement. The jury would find Lester guilty on all counts, and he was ultimately sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, a concurrent term of 20 years for armed robbery, and terms of 20 years for burglary to run consecutively to the murder sentence and 5 years for the firearm count to run consecutively to the burglary sentence. The felony-murder counts were vacated by operation of law. On appeal, Lester contends that the trial court erred in admitting statements he made to law enforcement after Bozeman’s death and in denying his “motion for mistrial” arising from the presence of an alternate juror during jury deliberations. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Coates v. Georgia

Docket: S20A1128

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Carla Wong McMillian

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Horace Coates appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Adrian Brooks and aggravated assault of Senchael Clements following an illicit drug purchase gone bad. In his sole enumeration of error on appeal, Coates contended the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Coates' convictions.

Georgia v. Stephens

Docket: S20A0714

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Carla Wong McMillian

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The State appealed a trial court’s order partially denying its “Motion to Include Relevant and Probative Evidence,” which sought a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of two photographs for use at Justin Stephens’s second trial for the murder of Christopher Starks. One of those photographs purportedly depicted Stephens with a gun in his hand (“Exhibit 1”). The other photograph depicted Stephens’s girlfriend as she pointed a handgun at the camera and Stephens in the background holding what the State described as a silver gun magazine (“Exhibit 2”). The trial court ruled that Exhibit 2 was inadmissible during Stephens’s first trial, and again found it to be inadmissible in denying the State’s motion to introduce Exhibit 2 at the second trial. Because the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Exhibit 2 was irrelevant, it affirmed.

Georgia v. Wheeler

Docket: S20A0758

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

George Hughes, a tenant in the Venetian Hills apartment complex, died after a fire broke out in the early morning of March 15, 2017. Police investigated the fire, identified Kamara Wheeler as an arson suspect, and on March 18, 2017, arrested her on an unrelated warrant. When officers interviewed Wheeler about the apartment fire, she admitted that she started it. She was then indicted by grand jury for one count of malice murder, one count of felony murder predicated on arson, and four counts of arson in the first degree. Prior to trial, the State provided Wheeler with a “Notice of Intent to Present Evidence of Other Acts,” and an amended notice on August 13, 2019, indicating that it intended to offer evidence under OCGA 24-4-404(b) of three previous instances in which Wheeler set or attempted to set fires as proof of her motive and intent in this case. The trial court denied the State's 404(b) motion. On appeal, the State argued the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion because it omitted key facts from its analysis and misapplied the three-part test governing the admissibility of “other acts” evidence under Rule 404 (b). The Georgia Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the State's claims, holding that the the timing and certification requirements set forth in OCGA 5-7-1(a)(5) were jurisdictional, and that because the State failed to comply with OCGA 5-7-1(a)(5)(B), the Supreme Court determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal. Therefore, this appeal was dismissed.

Glenn v. Georgia

Docket: S19G1236

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Christopher Glenn’s petition for a writ of certiorari was granted for consideration of whether the Georgia Court of Appeals erred in affirming a trial court’s order revoking Glenn’s probation based on its determination by a preponderance of the evidence that Glenn committed felony interference with government property by kicking and damaging the door of a police car when he was detained inside. Glenn claimed he damaged the door in the court of exercising his common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest and detention; this claim was rejected by both the trial and appellate courts. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed: (1) whether a person has a common-law right to attempt to escape from the detention resulting from an unlawful arrest; and (2) if so, whether a person may damage government property in such an attempt. The Court held that the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest includes the right to use proportionate force against government property to escape an unlawful detention following the arrest. Because the trial court found that Glenn’s arrest was unlawful but did not then consider whether the force he used in attempting to escape the ensuing unlawful detention was proportionate, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision with direction that the case be remanded to the trial court to make this "essential" determination.

Horton v. Georgia

Docket: S20A0799

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Quentin Lee Horton was convicted of malice murder, arson in the first degree, and related crimes in connection with the stabbing death of his neighbor Jeffrey Hagan and the burning of Hagan’s home. Horton was sentenced to serve life in prison plus five years without the possibility of parole, and he appealed, asserting five enumerations of error. Finding no merit to any of these contentions, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction and sentence.

Swann v. Georgia

Docket: S20A0767

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Dakota Swann challenged his 2014 convictions for murder and other crimes in connection with the 2008 shooting death of Shannon Williams. Appellant argued his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to fully investigate an earlier shooting incident involving Appellant or to utilize it at trial and for not discussing the parole implications of the State’s plea offer. The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed with this contention and affirmed the trial court.

Premier Health Care Investments, LLC v. UHS of Anchor, LP

Docket: S19G1491

Opinion Date: October 5, 2020

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

In 2005, the Georgia Department of Community Health (Department) promulgated a rule, commonly known as the “Psychiatric Rule” (“the Rule”), that required hospitals to obtain a Certificate of Need (“CON”) “prior to the establishment of a new or the expansion of an existing acute care adult psychiatric and/or substance abuse inpatient program,” and defined “expansion” as “the addition of beds to an existing CON-authorized or grandfathered psychiatric and/or substance abuse inpatient program.” The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Department could, through the Rule, require a licensed hospital with a psychiatric/substance-abuse program authorized by a CON, to obtain an additional CON to redistribute inpatient beds in excess of those identified in its CON to operate a psychiatric/substance-abuse program, but within its total licensed bed capacity. In UHS of Anchor, L.P. v. Department of Community Health, 830 SE2d 413 (2019), the Court of Appeals held that the Department could. The Supreme Court determined the appellate court erred in that conclusion, and reversed. "The General Assembly’s delegation of legislative authority to the Department to promulgate rules as part of its administration of the CON program does not include the authority to define additional new institutional health services requiring a CON, beyond those listed in OCGA 31-6-40 (a)."